WO2017120618A1

WO2017120618A1 - System and method for autonomous vehicle air traffic control

Info

Publication number: WO2017120618A1
Application number: PCT/US2017/017117
Authority: WO
Inventors: David Wayne RUSSELL
Original assignee: Russell David Wayne
Priority date: 2016-01-06
Filing date: 2017-02-09
Publication date: 2017-07-13

Abstract

This disclosure describes the implementation of a series of technologies to create a safe and effective air traffic control system for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (AAV) by combining registration databases with trackpath autonomous flight plans calculated using 4D autorouters.

Description

SPECIFICATION TITLE OF INVENTION

System and Method for Autonomous Vehicle Air Traffic Control INVENTORS

David Wayne Russell, (USA) Winter Garden, Florida USA CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS US 62/275,743 01/06/2016

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

Not Applicable

REFERENCE TO SEQUENCE LISTING, A TABLE, OR A COMPUTER PROGRAM

LISTING COMPACT DISK APPENDIX

Not Applicable

FIELD

[0001] This invention relates generally to Unmanned Vehicle management and more specifically to a system and method to implement cooperative UAV air traffic control.

BACKGROUND

[0002] Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or remote-piloted vehicles are appearing in the sky in exponentially increasing numbers. Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) will soon be joining them which do not require remote piloting. With registration of these craft now mandatory in some countries, a safe and effective means of Air Traffic Control (ATC), enforcement of registration laws, and safety for both the public and the aerial vehicles is desired. The ATC can then provide that information to other agencies for threat assessment, air traffic warning and viewing systems, and the distributed air traffic monitoring systems. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0003] In order to ensure the safety of UAV and AAV systems with respect to the general public, an overall Air Traffic Control system is required to manage these vehicles. The UAV / AAV (AKA drone) ATC is distinguished from the commercial aircraft ATC by several factors. First, UAVs typically occupy low altitudes, which mean in urban settings they will often be routed through and around anything from buildings to trees, tall antennae and power lines.

[0004] Second, in general the UAV platforms are much less expensive than commercial aircraft and significantly smaller such that costs for instrumentation within the platform must be low and lightweight.

[0005] Third, they are difficult to track with radar systems that are used to protect hard targets from aircraft incursion. In one embodiment the drone ATC is a free service of the nation's overall air traffic control administration. In other embodiments one or more third party systems which may implement fee structures are set up to help pay for the overall deployment of monitoring assets and IT infrastructure necessary to make the skies safer.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[006] The following detailed description illustrates embodiments of the invention by way of example and not by way of limitation. The description clearly enables one skilled in the art to make and use the disclosure, describes several embodiments, adaptations, variations,

alternatives, and use of the disclosure, including what is currently believed to be the best mode of carrying out the disclosure. The disclosure is described as applied to an exemplary embodiment namely, an UAV air traffic control system. However, it is contemplated that this disclosure has general application to vehicle management systems in industrial, commercial, military, and residential applications.

[0007] As used herein, an element or step recited in the singular and preceded with the word "a" or "an" should be understood as not excluding plural elements or steps, unless such exclusion is explicitly recited. Furthermore, references to "one embodiment" of the present invention are not intended to be interpreted as excluding the existence of additional embodiments that also incorporate the recited features. [0008] The detailed description is described with reference to the accompanying figures. In the figures, the left-most digit(s) of a reference number identifies the figure in which the reference number first appears. The use of the same reference numbers in different figures indicates similar or identical components or features.

[0009] The novel features believed characteristic of the illustrative embodiments are set forth in the appended claims. The illustrative embodiments, however, as well as a preferred mode of use, further objectives, and features thereof will best be understood by reference to the following detailed description of illustrative embodiments of the present disclosure when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0010] FIG. 1 depicts an overall schematic diagram the data flow for Air Traffic Control (ATC) flight plan generation.

[0011] FIG. 2 depicts a block diagram of the data flow for ATC enforcement of registration requirements.

[0012] FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of the data flow for ATC threat assessment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0013] The first class of vehicles to consider is the AAV. AAVs may be implemented to follow pre-loaded trajectories hereafter referred to as a trackpath. Trackpath data structures may also contain Free Flight Corridor (FFC) information also sometimes referred to as an inverse- geofence which prevents the vehicle from crossing the FFC boundary in the event of malfunction or application of external forces without declaring an emergency. These trackpath spline-based flight plans simply cannot go anywhere but the trajectory specified. Trackpaths are 4- dimensional structures as they specify the timing of the pat as well as the trajectory. Both are required for a meaningful ATC.

[0014] In other embodiments other forms of AAVs may be implemented but are still required to follow only the navigation data they are given by the ATC. The only requirement of the ATC, therefore, is to create the navigation data such that all other known vehicle paths, timing, obstructions, and "no fly" areas are taken into account. This could include a national database of homeowners who "opt out" of allowing drones to fly over their properties below a given altitude. [0015] To implement this complex data, a 4-dimensional autorouter is required which has access to all of the previously approved trackpath flight plans. Encryption of this data and the trackpath data structure may be required to ensure that the flight plan data is not altered or corrupted by a hacker or enemy action.

[0016] Similarly since the vehicle can only fly where it is instructed to fly by the trackpath data structure, transmission of that data to the vehicle must be encrypted to ensure that it cannot be altered or hacked by a third party. Failure to do so would allow a third party to load an unapproved trackpath with potentially deadly consequences. For similar reasons the registration database needs to be secured because if it's not, then enemy action could insert fictitious registration and Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) data into the database such that the monitoring system would not flag it as an unregistered platform and issue a threat assessment, and the IFF database could be compromised as well with a fictitious IFF.

[0017] For each AAV, the user submits the source and destination locations and desired start of flight time to the ATC. The ATC utilizes the 4D autorouter to find the optimal flight path and start time for that vehicle. This data is then loaded into the vehicle, synchronized with system time, and it launches automatically at the designated time. While en route an IFF module within the AAV broadcasts its information either periodically or upon reception of a "ping" command or both.

[0018] The IFF broadcast contains information such as but not limited to its FCC identification number, current estimated location, current trackpath ID, and platform status. ATC monitoring modules can be positioned in the Area of Operation (AO) at locations such as but not limited to cell phone towers and structures. This allows the progress of the vehicle to be monitored across its path and correlated against the known flight plans for threat assessment. This information can be updated in real time to the systems such as but not limited to the FAA's ADS-B flight information system, low cost UAV / AAV warning displays in some cases, and the 4D autorouter flight planning systems. Other nationalities may have similar systems or implement the same systems.

[0019] Similar implementations work in the same manner for Safe Autonomous Light Aircraft (SALA) and drone carrier vehicles which are not currently classified as UAVs. [0020] The second class of vehicle for the ATC to consider is the UAV or remotely piloted vehicles. The most common case in this class are drones flown for recreation and other Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft that are remotely piloted via some camera system that allows it to be flown outside the direct viewing area of the pilot. The simplest mechanism for ATC of these vehicles is the Block Reservation system. This system would most often be used when the vehicle flight is limited to a particular area with a maximum allowed X, Y and Z (altitude) footprint.

[0021] This part of the ATC allows a UAV pilot to use the Internet via a laptop, smart phone, or other mobile or fixed device to reserve the given area in advance for a given time period. That reservation block is then approved and loaded into the UAV as the inverse of a GPS "no fly" zone. In other words, the UAV can only fly within that envelope, whereas the current Geo- Fencing paradigm only gives the UAV information on where it cannot fly.

[0022] This block reservation information is utilized by both the 4D autorouting system to keep other aircraft out of the block and by the monitoring system to verify that the platform remains within the block. In some cases, such as a hobbyist flying park, the block reservation could be on a permanent or other long term basis. The platform would still be required to submit an FAA flightplan request, but it could do so automatically.

[0023] The ATC monitoring system is deployed to monitor and update the UAV/ AAV traffic in flight. It is this part of the system which allows for real-time updates to the ADS-B and other flight monitoring systems possible as well as the only means for enforcing the registration regulations. Most importantly it allows for detection and threat assessment of unlicensed and/or unrestricted drones within the AO and provides critical additional warning and response times to protect what might be the targets of an unlicensed actor. For example, if an enemy actor flew the drone within a licensed long term block reservation, and then subsequently "spoofed" the GPS in the unit to think it was inside that block when it was not, the monitoring system would recognize the discrepancy and issue a threat warning.

[0024] Similarly UAVs that will be manually flown from a source to destination point outside the direct view of the pilot are given a wider Free Flight Corrior, but the path and waypoint times are still calculated and set by the 4D autorouting system. The primary differences are that the piloted UAV trackpaths are calculated with a larger margin of error, waypoints are listed with times for the pilot, and the trackpath is flagged such that the ATC monitoring system knows of its existence and monitors the vehicle more closely and updates the monitoring data systems more often.

[0025] The piloted UAV is loaded with a more exact and complex GeoFence envelope, again so that it can only fly within the given trackpath envelope, but the envelope would be more accurate and more complex than the block reservation envelope. The UAV owner may be cited or warned if he cannot pilot the craft within the envelope as detected and documented by the ATC monitoring system. Signatures of flight characteristics can be stored in the registration database such that over time the 4D autorouting system builds data on that particular platform and/or pilot to be used in matching the route to the pilot's abilities. This would lead to an addition in the registration database of both the platform and the listed pilots.

[0026] UAVs which are not registered or not within their flight envelopes are flagged by the monitoring system and dealt with as required by a threat assessment system. The ATC system may in one embodiment share a national, regional, or global database of all activity, or it may simultaneously be segmented into smaller localized areas. The 4D autorouters have the ability to calculate multiple simultaneous trackpath flight plans within the same area and as long as the computed routes of two or more vehicles that do not directly overlap a practically unlimited number of simultaneous 4D autorouter instances may simultaneously run from the same flight plan database. One additional advantage would be to sort and/or link the database via a k-D Tree to quickly find only the flight plans that impinge on a given area. In other embodiments other data structures might be used to order the data for quick recovery within a given area.

[0027] The trackpath system provides both the spline-based navigation information and FFC 4D constructs, but it is also a programming system which allows for scene analysis and switching from one trackpath to another based on the analysis system or other variables defined within, detected by, or communicated to the platform. A platform could have a trackpath designed not by the FAA, but by the operator. In this case the trackpath could either be submitted in advance with a set or recurring start time, or it must be submitted at the time of flight for validation. In this case the 4D autorouter performs a set join on all the possible contingencies and/or combinations of the trackpath and tests that combined set against the trackpath database. As this might be a large set and trackpaths may be prioritized on a first-come-first-served basis, the earlier the reservation might be made the higher the probability of approval. If the same trackpath were submitted just prior to flight, and existing trackpaths in the same area would be given priority and the trackpath might be rejected.

[0028] In another example, a base plus offset calculation is used. If the general area of operation is known, i.e. if the base is within a known area, then the area can be expanded by the set join of the original base area expanded by the maximum offset of the subsequent trackpath. If the trackpath cannot be pre-submitted because the base area is too large or simply not known, then a block reservation of the base plus offset is communicated to the ATC just prior to launch. The more restricted the base plus offset deployment is, the higher the probability of approval.

[0029] In some cases, tracking mode may be enabled in a platform. This spawns a block reservation equal to the projected range of the platform. If this is a priority request, such as law enforcement, then overlapping block reservations might be allowed and it is up to the collision avoidance system of each platform to prevent a collision. This is similar to the operation of multiple vehicles within the block reservation of a flight park.

[0030] In the event of an emergency situation, the IFF system may request that any or all platforms perform emergency actions such as but not limited to Return to Base (RTB),

Emergency Landing (until released), Hold (go to hover flight mode at current location until released), Release (return to flight mode at Time X). These options allow the ATC to prioritize the actions of the platforms based on whatever information it has on the platform, such as but not limited to the platform status received from the monitoring system (fuel state), priority request flags given at trackpath inception, get them to a known state, and then recompute the trackpaths of the vehicles before they are released. If, for example, the fuel state has no margin for a particular platform to hover for a given length of time, then the platform might be ordered to land.

[0031] Referring now to the invention in more detail, in Fig. 1 there is shown an overall diagram of a flight plan generation system. The different illustrative embodiments recognize and take into account a number of different considerations. "A number", as used herein with reference to items, means one or more items. For example, "a number of different considerations" means one or more different considerations. "Some number", as used herein with reference to items, may mean zero or more items.

[0032] In FIG. 1 one possible data flow diagram of requesting a new trackpath is shown. The user / platform operations are shown in the left column and the ATC level functions are shown in the right column. In one embodiment, the system begins when the unit is powered up and is disabled from flight by the IFF module until a trackpath is loaded. The user begins by entering the source and destination addresses or latitude / longitude data or a combination of both 100. This could be entered via, for example without limitation, the Internet, telephone processing, voice recognition, mail, email, text message, or by a user interface on the platform itself.

[0033] In another embodiment the reservation and trackpath could have been made in advance, and the trackpath ID for a particular location and time could be stored in advance. The platform may be capable of storing multiple trackpaths, some of which are conditional or derived at the time of deployment by a "base plus offset" calculation. At power up the platform may be able to automatically request any pending trackpaths from the ATC for this location. This would handle both automated systems such as but not limited to delivery logistics, but also block reservations at known locations.

[0034] The system first checks the registration information on the platform and optionally the pilot 105 to determine if the platform is registered and pull up any information it might need for the 4D autorouter. If the registration search fails, an error is transmitted to the user 110 via whatever communications means the user utilized in submitting the request and/or other communications channels which may be available such as but not limited to the phone number or email address given in the registration information.

[0035] If the registration check passes, any registration data and the source/destination information are passed to a search system 115 which retrieves all existing trackpath and 4D model information from the ATC databases. This initial check can do a quick calculation for any number of situations which might immediately disqualify the requested trackpath. If the trackpath fails this initial search, the user is again notified 120.

[0036] Of the initial search passes, the data is used to create a hierarchical 4D model 125 of the requested area plus some additional space in case a more roundabout course becomes necessary. [0037] In one embodiment the user may specify how much additional space is allowed. In other embodiments the distance may be a constant value or derived from the platform's maximum range, the Area of Operation, local regulations, or other calculated means.

[0038] Once the model is created an instance of the 4D autorouter 130 is called. When complete, the autorouter creates and returns the trackpath data structure 135 including timing and FFC data. This data is transmitted back to the platform 140 and stored in the ATC database so that it can be used to validate future trackpaths and be evaluated by the ATC monitoring network. In one embodiment the transmitted trackpath is encrypted and if possible transmitted directly to the platform's IFF transponder, regardless of what interface the user might have employed to transmit the initial request. This makes it more difficult to intercept the transmission and therefore more difficult to decrypt and alter it.

[0039] Once received by the IFF transponder the data is checked for validity then decrypted 150. Within the data is an encrypted key with is transmitted back to the ATC by the IFF system for final validation of a legal trackpath structure 155. If valid, a return key is transmitted back to the IFF 160. In another embodiment the trackpath structure, which may contain a significant amount of data, is transmitted via whatever is the most available and/or economical means available, and only the return key is transmitted directly to the IFF. Once validated, the IFF passes the trackpath to the platform 170 and enables it to load the path and execute. If the key test fails 165 the error is flagged for the administrator to mark it as a possible hacking detect and the platform and/or the user is notified that the trackpath failed to load.

[0040] In FIG. 2 a flow diagram depicting one of the procedures for the ATC network monitoring system is presented. The monitoring station begins with either transmitting a "ping" or request for IFF data in the Area of Operation (AO) or receiving IFF data in the blind 210. As one or both may be happening periodically, it is not an important distinction and both paths 210 220 are handled the same way, by reading the GPS data transmitted by the IFF transponder and calculating the bearing and range 230 from the monitoring system to the IFF platform.

[0041] Depending on circumstances and deployment, in one embodiment platforms may be given a variable that directs it to respond to the ping from a given monitoring station some number of times. This minimizes the RF traffic and power usage of the IFF system, but in high traffic environments there may only be a limited number of cameras assigned to the monitoring system and it may take longer to correlate the bearing to the camera image. Hence it may need to respond more than once because the bearing and range will change. Once the IFF data is received, in another embodiment it is possible for the monitor station to access the trackpath of the vehicle and therefore determine what the bearing and range should be at any given moment, especially with correlation to the given IFF bearing, range, and time. UAVs with pilots and less accuracy would be more difficult to track and require more resources. This might result in a higher fee structure, if any.

[0042] Given the range and bearing monitoring system comprised of some combination of some number of detectors such a but not limited to tilt, pan, zoom camera system, 3D imager, RADAR, FLIR, or LIDAR, possibly one of many available to the monitoring system, can attempt to image and/or the platform for detection 240. If the detector succeeds the IFF data is checked against the registration database 260. Depending on the capability of the detector system in one embodiment the image obtained may also be used to verify the platform model type and run additional analysis of threat signatures. If the detection fails, this means that for some reason the IFF was received but the monitor was unable to verify its position or image it, and an initial threat warning might be transmitted 250. Similarly if the platform was detected but did not have valid registration, then the admin could be provided with the images of the target for follow-up with the user 270.

[0043] With the IFF received, detection successful, and registration valid, the platform is validated and the ATC database updated 280 as to the current location and time of the detection. The validation is also logged into the monitor's database 290 such that it may not try to validate the same platform twice. In one embodiment this database is stored only within its own memory and is deleted when the platform exits or is estimated to exit the AO. In other embodiments the platform validation is stored in a global or regional database or a combination of both. Once validated, the threat level 295 of this platform is set to 0, unless other processing of threat signatures determines otherwise.

[0044] In FIG. 3 a flow diagram of one embodiment of a threat assessment system is depicted. In parallel with the system of Figure 2, which is triggered by the receipt of IFF data, this system utilizes one or more resources of the overall detector system to constantly scan large areas of the AO to detect AAV or UAV platforms, in particular platforms which may not be transmitting IFF data. The system is triggered when the scanner detects a platform 300.

[0045] The quality of the detection is highly dependent on the imaging/detection system used and the parameters which define a valid detection. In general the highest accuracy of detection comes from a hierarchical system where the initial detector allows in detections of moderately low confidence and then allows other parts of the system to review and either promote the target for further analysis or discard it.

[0046] Once detected, the system looks at the validation database 290 from Figure 2 to see if it had already been identified and validated. If so the target is quickly discarded and the threat level 310 remains 0. If it has not yet been validated, it is either still in the validation process, or it has not yet transmitted its IFF data, so a ping may be sent 320 unless a ping was just about to be sent or just sent from the validation system of Figure 2.

[0047] Once the ping is transmitted from either system, the evaluation system delays for a short period to allow the platform(s) to respond. After the delay the validation 305 is checked again, and if still not found is retried some number of times depending on the traffic and threat level tolerance of the AO. Once the timeout is reached, either a second threat level warning is issued to the ATC or an interceptor is launched 325, or both.

[0048] The interceptor is an Application Specific Autonomous Vehicle (ASAV) designed to quickly intercept, track, and image a detected platform, and as such has a relatively simple trackpath and an enhanced collision avoidance system. As the platform nears proximity with the target platform 330 it transmits another ping 335 for IFF information in case the IFF RF system were merely compromised and did not produce enough signal to be picked up by the monitoring system.

[0049] If it receives a response 340 and can validate it against data loaded into it before launch 355 then an admin error denoting the equipment problem is transmitted and the threat level 370 set to 0 unless the threat signature analysis system 365 determines otherwise. The interceptor may also simply forward the ping response to the monitoring station and await further instructions. If no response, then the IFF system may be compromised or nonexistent and the threat warning is raised 345. [0050] Simultaneously, systems within the interceptor are attempting to image the platform at high resolution from multiple angles to see if a tail number can be detected and recognized 350. If the tail number is recognized the system can use this to test validity and again issue an equipment warning to the user. If the tail number is not visible or is not valid, the threat warning is raised.

[0051] As images of the platform are received, from either imaging system, a specialized analysis system applies 3D pattern recognition techniques to the platform to search for threat signatures. If any of or multiples of the signatures match, the threat level is raised accordingly.

[0052] If the threat level ends up greater than a threshold set by the ATC for the particular area and traffic conditions, countermeasures 375 may then be considered. In some embodiments some forms of countermeasures may be deployed automatically. In other embodiments

countermeasures could only be deployed from the monitoring station, the interceptor, or some other location with human observation and intervention.

[0053] While the foregoing written description of the invention enables one of ordinary skill to make and use what is considered presently to be the best mode thereof, those of ordinary skill will understand and appreciate the existence of variations, combinations, and equivalents of the specific embodiment, method, and examples herein. The invention should therefore not be limited by the above described embodiment, method, and examples, but by all embodiments and methods within the scope and spirit of the invention. Further, different illustrative embodiments may provide different benefits as compared to other illustrative embodiments. The embodiment or embodiments selected are chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the embodiments, the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the disclosure for various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.

[0054] The flowcharts and block diagrams described herein illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various illustrative embodiments. In this regard, each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function or functions. It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in a block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, the functions of two blocks shown in succession may be executed substantially concurrently, or the functions of the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved.

Claims

The invention claimed is:

1) A system whereby safe Air Traffic Control functionality is achieved by assigning

validated navigation trajectories and/or free flight corridors or block reservations to all applicable platforms before they are permitted to fly.

2) The system of 1 where some number of the ATC databases is encrypted.

3) The system of 1 where the trackpath and/or free flight corridor information is encrypted when transmitted to the platform, the platform's IFF transceiver if any and/or user.

4) The system of 1 where all platforms also include IFF transponders appropriate to the system.

5) The system of 1 where monitoring stations are deployed to monitor platforms within their Area of Operation (AO).

6) The system of 1 where monitoring systems are transmitted or have access to the expected routes and times of all known platforms to be expected in their AO.

7) The system of 1 where UAV pilots request block reservations to fly within certain

coordinates within a given time period.

8) The system of 1 where platforms may autonomously request trajectory information from the ATC system.

9) The system of 1 where UAV pilots request validated free flight corridors to fly outside the limits of visual contact with the platform for a given period of time.

10) The system of 1 where AAV systems request validated trackpaths when traversing from a start location to a destination location at a particular time.

11) The system of 1 where routes and/or free flight corridors or block reservations are

automatically generated via 4D autorouter.

12) The system of 1 where routes are generated via a simpler 3D autorouter and vehicles are left to their own obstacle avoidance systems to avoid collisions.

13) The system of 1 where citizens are able to define their property as "no fly" zones below a given altitude defined by the ATC.

14) The system of 1 where the loaded navigation information contains a key code that must be transmitted back to the ATC for validation before startup. 15) The system of 1 where Application Specific Autonomous Vehicles or other UAVs are used to intercept or otherwise monitor and enforce the ATC regulations.

16) The system of 1 where countermeasures are deployed on interceptors and/or monitoring stations to provide action altering the flight path or deployment of any platform.

17) The system of 1 where an automated system monitors, calculates, and provides threat assessment data to the ATC and/or other agencies.

18) The system of 1 where the monitoring system and/or interceptor platforms apply remote sensing technology such as but not limited to 3D imaging, stereoscopic imaging, RADAR, FLIR, or LIDAR, to detect target vehicles within the AO.

19) The system of 1 where some dimension of pattern recognition and/or signal analysis is applied to validating target platforms against the IFF data and/or ATC database.

20) The system of 1 where IFF module commands are utilized by the ATC, monitoring

network, and interceptors to alter the flight path and/or deployment of platforms.

21) The system of 1 where information derived from navigation and timing data is made available to other ATC systems such as but not limited to ADS-B, low cost ATC tracking display instruments or other assessment, monitoring, and/or tracking systems.

22) The system of 1 where navigation trajectory data includes some combination and form of but not limited to GeoFencing and/or Free Flight Corridor information.

23) The system of 1 applied not only to the current definition of "drone" but to new models such as but not limited to Safe Autonomous Light Aircraft or Drone Carriers which do not yet have formal classifications.

24) The system of 1 applied to semi-autonomous light aircraft or platforms.

25) The system of 1 where parameters describing a model of a platform are stored with or derived from the navigation data and/or transmitted to the monitoring stations to aid in automated recognition of targets and validating them against the platform data.

26) The system of 1 where character recognition is used to automatically read platform

registration or "tail" numbers on the craft.

27) The system of 1 where pattern recognition against a known data model of a platform is used to automatically identify a platform.

28) The system of 1 where a mobile communication device is used to request flight clearance and trackpath data from the ATC. 29) The system of 1 where an automated system such as but not limited to a package delivery service automatically requests flightplan, trajectory, FFC, and navigation data from the ATC to clear a package for delivery either from a static debarkation point, a temporary debarkation point, or a base plus offset location.

30) The system of 1 where an autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicle can request

unrestricted or less restricted free-flight tracking mode from the ATC.

31) The system of 1 which defines preferred 3D or 4D drone corridors for operation.

32) The system of 1 which provides Application Interfaces to trusted third party systems to interface with the ATC systems such as but not limited to registration and path or block reservation requests.