WO2009083679A2 - Method of reading an electronic tag by a terminal - Google Patents

Method of reading an electronic tag by a terminal Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009083679A2
WO2009083679A2 PCT/FR2008/052275 FR2008052275W WO2009083679A2 WO 2009083679 A2 WO2009083679 A2 WO 2009083679A2 FR 2008052275 W FR2008052275 W FR 2008052275W WO 2009083679 A2 WO2009083679 A2 WO 2009083679A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
tag
application
reading
electronic tag
card emulation
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/FR2008/052275
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2009083679A3 (en
Inventor
Houssem Assadi
David Picquenot
Original Assignee
France Telecom
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by France Telecom filed Critical France Telecom
Priority to EP08866018A priority Critical patent/EP2243106A2/en
Publication of WO2009083679A2 publication Critical patent/WO2009083679A2/en
Publication of WO2009083679A3 publication Critical patent/WO2009083679A3/en

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/326—Payment applications installed on the mobile devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G06Q20/3227—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices] using secure elements embedded in M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
    • G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/351—Virtual cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/353—Payments by cards read by M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/02—Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to the field of telecommunications, and more specifically to the field of electronic tag reading applications using so-called “non-contact” technologies for short-distance radio reading.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • ISO International Standard Organization
  • the applications of the second type are card emulation applications: a mobile terminal is used to secure electronic transactions between an application emulating for example a payment card on this terminal, and an external reading terminal which emits radio waves. short distance to read the data from this virtualized card on the handheld.
  • the mobile terminal is then associated with a security element in which the card emulation application is stored.
  • the mobile terminal is a GSM compatible mobile phone (according to the English "Global System for Mobile Communications") or UMTS (according to the English "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System")
  • the UICC card from the English "Universal Integrated Circuit Card" is used as a security element. This element is typically used by the external read terminal to authenticate the map emulation application.
  • components implementing these contactless technologies in the terminals limit the applications offered to users. Indeed these components operate either in a reading mode, allowing applications of the first type to operate, or in a card emulation mode, allowing applications of the second type to operate. They do not make it possible to operate both in a reading mode and in a card emulation mode, limiting the development of applications of the first type or the second type, without service logic making these two types of applications interact. .
  • Discounted coupons stored in electronic tags currently only applications of the first type are available.
  • a user approaches his mobile terminal of one of these tags, which triggers the reading of the corresponding discount coupon by a reading application on the mobile terminal, which then sends the data read to a remote server managing a user's loyalty account, for example.
  • the data contained in the electronic tag are intended only for a predetermined application of a service provider.
  • the electronic tag therefore transmits this data only to this predetermined application.
  • This predetermined application to use the reading mode of the mobile terminal it is an application of the first type, which means that coupons using a contactless technology are not directly transmissible to a virtualized loyalty card in the UICC card of a user's terminal.
  • the present invention aims to overcome the disadvantages of the prior art by providing a method and devices for reading an electronic tag, allowing a card emulation application in a terminal to read data contained in this electronic tag and which are intended for him.
  • the invention proposes a method for reading an electronic tag storing data comprising an identifier, a terminal equipped with a short-distance radio reading module and a card emulation application, associated with said identifier and located in a secure element of said terminal, said method being characterized in that it comprises the steps of:
  • an electronic tag is made capable of communicating directly with a card emulation application located in the terminal of a user, the authentication of this card emulation application being carried out beforehand by the module terminal, or by the electronic tag itself.
  • a user whose terminal implements the invention is thus offered the possibility of updating a virtualized loyalty card on its terminal using a contactless technology, provided that the service provider associated with this loyalty card has an agreement with the issuer of the secure element.
  • the invention enables card emulation applications to interact with electronic tag reading applications in a terminal to render services to users in a secure manner.
  • the invention enables an electronic tag to securely transmit, via a reader application in a terminal, service tokens to a card emulation application in the same terminal.
  • service tokens are for example telephone tokens, identification tokens or rights of use of a content.
  • said reading module is an NFC reader and said electronic tag is a passive RFID tag.
  • said NFC reader and said electronic tag is a passive RFID tag.
  • This choice of implementation of the invention has the advantage of using a mature contactless technology, NFC technology being widely used.
  • passive RFID tags is economically advantageous. Indeed these labels are very cheap and do not require power supply or network connection as opposed to active electronic tags.
  • the step of establishing said communication session comprises a substep of mutual authentication between said card emulation application and said electronic tag.
  • This characteristic corresponds to an alternative embodiment of the invention in which the authentication of the application is performed by the electronic tag.
  • This variant has the advantage of minimizing the impact of the implementation of the invention on the terminal used.
  • Securing exchanges between the electronic tag and the card emulation application is further reinforced by this substep.
  • the card emulation application authenticates the electronic tag, which protects the card emulation application against unauthorized updating by a fraudulent electronic tag.
  • said communication session uses a secure tunnel between said card emulation application and said electronic tag.
  • This additional feature ensures the integrity of data exchanged end-to-end between the electronic tag and the map emulation application.
  • the step of reading by said read module of said identifier is followed by a step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module.
  • This characteristic corresponds to another variant embodiment of the invention in which the authentication of the application is performed by the reader module.
  • This variant has the advantage of not requiring complex electronic tags including authentication capabilities to implement the invention, at the cost of a slightly more complex implementation in the terminal than in the previous variant.
  • the emulation application card is then authenticated both by the terminal itself and by the electronic tag during a sub-step of mutual authentication during the establishment of the communication session between the map emulation application and the electronic tag.
  • said step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module is preceded or followed by a step of authentication of said read module by an entity of said secure element.
  • Authentication of the reader module allows the service provider related to the card emulation application to limit the use of the invention to certain terminals.
  • these terminals are those for which the implementation of the invention conforms to a particular security standard, or to a signed charter with the service provider.
  • said secure element when said secure element is a smart card inserted in said terminal, during said step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module, the authentication data of said application of card emulation are provided by an authentication gateway contained in the operating system of said smart card.
  • the authentication step of the card emulation application is then provided by an authentication gateway on the secure element of the terminal, forming part of a pre-existing application framework on the secure element of the terminal, or having been downloaded by the issuer of this secure element. For example, if this secure element is a smart card, the issuer is the telecommunications operator linked to this smart card.
  • the invention also relates to a mobile terminal provided with a short-distance radio reading module, said mobile terminal being characterized in that said reading module comprises: means for reading an identifier stored in an electronic tag,
  • the invention also relates to a smart card hosting a card emulation application associated with an identifier, characterized in that it comprises: an authentication gateway comprising means for authenticating said card emulation application with an electronic tag or a short-distance radio reading module of a mobile terminal,
  • the invention finally relates to a computer program comprising instructions for implementing the method according to the invention, when it is executed on an integrated circuit, a microprocessor, a processor or a computer.
  • the mobile terminal, the smart card and the computer program have advantages similar to those of the reading method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 1 represents a mobile terminal according to the invention, connected to a communication network, and implementing the reading method according to the invention for reading an electronic tag
  • FIG. 2 represents steps of the reading method according to the invention in a first variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention
  • FIG. 3 represents a flow diagram between the electronic tag read by the mobile terminal according to the invention and entities of the mobile terminal, in this first variant embodiment;
  • FIG. 4 represents steps of the reading method according to FIG. invention in a second variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention,
  • FIG. 5 represents a flow diagram between the electronic tag read by the mobile terminal according to the invention and entities of the mobile terminal, in this second variant embodiment.
  • the reading method according to the invention is used by the user of a mobile terminal T, shown in Figure 1, to read an electronic tag TAG.
  • the electronic tag TAG is, in this embodiment of the invention, a passive RFID tag, such as micro-controller or Mifare® type, that is to say that it uses the energy provided by the short-distance radio waves emitted by a short-distance MR radio module in the mobile terminal T, to function.
  • This operation corresponds to the activation and progress of a program stored in the tag TAG, in particular to transmit to the terminal T information also stored or calculated in this tag TAG.
  • the radio module MR of the terminal T is, in this embodiment of the invention, a conventional NFC component, compliant with the ISO 14443 or ISO 15693 standard.
  • the invention is not limited to reading passive RFID tags by NFC components, other non-contact technologies being also usable.
  • the electronic tag TAG is an active electronic tag, that is to say that it has its own power supply, or includes an NFC reader operating in "peer-to-peer” mode.
  • the electronic tag TAG and the radio module MR use infrared or optical non-contact technologies, or technologies such as ZigBee® or UWB (according to the English "Ultra-Wideband") to operate.
  • the tag TAG contains so-called "public” DP data, which it transmits to any entity reading it without prior authentication, and so-called “private” DS data, intended for a card emulation CA application located in a data element.
  • the public data DP contain in particular a service provider identifier ID associated with the AC card emulation application. In a variant, this identifier ID is more specifically associated with a predetermined service, or with a predetermined card emulation application. This is for example an "AID" identifier as standardized by the ISO 7816-5 standard and coded on 16 bytes.
  • the security element ES hosting the application AC is a UICC card inserted in the mobile terminal T, the latter being a mobile phone compatible GSM or UMTS.
  • the telecommunications operator of the user of the mobile terminal T has a TSM server for downloading card emulation applications in the terminals of his clients, located in the communication RES network to which the terminal T is connected.
  • the AC card emulation application has thus been downloaded by the TSM server into the UICC card of the terminal T, thanks to an agreement between the telecommunications operator of the user and the service provider associated with the application of the AC card emulation.
  • Downloading or updating applications in the UICC card of the T terminal by the TSM server is done by the OTA mechanism (according to the English “Over The Air"), standardized by ETSI (according to the English “European Telecommunications Standards Institute") and 3GPP (according to the English “Third Generation Partnership Project”) .
  • the TSM server is managed by the service provider associated with the AC card emulation application, the download of the card emulation application AC in the UICC card of the terminal T by OTA mechanism being done after authorization of the telecommunications operator of the user.
  • the invention is of course implementable in other types of terminals comprising various types of security elements.
  • the terminal T is a fixed computer, a personal digital assistant PDA (or the “Personal Digital Assistant") or any other type of laptop
  • the security element ES is a "Secure Multimedia Card” type memory card inserted in the terminal T, or in a secure controller connected to the radio module MR.
  • the radio module MR of the terminal T communicates with a reader module ML in the terminal T, via an interface 12 in the Java programming language, in accordance with the specification "Java Requesf Specification (JSR) 257 standardized by the JCP community ("Java Community Process”)
  • This reading module conventionally implements applications for reading electronic tags of the prior art in the terminal T.
  • the applications contained in the security element ES are commonly called “cardlets”, and that the applications contained in the rest of the terminal T, such as those implemented by the ML reader module, are commonly referred to as “midlets”.
  • the invention is not limited to card emulation applications developed as “midlets” and to reading modules developed as “cardlets”.
  • the map emulation application AC is for example a native application of the security element ES
  • the reader module ML is an Internet browser integrating a reading function. electronic tags.
  • the operating system of the security element ES integrates a CG authentication gateway, application making the interface between the "cardlets” and the “midlets” for all that concerns the authentications of a "cardlet” by a “midlet” or a “midlet” by a “cardlet”.
  • the authentication gateway CG uses the interface 11 to communicate with the read module ML.
  • Step E1 is the reading of the service provider identifier ID on the electronic tag TAG by the read module ML.
  • the ML reading module uses for that the request or "method" Java
  • MR is represented by the message m1 in FIG.
  • TAG then sends in response to the radio module MR, in a new frame
  • the read module ML then decodes the received byte stream into a service provider identifier ID associated with the tag TAG. Thanks to a correspondence table stored in the read module ML, it deduces a corresponding application identifier, here an identifier of the card emulation application AC. It should be noted that this identifier is commonly called "AID" according to the ISO standard.
  • Step E2 is the authentication of the card emulation application AC by the reader module ML.
  • the reader module ML uses the method JSR177 "Connector.open” and sends an "exchangeAPDU" message on the interface 11, represented by the message m3 in FIG. 3, to the authentication gateway CG.
  • This message includes an "authenticate” application message with in its arguments the identifier of the application AC determined in step E1, and a string of characters to be signed.
  • the authentication gateway CG managing the authentication of the "cardlets” contained in the security element ES, has access to the private keys of these cardlets, stored in a register of the security element ES.
  • the read module ML further checks, upon receipt of the signed string of characters, that this signature is correct. For this purpose, it uses the public key of the card emulation application AC, stored in a register accessible to the reader module ML on the terminal T. This public key has for example been downloaded by the user of the terminal T since.
  • the TSM server via a GPRS connection (according to the English "Global Packet Radio Service") to the Internet, for example to time of his subscription to the service provided by the map emulation AC application.
  • a GPRS connection according to the English "Global Packet Radio Service”
  • the signature provided by the map emulation application AC is correct.
  • the reader module ML sends a request JSR177 "Connector.open" represented by the message m5 in FIG. 3, to the authentication gateway CG. This request is based on the identifier of the map emulation application AC determined in step E1.
  • the authentication gateway CG does not have access to the private keys of the "cardlets" contained in the security element ES.
  • the authentication of the card emulation application AC is then carried out by the provision by the authentication gateway CG to the read module ML, of a proof that the issuer of the security element ES, by example the telecommunications operator of the user, has approved the AC card emulation application.
  • the authentication gateway CG maintains for example a list of "cardlets” approved by the issuer of the security element ES, and signs the string of characters received in the message m3 with a secret key common to the transmitter of the security element ES and the reader module ML.
  • Step E3 is the authentication of the read module ML by the authentication gateway CG.
  • the authentication gateway sends on the interface 11 an "authenticate” request, represented by the message m6 in FIG. 3, to the read module ML.
  • This request is proprietary, that is, it is not specified by JSR177. It is constructed similarly to the "authenticate” request of step E2, in particular it includes in its arguments a string of characters to be signed, but does not include an application identifier.
  • the reading module signs the string of characters contained in this request with a private key associated with the terminal T and contained in a register accessible to the read module ML, according to the RSA mechanism. Then the reader module ML sends the string of characters thus signed to the authentication gateway CG, in a response to the request "authenticate” corresponding to the message m7.
  • the authentication gateway CG further checks, upon receipt of the signed string of characters, that this signature is correct. For this it uses the public key associated with the terminal T, stored in a register of the security element ES. This public key will for example have been previously downloaded into this register using the OTA mechanism, by the telecommunications operator of the user. For the sake of clarity and simplification, it is assumed in this example of use of the invention that the signature provided by the read module ML is correct.
  • the latter accepts, in this step E3, the connection request of the read module ML to the card emulation application AC, corresponding to the message m5.
  • the authentication gateway CG requests the card emulation application AC to create a new connection interface dedicated to the reader module ML, and sends an identifier of this interface in a "exchangeAPDU" message, represented by the message m8 in FIG. 3, to the reading module ML.
  • Other authentication mechanisms are of course usable in these steps E2 and E3, for example by using a shared secret code between the reader module ML and the card emulation application AC.
  • the authentication data of the map emulation application CA are moreover not necessarily specific to this application AC, they are for example associated with an application security domain dedicated to the service provider identified by the identifier ID.
  • an authentication gateway is optional: alternatively, the card emulation AC application directly receives the "exchangeAPDU" message containing the "authenticate” application message and authenticates itself with the read module ML in step E2. Similarly, alternatively, the card emulation AC application directly authenticates the read module ML in step E3, or does not require such authentication, that is to say that step E3 is limited to then at the connection of the reading module ML to the card emulation application AC.
  • Step E4 is the establishment of a communication session between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG, the card emulation application AC using the reader module ML as a proxy server ( commonly called "proxy").
  • proxy a proxy server
  • the read module ML having received a connection interface identifier to the AC card emulation application at the end of step E3, it is able to send or receive application messages or "APDU" (according to the English “Application Protocol Data Unit") using the ISO 7816-4 application protocol, to or from the AC card emulation application.
  • APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
  • this step E4 it sends a message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" containing such an application message and represented by the message m9 in FIG. 3, to the application AC card emulation.
  • the application message contained in this message m9 indicates to the card emulation application AC that the reader module ML is ready to operate in proxy mode with an electronic tag external to the terminal T, here the electronic tag TAG.
  • the card emulation AC application then sends the reader module ML, in response to the message m9, a first APDU application message represented by the message m10 in FIG. 3, in accordance with the standard JSR177.
  • the content of this message is not intended for the reader module ML, but the electronic tag TAG, since the reader module ML now operates in proxy mode.
  • the read module ML On receipt of the message m10, the read module ML transmits it as a message JSR257 "exchangeData" on the interface 12 to the radio module MR, this message "exchangeData" containing the first "APDU” application message.
  • the radio module MR Upon receipt of the "exchangeData” message, the radio module MR sends a "Block” frame conforming to the ISO 14443 standard to the electronic tag TAG, this "Block” frame also containing the first "APDU” application message.
  • This sending of information between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG via the radio module MR is represented by the message m11 in FIG.
  • this first application message "APDU" between the map emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG in this step E4 makes it possible to establish a communication session with the electronic tag TAG, insofar as the following information exchanges between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG will be linked to this first application message.
  • the electronic tag TAG responds to each application message "APDU” sent by the map emulation application AC, by an application message "APDU” response. For this, the electronic tag TAG sends this application message "APDU” response to the radio module MR in a frame
  • the radio module MR then inserts the response "APDU” application message in the response to the "exchangeData” method received previously from the read module ML and corresponding to the "APDU” application message sent by AC map emulation application.
  • the read module ML When the read module ML receives this response to the "exchangeData” method containing the response "APDU” application message, it inserts it into a new JSR177 "exchangeAPDU” message that it sends to the emulation application AC. Map.
  • the sending of an "APDU” application message of response between the electronic tag TAG and the module of reading ML via the radio module MR is represented by the message m12 in FIG. 3, and the transmission by the read module ML of this application message "APDU" of response to the card emulation application AC is represented by the message m13.
  • the card emulation AC application After receiving a reply from the TAG electronic tag, the card emulation AC application sends, if necessary, a new "APDU" application message to the electronic tag
  • the content of the "APDU" application messages exchanged between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG depends on the implementation of the service provided by these two entities. For example, if this service requires high security of the exchanged data, the TAG electronic label and the card emulation AC application mutually authenticate each other before the TAG electronic tag authorizes the AC application to emulate the card. read the DS data contained in the TAG electronic tag. Moreover, the sending of the DS data to the card emulation application AC is possibly encrypted. This option is detailed later in the second embodiment of the invention.
  • Step E5 is the reading of the DS data stored in the electronic tag TAG by the card emulation application AC.
  • the map emulation application AC sends an application message "APDU" to the electronic tag TAG, possibly encrypted, indicating to the electronic tag TAG that it is ready to receive the data DS.
  • this application message "APDU” is the first application message "APDU” sent by the user.
  • AC card emulation application to the TAG electronic tag.
  • the electronic tag TAG sends the card emulation application AC an "APDU” application message, possibly encrypted, containing the DS data.
  • the reading method according to the invention is now described in a second variant embodiment in the form of an algorithm comprising steps F1 to F4.
  • This second embodiment of the reading method according to the invention is much less detailed than the first embodiment, because these two variants have many steps and messages used in common.
  • the differences between this second embodiment variant and the first embodiment essentially reside in the way of authenticating the AC map emulation application.
  • Step F1 is the reading of the service provider identifier ID on the electronic tag TAG by the read module ML.
  • This step is carried out in the same way as step E1 in the first variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention: it uses an exchange of two messages between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG, these messages passing through the radio module MR. This exchange is represented by the messages m'1 and m'2 in FIG.
  • step F1 the read module ML deduced from the stream of bytes received in the message m'2, the identifier ID of the service provider associated with the tag TAG, and determines an identifier of the corresponding map emulation AC application.
  • Step F2 is a connection request from the read module ML to the card emulation application AC.
  • the reader module ML uses the method JSR177 "Connector.open” and sends an "exchangeAPDU" message represented by the message m'3 in FIG. 5, to the authentication gateway CG.
  • This message is based on the identifier of the card emulation application AC determined in step F1. Unlike the first embodiment of the reading method according to the invention, this message does not contain an "authenticate” application message and does not cause the authentication of the reader module ML by the authentication gateway CG.
  • the authentication gateway CG Upon receipt of the "exchangeAPDU” message, the authentication gateway CG requests the card emulation AC application to create a new connection interface dedicated to the reader module ML, and sends an identifier of this interface in a response.
  • the "exchangeAPDU” message represented by the message m'4 in FIG. 5, to the reading module ML.
  • Step F3 is the establishment of a communication session between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG, the card emulation application AC using the reader module ML as a proxy server ( commonly called "proxy").
  • proxy a proxy server
  • the reader module ML sends a message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" containing an application message and represented by the message m'5 in FIG. 5, to the application AC card emulation.
  • the application message contained in this message tells me to the card emulation AC application that the read module ML is ready to operate in proxy mode with an electronic tag external to the terminal T, here the electronic tag TAG.
  • the card emulation AC application then sends the reader module ML, in response to the message m'5, an APDU application response represented by the message m'6 in FIG. 5, in accordance with the standard JSR177.
  • the content of this message is not intended for the read module ML, but the electronic tag TAG, since the read module ML operates in proxy mode, and aims to authenticate the electronic tag TAG.
  • the read module ML On receipt of the message m'6, the read module ML transmits it as a message JSR257 "exchangeData" on the interface 12 to the radio module MR, this message "exchangeData" containing the application response "APDU".
  • the radio module MR Upon receipt of the "exchangeData" message, the radio module MR sends a "Block” frame conforming to the ISO 14443 standard to the electronic tag TAG, this "Block” frame also containing the application response "APDU".
  • This sending of information between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG via the radio module MR is represented by the message m'7 in FIG.
  • the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG share a secret key, stored on the one hand in the electronic tag TAG, and on the other hand downloaded for example previously in the map emulation application AC by the OTA mechanism.
  • This secret key is used by the card emulation application CA to authenticate in this step F3, in the form of mutual authentication between the electronic tag TAG and the card emulation application AC.
  • Mutual authentication by public key is however also usable.
  • the APDU application response received by the electronic tag TAG in the message m'7 thus comprises a string of characters to be decrypted by the electronic tag TAG, this string of characters having been previously encrypted by the card emulation application AC. using the key secret shared between the map emulation AC application and the TAG electronic tag.
  • the electronic tag TAG On receipt of the message m'7, the electronic tag TAG decrypts the string of characters included in this message using the secret key, and sends another application message to the card emulation application AC. , with the decrypted string of characters and another string of characters to decipher.
  • This application message is carried by the messages m'8 and me 9 shown in Figure 5.
  • the map emulation AC application Upon receipt of this application message, the map emulation AC application checks that the electronic tag TAG has correctly decrypted the chain previously sent to it. If this decryption is incorrect, the card emulation AC application interrupts the communication session with the electronic tag TAG.
  • the card emulation application AC decrypts the string of characters to be decrypted sent by the electronic tag TAG and sends the string of characters thus deciphered in a new application response, transported via lower-level messages m'10 and m'11, to the TAG electronic tag.
  • the electronic tag TAG verifies that the map emulation application AC has deciphered this chain of characters. If this decryption is incorrect, the electronic tag TAG interrupts the communication session with the map emulation application AC. On the contrary, if this decryption is correct, the electronic tag TAG then authorizes the card emulation application AC to read the DS data contained in the electronic tag TAG.
  • step F4 is the reading of the DS data stored in the electronic tag TAG, by the card emulation application AC.
  • the electronic tag TAG sends the card emulation application AC an application "APDU" response message, encrypted using the secret key shared between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG. , containing the DS data.
  • the electronic tag TAG sends the DS data to the card emulation application CA only after receipt by the latter of an optionally encrypted application message "APDU", indicating to the TAG electronic tag that the card emulation AC application is ready to receive DS data.
  • APDU optionally encrypted application message
  • the encryption of the data DS sent by the electronic tag TAG is not necessary for the implementation of the invention, it is for example activated according to the degree of security desired by the associated service provider to the TAG electronic tag.

Abstract

The invention relates to a method of reading an electronic tag (TAG) storing data comprising an identifier (ID), by a terminal (T) furnished with a short-range radio reading module (ML) and with a card emulation application (AC), associated with said identifier (ID) and situated in a secure element (ES) of said terminal (T), said method being characterized in that it comprises the steps of: - reading by said reading module (ML) of said identifier (ID), - establishment of a communication session between said card emulation application (AC) and said electronic tag (TAG), said reading module (ML) being used as agent server by said card emulation application (AC), said card emulation application (AC) having been previously authenticated, - and reading by said card emulation application (AC) of data (DS) stored in said electronic tag (TAG) and intended for said card emulation application (AC).

Description

Procédé de lecture d'une étiquette électronique par un terminal Method of reading an electronic tag by a terminal
La présente invention se rapporte de manière générale au domaine des télécommunications, et plus précisément au domaine des applications de lecture d'étiquettes électroniques utilisant les technologies dites "sans contact" de lecture radio courte distance.The present invention relates generally to the field of telecommunications, and more specifically to the field of electronic tag reading applications using so-called "non-contact" technologies for short-distance radio reading.
Les technologies sans contact, telles que la technologie NFC ("Near Field Communication" de la norme "International Standard Organization (ISO)" 14443), permettent de développer principalement deux types d'applications : - Les applications du premier type sont des applications de lecture d'étiquettes électroniques, qui permettent de lire une étiquette électronique, par exemple une étiquette RFID (d'après l'anglais "Radio Frequency IDentification"), avec un terminal. Celui-ci devient donc un lecteur d'étiquettes électroniques appelées aussi "tags" passifs : il émet un champ radio courte distance qui alimente électriquement ces étiquettes, leur permettant de transmettre au terminal des informations qu'elles contiennent. Ces applications permettent notamment à un utilisateur de lire des informations en approchant son terminal mobile d'étiquettes électroniques disposées par exemple sur des affiches, des catalogues ou des colis.Contactless technologies, such as Near Field Communication (NFC) technology of the International Standard Organization (ISO) 14443, allow to develop two main types of applications: - Applications of the first type are applications of reading electronic tags, which make it possible to read an electronic tag, for example an RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) tag, with a terminal. The latter thus becomes a reader of electronic tags also called "tags" passive: it emits a short-range radio field that electrically feeds these tags, allowing them to transmit to the terminal information they contain. These applications in particular allow a user to read information by approaching his mobile terminal electronic tags arranged for example on posters, catalogs or packages.
Les applications du second type sont des applications d'émulation de carte: on utilise un terminal mobile afin de sécuriser des transactions électroniques entre une application émulant par exemple une carte de paiement sur ce terminal, et une borne externe de lecture qui émet des ondes radio courte distance pour lire les données de cette carte virtualisée sur le terminal mobile. Le terminal mobile est alors associé à un élément de sécurité dans lequel est stockée l'application d'émulation de carte. Dans le cas où le terminal mobile est un téléphone mobile compatible GSM (d'après l'anglais "Global System for Mobile communications") ou UMTS (d'après l'anglais "Universal Mobile Télécommunications System"), la carte UICC (d'après l'anglais "Universal Integrated Circuit Card") est utilisée comme élément de sécurité. Cet élément est généralement utilisé par la borne externe de lecture pour authentifier l'application d'émulation de carte. Ces applications d'émulation de carte permettent ainsi d'étendre les usages du terminal mobile notamment au paiement électronique, à la "billettique" (par exemple le terminal mobile émule un titre de transport) et au contrôle d'accès. Les applications hébergées dans la carte UICC du terminal sont en effet plus fiables que les applications embarquées sur le terminal, les données qui y sont stockées étant très difficilement accessibles. De plus, les applications hébergées dans cette carte UICC sont plus facilement contrôlables par l'opérateur de communication associé à la carte UICC. II est à noter que bien que destinées majoritairement aux terminaux mobiles, les applications de lecture ou d'émulation de carte utilisant cette technologie NFC fonctionnent de la même façon sur des terminaux fixes.The applications of the second type are card emulation applications: a mobile terminal is used to secure electronic transactions between an application emulating for example a payment card on this terminal, and an external reading terminal which emits radio waves. short distance to read the data from this virtualized card on the handheld. The mobile terminal is then associated with a security element in which the card emulation application is stored. In the case where the mobile terminal is a GSM compatible mobile phone (according to the English "Global System for Mobile Communications") or UMTS (according to the English "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System"), the UICC card (from the English "Universal Integrated Circuit Card") is used as a security element. This element is typically used by the external read terminal to authenticate the map emulation application. These card emulation applications thus make it possible to extend the uses of the mobile terminal in particular to electronic payment, "ticketing" (for example the mobile terminal emulates a ticket) and access control. The applications hosted in the UICC card of the terminal are indeed more reliable than the applications embedded on the terminal, the data stored there being very difficult to access. In addition, the applications hosted in this UICC card are more easily controllable by the communication operator associated with the UICC card. It should be noted that although intended mainly for mobile terminals, card reading or emulation applications using this NFC technology operate in the same way on fixed terminals.
Les composants implémentant ces technologies sans contact dans les terminaux limitent cependant les applications offertes aux utilisateurs. En effet ces composants fonctionnent soit dans un mode de lecture, permettant aux applications du premier type de fonctionner, soit dans un mode d'émulation de carte, permettant aux applications du second type de fonctionner. Ils ne permettent pas de fonctionner à la fois dans un mode de lecture et dans un mode d'émulation de carte, limitant les développements d'applications au premier type ou au second type, sans logique de service faisant interagir ces deux types d'applications.However, components implementing these contactless technologies in the terminals limit the applications offered to users. Indeed these components operate either in a reading mode, allowing applications of the first type to operate, or in a card emulation mode, allowing applications of the second type to operate. They do not make it possible to operate both in a reading mode and in a card emulation mode, limiting the development of applications of the first type or the second type, without service logic making these two types of applications interact. .
Ainsi pour utiliser des coupons de réduction stockés dans des étiquettes électroniques, actuellement seules les applications du premier type sont disponibles. Un utilisateur approche son terminal mobile d'une de ces étiquettes, ce qui déclenche la lecture du coupon de réduction correspondant par une application de lecture sur le terminal mobile, qui envoie ensuite les données lues à un serveur distant de gestion d'un compte de fidélité de l'utilisateur par exemple. En effet les données contenues dans l'étiquette électronique sont destinées uniquement à une application prédéterminée d'un fournisseur de service. L'étiquette électronique ne transmet donc ces données qu'à cette application prédéterminée. Cette application prédéterminée devant utiliser le mode de lecture du terminal mobile, il s'agit d'une application du premier type, ce qui signifie que les coupons de réduction utilisant une technologie sans contact ne sont pas directement transmissibles à une carte de fidélité virtualisée dans la carte UICC du terminal d'un utilisateur.Thus to use discount coupons stored in electronic tags, currently only applications of the first type are available. A user approaches his mobile terminal of one of these tags, which triggers the reading of the corresponding discount coupon by a reading application on the mobile terminal, which then sends the data read to a remote server managing a user's loyalty account, for example. Indeed the data contained in the electronic tag are intended only for a predetermined application of a service provider. The electronic tag therefore transmits this data only to this predetermined application. This predetermined application to use the reading mode of the mobile terminal, it is an application of the first type, which means that coupons using a contactless technology are not directly transmissible to a virtualized loyalty card in the UICC card of a user's terminal.
La présente invention vise à remédier aux inconvénients de la technique antérieure en fournissant un procédé et des dispositifs de lecture d'une étiquette électronique, permettant à une application d'émulation de carte dans un terminal de lire des données contenues dans cette étiquette électronique et qui lui sont destinées.The present invention aims to overcome the disadvantages of the prior art by providing a method and devices for reading an electronic tag, allowing a card emulation application in a terminal to read data contained in this electronic tag and which are intended for him.
A cette fin, l'invention propose un procédé de lecture d'une étiquette électronique stockant des données comportant un identifiant, par un terminal muni d'un module de lecture radio courte distance et d'une application d'émulation de carte, associée audit identifiant et située dans un élément sécurisé dudit terminal, ledit procédé étant caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes de :To this end, the invention proposes a method for reading an electronic tag storing data comprising an identifier, a terminal equipped with a short-distance radio reading module and a card emulation application, associated with said identifier and located in a secure element of said terminal, said method being characterized in that it comprises the steps of:
- lecture par ledit module de lecture dudit identifiant,reading by said read module of said identifier,
- établissement d'une session de communication entre ladite application d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique, ledit module de lecture étant utilisé comme serveur mandataire par ladite application d'émulation de carte, ladite application d'émulation de carte ayant été préalablement authentifiée,establishing a communication session between said card emulation application and said electronic tag, said read module being used as a proxy server by said card emulation application, said card emulation application having been previously authenticated ,
- et lecture par ladite application d'émulation de carte de données stockées dans ladite étiquette électronique et destinées à ladite application d'émulation de carte. Grâce à l'invention, une étiquette électronique est rendue capable de communiquer directement avec une application d'émulation de carte située dans le terminal d'un utilisateur, l'authentification de cette application d'émulation de carte étant effectuée au préalable par le module de lecture du terminal, ou par l'étiquette électronique elle-même. Un utilisateur dont le terminal implémente l'invention, se voit ainsi offrir la possibilité de mettre à jour une carte de fidélité virtualisée sur son terminal en utilisant une technologie sans contact, pourvu que le fournisseur de service associé à cette carte de fidélité ait un accord avec l'émetteur de l'élément sécurisé. De plus l'intervention d'un serveur distant pour mettre à jour un compte de fidélité de l'utilisateur n'est plus nécessaire : grâce à l'invention, l'utilisateur qui approche son terminal d'une étiquette électronique correspondant à un bon de réduction, bénéficie très rapidement de cette réduction, puisque celle- ci est enregistrée directement sur sa carte de fidélité virtualisée. Les échanges entre l'étiquette électronique et la carte virtualisée se font localement, ce qui est plus rapide que dans l'art antérieur.and reading by said data card emulation application stored in said electronic tag and intended for said card emulation application. Thanks to the invention, an electronic tag is made capable of communicating directly with a card emulation application located in the terminal of a user, the authentication of this card emulation application being carried out beforehand by the module terminal, or by the electronic tag itself. A user whose terminal implements the invention, is thus offered the possibility of updating a virtualized loyalty card on its terminal using a contactless technology, provided that the service provider associated with this loyalty card has an agreement with the issuer of the secure element. Moreover the intervention of a remote server to update a user's loyalty account is no longer necessary: thanks to the invention, the user who approaches his terminal with an electronic tag corresponding to a good discount, benefits very quickly from this reduction, since it is recorded directly on its virtualized loyalty card. The exchanges between the electronic tag and the virtualized card are done locally, which is faster than in the prior art.
Plus généralement, l'invention permet aux applications d'émulation de carte d'interagir avec des applications de lecture d'étiquettes électroniques dans un terminal, pour rendre des services aux utilisateurs de façon sécurisée. Par exemple l'invention permet à une étiquette électronique de transmettre de façon sécurisée, par l'intermédiaire d'une application de lecture dans un terminal, des jetons de service à une application d'émulation de carte dans ce même terminal. Ces jetons sont par exemple des jetons téléphoniques, des jetons d'identification ou encore des droits d'usage d'un contenu.More generally, the invention enables card emulation applications to interact with electronic tag reading applications in a terminal to render services to users in a secure manner. For example, the invention enables an electronic tag to securely transmit, via a reader application in a terminal, service tokens to a card emulation application in the same terminal. These tokens are for example telephone tokens, identification tokens or rights of use of a content.
Selon une caractéristique avantageuse, ledit module de lecture est un lecteur NFC et ladite étiquette électronique est une étiquette RFID passive. Ce choix d'implémentation de l'invention a l'avantage d'utiliser une technologie sans contact mature, la technologie NFC étant largement répandue. De plus le choix d'utiliser des étiquettes RFID passives est économiquement avantageux. En effet ces étiquettes sont très peu chères et ne nécessitent pas d'alimentation ni de connexion réseau au contraire des étiquettes électroniques actives.According to an advantageous characteristic, said reading module is an NFC reader and said electronic tag is a passive RFID tag. This choice of implementation of the invention has the advantage of using a mature contactless technology, NFC technology being widely used. In addition the choice to use passive RFID tags is economically advantageous. Indeed these labels are very cheap and do not require power supply or network connection as opposed to active electronic tags.
Selon une autre caractéristique avantageuse, l'étape d'établissement de ladite session de communication comporte une sous-étape d'authentification mutuelle entre ladite application d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique.According to another advantageous characteristic, the step of establishing said communication session comprises a substep of mutual authentication between said card emulation application and said electronic tag.
Cette caractéristique correspond à une variante de réalisation de l'invention dans laquelle l'authentification de l'application est effectuée par l'étiquette électronique. Cette variante a l'avantage de minimiser l'impact de l'implémentation de l'invention sur le terminal utilisé.This characteristic corresponds to an alternative embodiment of the invention in which the authentication of the application is performed by the electronic tag. This variant has the advantage of minimizing the impact of the implementation of the invention on the terminal used.
La sécurisation des échanges entre l'étiquette électronique et l'application d'émulation de carte est de plus renforcée par cette sous-étape.Securing exchanges between the electronic tag and the card emulation application is further reinforced by this substep.
En particulier, l'application d'émulation de carte authentifie l'étiquette électronique, ce qui protège l'application d'émulation de carte contre une mise à jour non autorisée par une étiquette électronique frauduleuse.In particular, the card emulation application authenticates the electronic tag, which protects the card emulation application against unauthorized updating by a fraudulent electronic tag.
Selon une autre caractéristique avantageuse, ladite session de communication utilise un tunnel sécurisé entre ladite application d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique.According to another advantageous characteristic, said communication session uses a secure tunnel between said card emulation application and said electronic tag.
Cette caractéristique supplémentaire permet d'assurer l'intégrité des données échangées de bout en bout entre l'étiquette électronique et l'application d'émulation de carte.This additional feature ensures the integrity of data exchanged end-to-end between the electronic tag and the map emulation application.
Selon une autre caractéristique avantageuse, l'étape de lecture par ledit module de lecture dudit identifiant est suivie d'une étape d'authentification de ladite application d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture. Cette caractéristique correspond à une autre variante de réalisation de l'invention dans laquelle l'authentification de l'application est effectuée par le module de lecture. Cette variante a l'avantage de ne pas nécessiter d'étiquettes électroniques complexes incluant des capacités d'authentification pour mettre en œuvre l'invention, au prix d'une implémentation un peu plus complexe dans le terminal que dans la variante précédente. Cependant une combinaison de ces deux variantes est envisageable: l'application d'émulation de carte est alors authentifiée à la fois par le terminal lui-même et par l'étiquette électronique lors d'une sous-étape d'authentification mutuelle lors de l'établissement de la session de communication entre 'application d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique. Selon une autre caractéristique avantageuse, ladite étape d'authentification de ladite application d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture est précédée ou suivie d'une étape d'authentification dudit module de lecture par une entité dudit élément sécurisé.According to another advantageous characteristic, the step of reading by said read module of said identifier is followed by a step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module. This characteristic corresponds to another variant embodiment of the invention in which the authentication of the application is performed by the reader module. This variant has the advantage of not requiring complex electronic tags including authentication capabilities to implement the invention, at the cost of a slightly more complex implementation in the terminal than in the previous variant. However, a combination of these two variants is possible: the emulation application card is then authenticated both by the terminal itself and by the electronic tag during a sub-step of mutual authentication during the establishment of the communication session between the map emulation application and the electronic tag. According to another advantageous characteristic, said step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module is preceded or followed by a step of authentication of said read module by an entity of said secure element.
L'authentification du module de lecture permet au fournisseur de service lié à l'application d'émulation de carte de limiter l'usage de l'invention à certains terminaux. Par exemple ces terminaux sont ceux pour lesquels Pimplémentation de l'invention est conforme à une norme de sécurité particulière, ou à une charte signée avec le fournisseur de service.Authentication of the reader module allows the service provider related to the card emulation application to limit the use of the invention to certain terminals. For example, these terminals are those for which the implementation of the invention conforms to a particular security standard, or to a signed charter with the service provider.
Selon une autre caractéristique avantageuse, lorsque ledit élément sécurisé est une carte à puce insérée dans ledit terminal, lors de ladite étape d'authentification de ladite application d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture, les données d'authentification de ladite application d'émulation de carte sont fournies par une passerelle d'authentification contenue dans le système d'exploitation de ladite carte à puce. Cette caractéristique permet de simplifier le développement d'applications d'émulation de carte utilisant le procédé de lecture selon l'invention, par des fournisseurs de service. En effet l'étape d'authentification de l'application d'émulation de carte est alors assurée par une passerelle d'authentification sur l'élément sécurisé du terminal, faisant partie d'un cadre applicatif préexistant sur l'élément sécurisé du terminal, ou ayant été téléchargé par l'émetteur de cet élément sécurisé. Par exemple si cet élément sécurisé est une carte à puce, l'émetteur est l'opérateur de télécommunication lié à cette carte à puce.According to another advantageous characteristic, when said secure element is a smart card inserted in said terminal, during said step of authentication of said card emulation application by said read module, the authentication data of said application of card emulation are provided by an authentication gateway contained in the operating system of said smart card. This feature makes it possible to simplify the development of card emulation applications using the reading method according to the invention, by service providers. Indeed the authentication step of the card emulation application is then provided by an authentication gateway on the secure element of the terminal, forming part of a pre-existing application framework on the secure element of the terminal, or having been downloaded by the issuer of this secure element. For example, if this secure element is a smart card, the issuer is the telecommunications operator linked to this smart card.
L'invention concerne aussi un terminal mobile muni d'un module de lecture radio courte distance, ledit terminal mobile étant caractérisé en ce que ledit module de lecture comporte : - des moyens de lecture d'un identifiant stocké dans une étiquette électronique,The invention also relates to a mobile terminal provided with a short-distance radio reading module, said mobile terminal being characterized in that said reading module comprises: means for reading an identifier stored in an electronic tag,
- et des moyens de fonctionnement comme serveur mandataire entre une application d'émulation de carte située dans un élément sécurisé et ladite étiquette électronique, lorsque ledit élément sécurisé est inséré dans ledit terminal mobile.and means for operating as a proxy server between a card emulation application located in a secure element and said electronic tag, when said secure element is inserted in said mobile terminal.
L'invention concerne également une carte à puce hébergeant une application d'émulation de carte associée à un identifiant, caractérisée en ce qu'elle comporte : - une passerelle d'authentification comportant des moyens d'authentification de ladite application d'émulation de carte auprès d'une étiquette électronique ou d'un module de lecture radio courte distance d'un terminal mobile,The invention also relates to a smart card hosting a card emulation application associated with an identifier, characterized in that it comprises: an authentication gateway comprising means for authenticating said card emulation application with an electronic tag or a short-distance radio reading module of a mobile terminal,
- des moyens d'établissement d'une session de communication avec ladite étiquette électronique, en utilisant ledit module de lecture radio courte distance comme serveur mandataire,means for establishing a communication session with said electronic tag, using said short-distance radio reading module as a proxy server,
- et des moyens de lecture de données destinées à ladite application d'émulation de carte et stockées dans ladite étiquette électronique, au cours de ladite session de communication. L'invention concerne enfin un programme d'ordinateur comportant des instructions pour mettre en œuvre le procédé selon l'invention, lorsqu'il est exécuté sur un circuit intégré, un microprocesseur, un processeur ou un ordinateur.and data reading means intended for said card emulation application and stored in said electronic tag, during said communication session. The invention finally relates to a computer program comprising instructions for implementing the method according to the invention, when it is executed on an integrated circuit, a microprocessor, a processor or a computer.
Le terminal mobile, la carte à puce et le programme d'ordinateur présentent des avantages analogues à ceux du procédé de lecture selon l'invention.The mobile terminal, the smart card and the computer program have advantages similar to those of the reading method according to the invention.
D'autres caractéristiques et avantages apparaîtront à la lecture d'un mode de réalisation préféré décrit en référence aux figures dans lesquelles : - la figure 1 représente un terminal mobile selon l'invention, connecté à un réseau de communication, et mettant en œuvre le procédé de lecture selon l'invention pour lire une étiquette électronique,Other features and advantages will appear on reading a preferred embodiment described with reference to the figures in which: FIG. 1 represents a mobile terminal according to the invention, connected to a communication network, and implementing the reading method according to the invention for reading an electronic tag,
- la figure 2 représente des étapes du procédé de lecture selon l'invention dans une première variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention,FIG. 2 represents steps of the reading method according to the invention in a first variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention,
- la figure 3 représente un diagramme de flux entre l'étiquette électronique lue par le terminal mobile selon l'invention et des entités du terminal mobile, dans cette première variante de réalisation, - la figure 4 représente des étapes du procédé de lecture selon l'invention dans une seconde variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention,FIG. 3 represents a flow diagram between the electronic tag read by the mobile terminal according to the invention and entities of the mobile terminal, in this first variant embodiment; FIG. 4 represents steps of the reading method according to FIG. invention in a second variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention,
- et la figure 5 représente un diagramme de flux entre l'étiquette électronique lue par le terminal mobile selon l'invention et des entités du terminal mobile, dans cette seconde variante de réalisation.and FIG. 5 represents a flow diagram between the electronic tag read by the mobile terminal according to the invention and entities of the mobile terminal, in this second variant embodiment.
Selon un mode préféré de réalisation de l'invention, le procédé de lecture selon l'invention est utilisé par l'utilisateur d'un terminal mobile T, représenté à la figure 1, pour lire une étiquette électronique TAG. L'étiquette électronique TAG est, dans ce mode de réalisation de l'invention, une étiquette RFID passive, telle qu'à micro-contrôleur ou de type Mifare®, c'est-à-dire qu'elle l'utilise l'énergie fournie par les ondes radio courte distance émises par un module radio MR courte distance dans le terminal mobile T, pour fonctionner. Ce fonctionnement correspond à l'activation et au déroulement d'un programme stocké dans l'étiquette TAG, permettant notamment de transmettre au terminal T des informations également stockées ou calculées dans cette étiquette TAG.According to a preferred embodiment of the invention, the reading method according to the invention is used by the user of a mobile terminal T, shown in Figure 1, to read an electronic tag TAG. The electronic tag TAG is, in this embodiment of the invention, a passive RFID tag, such as micro-controller or Mifare® type, that is to say that it uses the energy provided by the short-distance radio waves emitted by a short-distance MR radio module in the mobile terminal T, to function. This operation corresponds to the activation and progress of a program stored in the tag TAG, in particular to transmit to the terminal T information also stored or calculated in this tag TAG.
De plus le module radio MR du terminal T est, dans ce mode de réalisation de l'invention, un composant NFC classique, conforme à la norme ISO 14443 ou ISO 15693. Cependant l'invention n'est pas limitée à une lecture d'étiquettes RFID passives par des composants NFC, d'autres technologies sans contact étant aussi utilisables. Par exemple en variante, l'étiquette électronique TAG est une étiquette électronique active, c'est-à-dire qu'elle dispose d'une alimentation électrique propre, ou inclut un lecteur NFC fonctionnant en en mode "peer-to- peer". Dans une autre variante l'étiquette électronique TAG et le module radio MR utilisent des technologies sans contact infrarouges ou optiques, ou encore des technologies telles que ZigBee® ou UWB (d'après l'anglais "Ultra- Wideband") pour fonctionner. L'étiquette TAG contient des données DP dites "publiques", qu'elle transmet à toute entité la lisant sans authentification préalable, et des données DS dites "privées", destinées à une application AC d'émulation de carte située dans un élément de sécurité ES du terminal T. Les données publiques DP contiennent notamment un identifiant ID du fournisseur de service associé à l'application d'émulation de carte AC. En variante cet identifiant ID est plus spécifiquement associé à un service prédéterminé, ou à une application d'émulation de carte prédéterminée. C'est par exemple un identifiant "AID" tel que normalisé par la norme ISO 7816-5 et codé sur 16 octets. Dans ce mode de réalisation de l'invention, l'élément de sécurité ES hébergeant l'application AC est une carte UICC insérée dans le terminal mobile T, celui-ci étant un téléphone mobile compatible GSM ou UMTS. L'opérateur de télécommunications de l'utilisateur du terminal mobile T dispose d'un serveur TSM de téléchargement d'applications d'émulation de carte dans les terminaux de ses clients, situé dans le réseau RES de communication auquel est connecté le terminal T. L'application d'émulation de carte AC a ainsi été téléchargée par le serveur TSM dans la carte UICC du terminal T, grâce à un accord entre l'opérateur de télécommunications de l'utilisateur et le fournisseur de service associé à l'application d'émulation de carte AC. Les téléchargements ou mise à jour d'applications dans la carte UICC du terminal T par le serveur TSM s'effectue par le mécanisme OTA (d'après l'anglais "Over The Air"), normalisé par l'ETSI (d'après l'anglais "European Télécommunications Standards Institute") et le 3GPP (d'après l'anglais "Third Génération Partnership Project"). En variante le serveur TSM est géré par le fournisseur de service associé à l'application d'émulation de carte AC, le téléchargement de l'application AC d'émulation de carte dans la carte UICC du terminal T par mécanisme OTA se faisant après autorisation de l'opérateur de télécommunications de l'utilisateur.In addition, the radio module MR of the terminal T is, in this embodiment of the invention, a conventional NFC component, compliant with the ISO 14443 or ISO 15693 standard. However, the invention is not limited to reading passive RFID tags by NFC components, other non-contact technologies being also usable. For example, in a variant, the electronic tag TAG is an active electronic tag, that is to say that it has its own power supply, or includes an NFC reader operating in "peer-to-peer" mode. . In another variant, the electronic tag TAG and the radio module MR use infrared or optical non-contact technologies, or technologies such as ZigBee® or UWB (according to the English "Ultra-Wideband") to operate. The tag TAG contains so-called "public" DP data, which it transmits to any entity reading it without prior authentication, and so-called "private" DS data, intended for a card emulation CA application located in a data element. ES security of the terminal T. The public data DP contain in particular a service provider identifier ID associated with the AC card emulation application. In a variant, this identifier ID is more specifically associated with a predetermined service, or with a predetermined card emulation application. This is for example an "AID" identifier as standardized by the ISO 7816-5 standard and coded on 16 bytes. In this embodiment of the invention, the security element ES hosting the application AC is a UICC card inserted in the mobile terminal T, the latter being a mobile phone compatible GSM or UMTS. The telecommunications operator of the user of the mobile terminal T has a TSM server for downloading card emulation applications in the terminals of his clients, located in the communication RES network to which the terminal T is connected. The AC card emulation application has thus been downloaded by the TSM server into the UICC card of the terminal T, thanks to an agreement between the telecommunications operator of the user and the service provider associated with the application of the AC card emulation. Downloading or updating applications in the UICC card of the T terminal by the TSM server is done by the OTA mechanism (according to the English "Over The Air"), standardized by ETSI (according to the English "European Telecommunications Standards Institute") and 3GPP (according to the English "Third Generation Partnership Project") . Alternatively, the TSM server is managed by the service provider associated with the AC card emulation application, the download of the card emulation application AC in the UICC card of the terminal T by OTA mechanism being done after authorization of the telecommunications operator of the user.
Cependant l'invention est bien sûr implémentable dans d'autres types de terminaux comportant divers types d'éléments de sécurité. Par exemple, en variante, le terminal T est un ordinateur fixe, un assistant numérique personnel de type PDA (d'après l'anglais "Personal Digital Assistant") ou tout autre type d'ordinateur portable, et l'élément de sécurité ES est une carte mémoire de type "Secure Multimedia Card" insérée dans le terminal T, ou dans un contrôleur sécurisé connecté au module radio MR. Le module radio MR du terminal T communique avec un module logiciel de lecture ML dans le terminal T, par l'intermédiaire d'une interface 12 en langage de programmation Java, conforme à la spécification "Java Spécification Requesf(JSR) 257 normalisée par la communauté JCP ("Java Community Process"). Ce module de lecture implémente de manière classique des applications de lecture d'étiquettes électroniques de l'art antérieur dans le terminal T. Il implémente de plus le procédé de lecture selon l'invention, grâce notamment à une interface 11 de communication avec les applications contenues dans l'élément de sécurité ES du terminal T, permettant de communiquer avec l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Cette interface 11 est développée en langage de programmation Java et utilise en partie les méthodes de la spécification JSR177 normalisée par la communauté JCP, d'autres méthodes utilisées étant propriétaires.However, the invention is of course implementable in other types of terminals comprising various types of security elements. For example, alternatively, the terminal T is a fixed computer, a personal digital assistant PDA (or the "Personal Digital Assistant") or any other type of laptop, and the security element ES is a "Secure Multimedia Card" type memory card inserted in the terminal T, or in a secure controller connected to the radio module MR. The radio module MR of the terminal T communicates with a reader module ML in the terminal T, via an interface 12 in the Java programming language, in accordance with the specification "Java Requesf Specification (JSR) 257 standardized by the JCP community ("Java Community Process") This reading module conventionally implements applications for reading electronic tags of the prior art in the terminal T. It further implements the reading method according to the invention, thanks to in particular to an interface 11 for communication with the applications contained in the security element ES of the terminal T, making it possible to communicate with the card emulation application AC This interface 11 is developed in Java programming language and partly uses the methods of the JSR177 specification standardized by the JCP community, other methods used being proprietary.
Il est à noter que les applications contenues dans l'élément de sécurité ES, telles que l'application AC d'émulation de carte, sont communément appelées "cardlets", et que les applications contenues dans le reste du terminal T, telles que celles implémentées par le module de lecture ML, sont appelées communément "midlets". Cependant l'invention n'est pas limitée aux applications d'émulation de carte développées comme "midlets" et aux modules de lecture développés comme "cardlets". En effet dans d'autres variantes de l'invention, l'application AC d'émulation de carte est par exemple une application native de l'élément de sécurité ES, et le module de lecture ML est un navigateur Internet intégrant une fonction de lecture d'étiquettes électroniques.It should be noted that the applications contained in the security element ES, such as the map emulation application CA, are commonly called "cardlets", and that the applications contained in the rest of the terminal T, such as those implemented by the ML reader module, are commonly referred to as "midlets". However, the invention is not limited to card emulation applications developed as "midlets" and to reading modules developed as "cardlets". Indeed, in other variants of the invention, the map emulation application AC is for example a native application of the security element ES, and the reader module ML is an Internet browser integrating a reading function. electronic tags.
Enfin le système d'exploitation de l'élément de sécurité ES intègre une passerelle d'authentification CG, application faisant l'interface entre les "cardlets" et les "midlets" pour tout ce qui concerne les authentifications d'une "cardlet" par une "midlet" ou d'une "midlet" par une "cardlet". La passerelle d'authentification CG utilise l'interface 11 pour communiquer avec le module de lecture ML.Finally, the operating system of the security element ES integrates a CG authentication gateway, application making the interface between the "cardlets" and the "midlets" for all that concerns the authentications of a "cardlet" by a "midlet" or a "midlet" by a "cardlet". The authentication gateway CG uses the interface 11 to communicate with the read module ML.
En référence à la figure 2, le procédé de lecture selon l'invention est maintenant décrit dans une première variante de réalisation sous la forme d'un algorithme comportant des étapes E1 à E5.With reference to FIG. 2, the reading method according to the invention is now described in a first variant embodiment in the form of an algorithm comprising steps E1 to E5.
L'étape E1 est la lecture de l'identifiant ID de fournisseur de service sur l'étiquette électronique TAG par le module de lecture ML. Le module de lecture ML utilise pour cela la requête ou "méthode" JavaStep E1 is the reading of the service provider identifier ID on the electronic tag TAG by the read module ML. The ML reading module uses for that the request or "method" Java
"exchangeData(commands)" sur l'interface 12 à destination du module radio"exchangeData (commands)" on the interface 12 to the radio module
MR, qui transforme cette requête en une trame "Block" conforme à la normeMR, which transforms this request into a "Block" frame conforming to the standard
ISO 14443, et l'envoie à l'étiquette électronique TAG. Cet envoi du module de lecture ML à l'étiquette électronique TAG par l'intermédiaire du module radioISO 14443, and sends it to the TAG electronic tag. This sending of the reading module ML to the electronic tag TAG via the radio module
MR, est représenté par le message m1 sur la figure 3. L'étiquette électroniqueMR, is represented by the message m1 in FIG.
TAG envoie alors en réponse au module radio MR, dans une nouvelle trameTAG then sends in response to the radio module MR, in a new frame
"Block", un flux d'octets contenant une réponse applicative ou "APDU""Block", a byte stream containing an application response or "APDU"
(d'après l'anglais "Application Protocol Data Unit"), que le module radio MR insère dans la réponse à la méthode "exchangeData(commands)" qu'il transmet au module de lecture ML. Cet envoi d'informations de l'étiquette électronique TAG au module de lecture ML par l'intermédiaire du module radio MR est représenté par le message m2.(according to the English "Application Protocol Data Unit"), that the radio module MR inserts in the response to the method "exchangeData (commands)" that it transmits to the reading module ML. This sending of information from the label TAG electronics to the ML read module via the radio module MR is represented by the message m2.
Le module de lecture ML décode ensuite le flux d'octets reçu en un identifiant ID de fournisseur de service associé à l'étiquette TAG. Grâce à une table de correspondance stockée dans le module de lecture ML, il en déduit un identifiant d'application correspondant, ici un identifiant de l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Il est à noter que cet identifiant est communément appelé "AID" selon la norme ISO.The read module ML then decodes the received byte stream into a service provider identifier ID associated with the tag TAG. Thanks to a correspondence table stored in the read module ML, it deduces a corresponding application identifier, here an identifier of the card emulation application AC. It should be noted that this identifier is commonly called "AID" according to the ISO standard.
L'étape E2 est l'authentification de l'application AC d'émulation de carte par le module de lecture ML. Pour cela le module de lecture ML utilise la méthode JSR177 "Connector.open" et envoie un message "exchangeAPDU" sur l'interface 11 , représentée par le message m3 sur la figure 3, à la passerelle d'authentification CG. Ce message inclut un message applicatif "authenticate" avec dans ses arguments l'identifiant de l'application AC déterminé à l'étape E1 , et une chaîne de caractères à signer. La passerelle d'authentification CG gérant l'authentification des "cardlets" contenues dans l'élément de sécurité ES, a accès aux clefs privées de ces cardlets, stockées dans un registre de l'élément de sécurité ES. Elle signe donc la chaîne de caractère contenue dans les arguments du message "authenticate", avec la clef privée de l'application AC d'émulation de carte, selon le mécanisme RSA ("Rivest Shamir Adleman"), et envoie la chaîne de caractères ainsi signée au module de lecture ML, dans une réponse au message "exchangeAPDU" correspondant au message m4. D'autres mécanismes d'authentification que RSA sont bien sûr utilisables. Dans cette étape E2, le module de lecture ML vérifie de plus, à la réception de la chaîne de caractères signée, que cette signature est correcte. Pour cela il utilise la clef publique de l'application AC d'émulation de carte, stockée dans un registre accessible au module de lecture ML sur le terminal T. Cette clef publique aura par exemple été préalablement téléchargée par l'utilisateur du terminal T depuis le serveur TSM par une connexion GPRS (d'après l'anglais "Global Packet Radio Service") à Internet, par exemple au moment de son abonnement au service fourni par l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Dans un souci de clarté et de simplification, on suppose dans cet exemple d'utilisation de l'invention, que la signature fournie par l'application AC d'émulation de carte est correcte. Une fois la signature de l'application AC d'émulation de carte vérifiée par le module de lecture ML, celui-ci effectue à la fin de cette étape E2 une demande de connexion à l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Pour cela le module de lecture ML envoie une requête JSR177 "Connector.open" représentée par le message m5 sur la figure 3, à la passerelle d'authentification CG. Cette requête a pour argument l'identifiant de l'application AC d'émulation de carte déterminé à l'étape E1.Step E2 is the authentication of the card emulation application AC by the reader module ML. For this, the reader module ML uses the method JSR177 "Connector.open" and sends an "exchangeAPDU" message on the interface 11, represented by the message m3 in FIG. 3, to the authentication gateway CG. This message includes an "authenticate" application message with in its arguments the identifier of the application AC determined in step E1, and a string of characters to be signed. The authentication gateway CG managing the authentication of the "cardlets" contained in the security element ES, has access to the private keys of these cardlets, stored in a register of the security element ES. It therefore signs the character string contained in the arguments of the "authenticate" message, with the private key of the map emulation application AC, according to the RSA mechanism ("Rivest Shamir Adleman"), and sends the string of characters thus signed to the reading module ML, in a response to the message "exchangeAPDU" corresponding to the message m4. Other authentication mechanisms than RSA are of course usable. In this step E2, the read module ML further checks, upon receipt of the signed string of characters, that this signature is correct. For this purpose, it uses the public key of the card emulation application AC, stored in a register accessible to the reader module ML on the terminal T. This public key has for example been downloaded by the user of the terminal T since. the TSM server via a GPRS connection (according to the English "Global Packet Radio Service") to the Internet, for example to time of his subscription to the service provided by the map emulation AC application. For the sake of clarity and simplification, it is assumed in this example of use of the invention that the signature provided by the map emulation application AC is correct. Once the signature of the card emulation AC application verified by the reader module ML, it performs at the end of this step E2 a connection request to the map emulation application AC. For this, the reader module ML sends a request JSR177 "Connector.open" represented by the message m5 in FIG. 3, to the authentication gateway CG. This request is based on the identifier of the map emulation application AC determined in step E1.
En variante, dans cette étape E2 la passerelle d'authentification CG n'a pas accès aux clefs privées des "cardlets" contenues dans l'élément de sécurité ES. L'authentification de l'application AC d'émulation de carte s'effectue alors par la fourniture par la passerelle d'authentification CG au module de lecture ML, d'une preuve que l'émetteur de l'élément de sécurité ES, par exemple l'opérateur de télécommunications de l'utilisateur, a bien approuvé l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Dans cette variante la passerelle d'authentification CG maintient par exemple une liste des "cardlets" approuvées par l'émetteur de l'élément de sécurité ES, et signe la chaîne de caractères reçue dans le message m3 avec une clef secrète commune à l'émetteur de l'élément de sécurité ES et au module de lecture ML.In a variant, in this step E2, the authentication gateway CG does not have access to the private keys of the "cardlets" contained in the security element ES. The authentication of the card emulation application AC is then carried out by the provision by the authentication gateway CG to the read module ML, of a proof that the issuer of the security element ES, by example the telecommunications operator of the user, has approved the AC card emulation application. In this variant, the authentication gateway CG maintains for example a list of "cardlets" approved by the issuer of the security element ES, and signs the string of characters received in the message m3 with a secret key common to the transmitter of the security element ES and the reader module ML.
L'étape E3 est l'authentification du module de lecture ML par la passerelle d'authentification CG. Pour cela la passerelle d'authentification envoie sur l'interface 11 une requête "authenticate", représentée par le message m6 sur la figure 3, au module de lecture ML. Cette requête est propriétaire, c'est-à-dire qu'elle n'est pas spécifiée par la norme JSR177. Elle est construite de manière similaire à la requête "authenticate" de l'étape E2, notamment elle inclut dans ses arguments une chaîne de caractères à signer, mais n'y inclut pas d'identifiant d'application. A la réception de cette requête "authenticate", le module de lecture signe la chaîne de caractères contenue dans cette requête avec une clef privée associée au terminal T et contenue dans un registre accessible au module de lecture ML, selon le mécanisme RSA. Puis le module de lecture ML envoie la chaîne de caractères ainsi signée à la passerelle d'authentification CG, dans une réponse à la requête "authenticate" correspondant au message m7.Step E3 is the authentication of the read module ML by the authentication gateway CG. For this, the authentication gateway sends on the interface 11 an "authenticate" request, represented by the message m6 in FIG. 3, to the read module ML. This request is proprietary, that is, it is not specified by JSR177. It is constructed similarly to the "authenticate" request of step E2, in particular it includes in its arguments a string of characters to be signed, but does not include an application identifier. On receipt of this "authenticate" request, the reading module signs the string of characters contained in this request with a private key associated with the terminal T and contained in a register accessible to the read module ML, according to the RSA mechanism. Then the reader module ML sends the string of characters thus signed to the authentication gateway CG, in a response to the request "authenticate" corresponding to the message m7.
Dans cette étape E3, la passerelle d'authentification CG vérifie de plus, à la réception de la chaîne de caractères signée, que cette signature est correcte. Pour cela elle utilise la clef publique associée au terminal T, stockée dans un registre de l'élément de sécurité ES. Cette clef publique aura par exemple été préalablement téléchargée dans ce registre en utilisant le mécanisme OTA, par l'opérateur de télécommunications de l'utilisateur. Dans un souci de clarté et de simplification, on suppose dans cet exemple d'utilisation de l'invention, que la signature fournie par le module de lecture ML est correcte.In this step E3, the authentication gateway CG further checks, upon receipt of the signed string of characters, that this signature is correct. For this it uses the public key associated with the terminal T, stored in a register of the security element ES. This public key will for example have been previously downloaded into this register using the OTA mechanism, by the telecommunications operator of the user. For the sake of clarity and simplification, it is assumed in this example of use of the invention that the signature provided by the read module ML is correct.
Une fois la signature du module de lecture ML vérifiée par la passerelle d'authentification CG, celle-ci accepte, dans cette étape E3, la demande de connexion du module de lecture ML à l'application AC d'émulation de carte, correspondant au message m5. Pour cela la passerelle d'authentification CG demande à l'application AC d'émulation de carte de créer une nouvelle interface de connexion dédiée au module de lecture ML, et envoie un identifiant de cette interface dans un message "exchangeAPDU", représenté par le message m8 sur la figure 3, au module de lecture ML. D'autres mécanismes d'authentification sont bien sûrs utilisables dans ces étapes E2 et E3, par exemple en utilisant un code secret partagé entre le module de lecture ML et l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Les données d'authentification de l'application AC d'émulation de carte ne sont en outre pas forcément spécifiques à cette application AC, elles sont par exemple associées à un domaine de sécurité applicatif dédié au fournisseur de service identifié par l'identifiant ID. De plus l'usage d'une passerelle d'authentification est optionnel : en variante, l'application AC d'émulation de carte reçoit directement le message "exchangeAPDU" contenant le message applicatif "authenticate" et s'authentifie elle-même auprès du module de lecture ML à l'étape E2. De même en variante, l'application AC d'émulation de carte authentifie directement le module de lecture ML à l'étape E3, ou n'exige pas une telle authentification, c'est-à-dire que l'étape E3 se limite alors à la connexion du module de lecture ML à l'application AC d'émulation de carte.Once the signature of the read module ML verified by the authentication gateway CG, the latter accepts, in this step E3, the connection request of the read module ML to the card emulation application AC, corresponding to the message m5. For this, the authentication gateway CG requests the card emulation application AC to create a new connection interface dedicated to the reader module ML, and sends an identifier of this interface in a "exchangeAPDU" message, represented by the message m8 in FIG. 3, to the reading module ML. Other authentication mechanisms are of course usable in these steps E2 and E3, for example by using a shared secret code between the reader module ML and the card emulation application AC. The authentication data of the map emulation application CA are moreover not necessarily specific to this application AC, they are for example associated with an application security domain dedicated to the service provider identified by the identifier ID. In addition, the use of an authentication gateway is optional: alternatively, the card emulation AC application directly receives the "exchangeAPDU" message containing the "authenticate" application message and authenticates itself with the read module ML in step E2. Similarly, alternatively, the card emulation AC application directly authenticates the read module ML in step E3, or does not require such authentication, that is to say that step E3 is limited to then at the connection of the reading module ML to the card emulation application AC.
L'étape E4 est l'établissement d'une session de communication entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG, l'application AC d'émulation de carte utilisant le module de lecture ML comme serveur mandataire (communément appelé "proxy").Step E4 is the establishment of a communication session between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG, the card emulation application AC using the reader module ML as a proxy server ( commonly called "proxy").
Le module de lecture ML ayant reçu un identifiant d'interface de connexion à l'application AC d'émulation de carte à la fin de l'étape E3, il est en mesure d'envoyer ou de recevoir des messages applicatifs ou "APDU" (d'après l'anglais "Application Protocol Data Unit") utilisant le protocole applicatif ISO 7816-4, en direction ou provenant de l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Dans cette étape E4, il envoie donc un message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" contenant un tel message applicatif et représenté par le message m9 sur la figure 3, à l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Le message applicatif contenu dans ce message m9 indique à l'application AC d'émulation de carte que le module de lecture ML est prêt à fonctionner en mode proxy avec une étiquette électronique externe au terminal T, ici l'étiquette électronique TAG.The read module ML having received a connection interface identifier to the AC card emulation application at the end of step E3, it is able to send or receive application messages or "APDU" (according to the English "Application Protocol Data Unit") using the ISO 7816-4 application protocol, to or from the AC card emulation application. In this step E4, it sends a message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" containing such an application message and represented by the message m9 in FIG. 3, to the application AC card emulation. The application message contained in this message m9 indicates to the card emulation application AC that the reader module ML is ready to operate in proxy mode with an electronic tag external to the terminal T, here the electronic tag TAG.
L'application AC d'émulation de carte envoie alors au module de lecture ML, en réponse au message m9, un premier message applicatif APDU représentée par le message m10 sur la figure 3, conformément à la norme JSR177. Le contenu de ce message n'est pas destiné au module de lecture ML, mais à l'étiquette électronique TAG, puisque le module de lecture ML fonctionne maintenant en mode proxy. A la réception du message m10, le module de lecture ML le transmet sous forme d'un message JSR257 "exchangeData" sur l'interface 12 au module radio MR, ce message "exchangeData" contenant le premier message applicatif "APDU". A la réception du message "exchangeData", le module radio MR envoie une trame "Block" conforme à la norme ISO 14443 à l'étiquette électronique TAG, cette trame "Block" contenant également le premier message applicatif "APDU". Cet envoi d'informations entre le module de lecture ML et l'étiquette électronique TAG par l'intermédiaire du module radio MR est représenté par le message m11 sur la figure 3.The card emulation AC application then sends the reader module ML, in response to the message m9, a first APDU application message represented by the message m10 in FIG. 3, in accordance with the standard JSR177. The content of this message is not intended for the reader module ML, but the electronic tag TAG, since the reader module ML now operates in proxy mode. On receipt of the message m10, the read module ML transmits it as a message JSR257 "exchangeData" on the interface 12 to the radio module MR, this message "exchangeData" containing the first "APDU" application message. Upon receipt of the "exchangeData" message, the radio module MR sends a "Block" frame conforming to the ISO 14443 standard to the electronic tag TAG, this "Block" frame also containing the first "APDU" application message. This sending of information between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG via the radio module MR is represented by the message m11 in FIG.
La transmission de ce premier message applicatif "APDU" entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG dans cette étape E4, permet d'établir une session de communication avec l'étiquette électronique TAG, dans la mesure où les échanges d'informations suivants entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG seront liés à ce premier message applicatif.The transmission of this first application message "APDU" between the map emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG in this step E4 makes it possible to establish a communication session with the electronic tag TAG, insofar as the following information exchanges between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG will be linked to this first application message.
Les échanges suivants entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG se déroulent comme suit :The following exchanges between the map emulation AC application and the TAG electronic tag are as follows:
- L'étiquette électronique TAG répond à chaque message applicatif "APDU" envoyé par l'application AC d'émulation de carte, par un message applicatif "APDU" de réponse. Pour cela l'étiquette électronique TAG envoie ce message applicatif "APDU" de réponse au module radio MR dans une trame- The electronic tag TAG responds to each application message "APDU" sent by the map emulation application AC, by an application message "APDU" response. For this, the electronic tag TAG sends this application message "APDU" response to the radio module MR in a frame
"Block" conforme à la norme ISO 14443. Le module radio MR insère alors le message applicatif "APDU" de réponse dans la réponse à la méthode "exchangeData" reçue précédemment du module de lecture ML et correspondant au message applicatif "APDU" envoyé par l'application AC d'émulation de carte."Block" conforms to the ISO 14443 standard. The radio module MR then inserts the response "APDU" application message in the response to the "exchangeData" method received previously from the read module ML and corresponding to the "APDU" application message sent by AC map emulation application.
Lorsque le module de lecture ML reçoit cette réponse à la méthode "exchangeData" contenant le message applicatif "APDU" de réponse, il insère celui-ci dans un nouveau message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" qu'il envoie à l'application AC d'émulation de carte. L'envoi d'un message applicatif "APDU" de réponse entre l'étiquette électronique TAG et le module de lecture ML par l'intermédiaire du module radio MR est représenté par le message m12 sur la figure 3, et la transmission par le module de lecture ML de ce message applicatif "APDU" de réponse à l'application AC d'émulation de carte est représenté par le message m13.When the read module ML receives this response to the "exchangeData" method containing the response "APDU" application message, it inserts it into a new JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" message that it sends to the emulation application AC. Map. The sending of an "APDU" application message of response between the electronic tag TAG and the module of reading ML via the radio module MR is represented by the message m12 in FIG. 3, and the transmission by the read module ML of this application message "APDU" of response to the card emulation application AC is represented by the message m13.
- Après réception d'une réponse de l'étiquette électronique TAG, l'application AC d'émulation de carte envoie si nécessaire un nouveau message applicatif "APDU" à l'étiquette électronique- After receiving a reply from the TAG electronic tag, the card emulation AC application sends, if necessary, a new "APDU" application message to the electronic tag
TAG, de la même façon qu'elle lui a envoyé le premier message applicatif "APDU", par l'intermédiaire du lecteur ML fonctionnant en mode proxy.TAG, in the same way that it sent him the first application message "APDU", through the ML reader running in proxy mode.
Le contenu des messages applicatifs "APDU" échangés entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG dépend de l'implémentation du service fourni par ces deux entités. Par exemple si ce service exige une haute sécurisation des données échangées, l'étiquette électronique TAG et l'application AC d'émulation de carte s'authentifient mutuellement avant que l'étiquette électronique TAG autorise l'application AC d'émulation de carte à lire les données DS contenues dans l'étiquette électronique TAG. De plus l'envoi des données DS à l'application AC d'émulation de carte est éventuellement crypté. Cette option est détaillée plus loin dans la deuxième variante de réalisation de l'invention.The content of the "APDU" application messages exchanged between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG depends on the implementation of the service provided by these two entities. For example, if this service requires high security of the exchanged data, the TAG electronic label and the card emulation AC application mutually authenticate each other before the TAG electronic tag authorizes the AC application to emulate the card. read the DS data contained in the TAG electronic tag. Moreover, the sending of the DS data to the card emulation application AC is possibly encrypted. This option is detailed later in the second embodiment of the invention.
L'étape E5 est la lecture des données DS stockées dans l'étiquette électronique TAG, par l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Pour cela l'application AC d'émulation de carte envoie un message applicatif "APDU" à l'étiquette électronique TAG, éventuellement crypté, indiquant à l'étiquette électronique TAG qu'elle est prête à recevoir les données DS. Dans le cas où aucune authentification mutuelle entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG n'était nécessaire à l'étape E4, ce message applicatif "APDU" est le premier message applicatif "APDU" envoyé par l'application AC d'émulation de carte à l'étiquette électronique TAG. A la réception de ce message applicatif "APDU", l'étiquette électronique TAG envoie à l'application AC d'émulation de carte un message applicatif "APDU" de réponse, éventuellement crypté, contenant les données DS.Step E5 is the reading of the DS data stored in the electronic tag TAG by the card emulation application AC. For this, the map emulation application AC sends an application message "APDU" to the electronic tag TAG, possibly encrypted, indicating to the electronic tag TAG that it is ready to receive the data DS. In the case where no mutual authentication between the map emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG was necessary in step E4, this application message "APDU" is the first application message "APDU" sent by the user. AC card emulation application to the TAG electronic tag. On receipt of this "APDU" application message, the electronic tag TAG sends the card emulation application AC an "APDU" application message, possibly encrypted, containing the DS data.
Il est à noter que dans ce mode de réalisation de l'invention, un seul échange de messages applicatifs est nécessaire entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG dans cette étape E5 pour lire les données DS, mais dans d'autres variantes de réalisation de l'invention, par exemple en fonction du service fourni, plusieurs échanges sont éventuellement nécessaires. De plus il n'est pas nécessaire de respecter l'ordre des étapes E1 à E5 ni d'implémenter toutes ces étapes pour réaliser le procédé de lecture selon l'invention. En effet dans le cas où l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG s'authentifient mutuellement, et où leurs échanges sont cryptés, les étapes E2 et E3 ne sont par exemple pas nécessaires. Ce dernier cas correspond à la deuxième variante de réalisation de l'invention, détaillé ci-dessous.It should be noted that in this embodiment of the invention, a single exchange of application messages is necessary between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG in this step E5 to read the data DS, but in other embodiments of the invention, for example depending on the service provided, several exchanges may be necessary. In addition, it is not necessary to respect the order of steps E1 to E5 nor to implement all these steps to carry out the reading method according to the invention. In fact, in the case where the map emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG mutually authenticate each other, and where their exchanges are encrypted, the steps E2 and E3 are, for example, not necessary. This last case corresponds to the second variant embodiment of the invention, detailed below.
En référence à la figure 4, le procédé de lecture selon l'invention est maintenant décrit dans une seconde variante de réalisation sous la forme d'un algorithme comportant des étapes F1 à F4. Cette seconde variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention est beaucoup moins détaillée que la première variante de réalisation, car ces deux variantes présentent beaucoup d'étapes et de messages utilisés en commun. Les différences entre cette seconde variante de réalisation et la première variante de réalisation résident en effet surtout dans la façon d'authentifier l'application AC d'émulation de carte.With reference to FIG. 4, the reading method according to the invention is now described in a second variant embodiment in the form of an algorithm comprising steps F1 to F4. This second embodiment of the reading method according to the invention is much less detailed than the first embodiment, because these two variants have many steps and messages used in common. The differences between this second embodiment variant and the first embodiment essentially reside in the way of authenticating the AC map emulation application.
L'étape F1 est la lecture de l'identifiant ID de fournisseur de service sur l'étiquette électronique TAG par le module de lecture ML. Cette étape s'effectue de la même manière que l'étape E1 dans la première variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention : elle utilise un échange de deux messages entre le module de lecture ML et l'étiquette électronique TAG, ces messages transitant par le module radio MR. Cet échange est représenté par les messages m'1 et m'2 sur la figure 5.Step F1 is the reading of the service provider identifier ID on the electronic tag TAG by the read module ML. This step is carried out in the same way as step E1 in the first variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention: it uses an exchange of two messages between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG, these messages passing through the radio module MR. This exchange is represented by the messages m'1 and m'2 in FIG.
De la même manière qu'à l'étape E1 , dans cette étape F1 le module de lecture ML déduit du flux d'octets reçu dans le message m'2, l'identifiant ID du fournisseur de service associé à l'étiquette TAG, et détermine un identifiant de l'application AC d'émulation de carte correspondant.In the same way as in step E1, in this step F1 the read module ML deduced from the stream of bytes received in the message m'2, the identifier ID of the service provider associated with the tag TAG, and determines an identifier of the corresponding map emulation AC application.
L'étape F2 est une demande de connexion du module de lecture ML à l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Pour cela le module de lecture ML utilise la méthode JSR177 "Connector.open" et envoie un message "exchangeAPDU" représenté par le message m'3 sur la figure 5, à la passerelle d'authentification CG. Ce message a pour argument l'identifiant de l'application AC d'émulation de carte déterminé à l'étape F1. Contrairement à la première variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention, ce message ne contient pas de message applicatif "authenticate" et ne provoque pas l'authentification du module de lecture ML par la passerelle d'authentification CG. A la réception du message "exchangeAPDU", la passerelle d'authentification CG demande à l'application AC d'émulation de carte de créer une nouvelle interface de connexion dédiée au module de lecture ML, et envoie un identifiant de cette interface dans une réponse au message "exchangeAPDU", représentée par le message m'4 sur la figure 5, au module de lecture ML.Step F2 is a connection request from the read module ML to the card emulation application AC. For this, the reader module ML uses the method JSR177 "Connector.open" and sends an "exchangeAPDU" message represented by the message m'3 in FIG. 5, to the authentication gateway CG. This message is based on the identifier of the card emulation application AC determined in step F1. Unlike the first embodiment of the reading method according to the invention, this message does not contain an "authenticate" application message and does not cause the authentication of the reader module ML by the authentication gateway CG. Upon receipt of the "exchangeAPDU" message, the authentication gateway CG requests the card emulation AC application to create a new connection interface dedicated to the reader module ML, and sends an identifier of this interface in a response. the "exchangeAPDU" message, represented by the message m'4 in FIG. 5, to the reading module ML.
L'étape F3 est l'établissement d'une session de communication entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG, l'application AC d'émulation de carte utilisant le module de lecture ML comme serveur mandataire (communément appelé "proxy").Step F3 is the establishment of a communication session between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG, the card emulation application AC using the reader module ML as a proxy server ( commonly called "proxy").
Dans cette étape F3, le module de lecture ML envoie un message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" contenant un message applicatif et représenté par le message m'5 sur la figure 5, à l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Le message applicatif contenu dans ce message m'5 indique à l'application AC d'émulation de carte que le module de lecture ML est prêt à fonctionner en mode proxy avec une étiquette électronique externe au terminal T, ici l'étiquette électronique TAG.In this step F3, the reader module ML sends a message JSR177 "exchangeAPDU" containing an application message and represented by the message m'5 in FIG. 5, to the application AC card emulation. The application message contained in this message tells me to the card emulation AC application that the read module ML is ready to operate in proxy mode with an electronic tag external to the terminal T, here the electronic tag TAG.
L'application AC d'émulation de carte envoie alors au module de lecture ML, en réponse au message m'5, une réponse applicative APDU représentée par le message m'6 sur la figure 5, conformément à la norme JSR177. Le contenu de ce message n'est pas destiné au module de lecture ML, mais à l'étiquette électronique TAG, puisque le module de lecture ML fonctionne en mode proxy, et a pour but d'authentifier l'étiquette électronique TAG. A la réception du message m'6, le module de lecture ML le transmet sous forme d'un message JSR257 "exchangeData" sur l'interface 12 au module radio MR, ce message "exchangeData" contenant la réponse applicative "APDU". A la réception du message "exchangeData", le module radio MR envoie une trame "Block" conforme à la norme ISO 14443 à l'étiquette électronique TAG, cette trame "Block" contenant également la réponse applicative "APDU". Cet envoi d'informations entre le module de lecture ML et l'étiquette électronique TAG par l'intermédiaire du module radio MR est représenté par le message m'7 sur la figure 3.The card emulation AC application then sends the reader module ML, in response to the message m'5, an APDU application response represented by the message m'6 in FIG. 5, in accordance with the standard JSR177. The content of this message is not intended for the read module ML, but the electronic tag TAG, since the read module ML operates in proxy mode, and aims to authenticate the electronic tag TAG. On receipt of the message m'6, the read module ML transmits it as a message JSR257 "exchangeData" on the interface 12 to the radio module MR, this message "exchangeData" containing the application response "APDU". Upon receipt of the "exchangeData" message, the radio module MR sends a "Block" frame conforming to the ISO 14443 standard to the electronic tag TAG, this "Block" frame also containing the application response "APDU". This sending of information between the read module ML and the electronic tag TAG via the radio module MR is represented by the message m'7 in FIG.
Dans cette variante de réalisation de l'invention, l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG partagent une clef secrète, stockée d'une part dans l'étiquette électronique TAG, et d'autre part téléchargée par exemple préalablement dans l'application AC d'émulation de carte par le mécanisme OTA. Cette clef secrète sert à l'application AC d'émulation de carte pour s'authentifier dans cette étape F3, sous forme d'une authentification mutuelle entre l'étiquette électronique TAG et l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Une authentification mutuelle par clef publique est cependant également utilisable.In this variant embodiment of the invention, the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG share a secret key, stored on the one hand in the electronic tag TAG, and on the other hand downloaded for example previously in the map emulation application AC by the OTA mechanism. This secret key is used by the card emulation application CA to authenticate in this step F3, in the form of mutual authentication between the electronic tag TAG and the card emulation application AC. Mutual authentication by public key is however also usable.
La réponse applicative APDU reçue par l'étiquette électronique TAG dans le message m'7 comporte ainsi une chaîne de caractères à déchiffrer par l'étiquette électronique TAG, cette chaîne de caractères ayant été chiffrée préalablement par l'application AC d'émulation de carte à l'aide de la clef secrète partagée entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG.The APDU application response received by the electronic tag TAG in the message m'7 thus comprises a string of characters to be decrypted by the electronic tag TAG, this string of characters having been previously encrypted by the card emulation application AC. using the key secret shared between the map emulation AC application and the TAG electronic tag.
La transmission de cette réponse applicative "APDU" entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG dans cette étape F3, permet d'établir une session de communication avec l'étiquette électronique TAG, dans la mesure où les échanges d'informations suivants entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG seront liés à cette première réponse applicative.The transmission of this application response "APDU" between the map emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG in this step F3, makes it possible to establish a communication session with the electronic tag TAG, insofar as the The following information exchanges between the map emulation AC application and the TAG electronic tag will be linked to this first application response.
Les échanges suivants entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG se déroulent selon le modèle décrit dans l'étape E4 de la première variante de réalisation du procédé de lecture selon l'invention, par échange de messages applicatifs APDU entre l'étiquette électronique TAG et l'application AC d'émulation de carte.The following exchanges between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG take place according to the model described in step E4 of the first variant embodiment of the reading method according to the invention, by exchange of application messages. APDU between the TAG electronic tag and the map emulation AC application.
A la réception du message m'7, l'étiquette électronique TAG déchiffre la chaîne de caractères incluse dans ce message à l'aide de la clef secrète, et envoie un autre message applicatif à destination de l'application AC d'émulation de carte, comportant la chaîne de caractères déchiffrée et une autre chaîne de caractères à déchiffrer. Ce message applicatif est transporté par les messages m'8 et m'9 représentés à la figure 5. A la réception de ce message applicatif, l'application AC d'émulation de carte vérifie que l'étiquette électronique TAG a correctement déchiffré la chaîne de caractères précédemment envoyée à celle-ci. Si ce déchiffrement est incorrect, l'application AC d'émulation de carte interrompt la session de communication avec l'étiquette électronique TAG. Si au contraire ce déchiffrement est correct, l'application AC d'émulation de carte déchiffre la chaîne de caractères à déchiffrer envoyée par l'étiquette électronique TAG et envoie la chaîne de caractères ainsi déchiffrée dans une nouvelle réponse applicative, transportée par l'intermédiaire de messages de plus bas niveau m'10 et m'11 , jusqu'à l'étiquette électronique TAG. A la réception de cette réponse, l'étiquette électronique TAG vérifie que l'application AC d'émulation de carte a bien déchiffré cette chaîne de caractères. Si ce déchiffrement est incorrect, l'étiquette électronique TAG interrompt la session de communication avec l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Au contraire si ce déchiffrement est correct, l'étiquette électronique TAG autorise alors l'application AC d'émulation de carte à lire les données DS contenues dans l'étiquette électronique TAG.On receipt of the message m'7, the electronic tag TAG decrypts the string of characters included in this message using the secret key, and sends another application message to the card emulation application AC. , with the decrypted string of characters and another string of characters to decipher. This application message is carried by the messages m'8 and me 9 shown in Figure 5. Upon receipt of this application message, the map emulation AC application checks that the electronic tag TAG has correctly decrypted the chain previously sent to it. If this decryption is incorrect, the card emulation AC application interrupts the communication session with the electronic tag TAG. If, on the other hand, this decryption is correct, the card emulation application AC decrypts the string of characters to be decrypted sent by the electronic tag TAG and sends the string of characters thus deciphered in a new application response, transported via lower-level messages m'10 and m'11, to the TAG electronic tag. On receipt of this response, the electronic tag TAG verifies that the map emulation application AC has deciphered this chain of characters. If this decryption is incorrect, the electronic tag TAG interrupts the communication session with the map emulation application AC. On the contrary, if this decryption is correct, the electronic tag TAG then authorizes the card emulation application AC to read the DS data contained in the electronic tag TAG.
Enfin l'étape F4 est la lecture des données DS stockées dans l'étiquette électronique TAG, par l'application AC d'émulation de carte. Pour cela l'étiquette électronique TAG envoie à l'application AC d'émulation de carte un message applicatif "APDU" de réponse, crypté en utilisant la clef secrète partagée entre l'application AC d'émulation de carte et l'étiquette électronique TAG, contenant les données DS.Finally, the step F4 is the reading of the DS data stored in the electronic tag TAG, by the card emulation application AC. For this, the electronic tag TAG sends the card emulation application AC an application "APDU" response message, encrypted using the secret key shared between the card emulation application AC and the electronic tag TAG. , containing the DS data.
En variante, l'étiquette électronique TAG n'envoie les données DS à l'application AC d'émulation de carte qu'après réception de la part de celle-ci d'un message applicatif "APDU" éventuellement crypté, indiquant à l'étiquette électronique TAG que l'application AC d'émulation de carte est prête à recevoir les données DS.As a variant, the electronic tag TAG sends the DS data to the card emulation application CA only after receipt by the latter of an optionally encrypted application message "APDU", indicating to the TAG electronic tag that the card emulation AC application is ready to receive DS data.
Il est à noter que le cryptage des données DS envoyées par l'étiquette électronique TAG n'est pas nécessaire à la mise en œuvre de l'invention, il est par exemple activé en fonction du degré de sécurité souhaité par le fournisseur de service associé à l'étiquette électronique TAG. It should be noted that the encryption of the data DS sent by the electronic tag TAG is not necessary for the implementation of the invention, it is for example activated according to the degree of security desired by the associated service provider to the TAG electronic tag.

Claims

REVENDICATIONS
1. Procédé de lecture d'une étiquette électronique (TAG) stockant des données comportant un identifiant (ID), par un terminal (T) muni d'un module de lecture (ML) radio courte distance et d'une application (AC) d'émulation de carte, associée audit identifiant (ID) et située dans un élément sécurisé (ES) dudit terminal (T), ledit procédé étant caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes de :1. A method for reading an electronic tag (TAG) storing data comprising an identifier (ID), by a terminal (T) equipped with a reading module (ML) radio short distance and an application (AC) card emulation associated with said identifier (ID) and located in a secure element (ES) of said terminal (T), said method being characterized in that it comprises the steps of:
- lecture (E1 , F1 ) par ledit module de lecture (ML) dudit identifiant (ID),reading (E1, F1) by said read module (ML) of said identifier (ID),
- établissement (E4, F3) d'une session de communication entre ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique (TAG), ledit module de lecture (ML) étant utilisé comme serveur mandataire par ladite application d'émulation de carte (AC), ladite application d'émulation de carte (AC) ayant été préalablement authentifiée,establishment (E4, F3) of a communication session between said card emulation application (AC) and said electronic tag (TAG), said reading module (ML) being used as a proxy server by said emulation application of a card (AC), said card emulation application (CA) having been previously authenticated,
- et lecture (E5, F4) par ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte de données (DS) stockées dans ladite étiquette électronique (TAG) et destinées à ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte.and reading (E5, F4) by said data card (DS) emulation application (AC) stored in said electronic tag (TAG) and intended for said card emulation application (AC).
2. Procédé de lecture selon la revendication 1 , caractérisé en ce que ledit module de lecture (ML) est un lecteur NFC et ladite étiquette électronique (TAG) est une étiquette RFID passive.2. The reading method according to claim 1, characterized in that said reading module (ML) is an NFC reader and said electronic tag (TAG) is a passive RFID tag.
3. Procédé de lecture selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que l'étape (F3) d'établissement de ladite session de communication comporte une sous-étape d'authentification mutuelle entre ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique (TAG). 3. Reading method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the step (F3) of establishing said communication session comprises a substep of mutual authentication between said application (AC) card emulation and said electronic tag (TAG).
4. Procédé de lecture selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé en ce que ladite session de communication utilise un tunnel sécurisé entre ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte et ladite étiquette électronique (TAG).4. Reading method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that said communication session uses a secure tunnel between said card emulation application (AC) and said electronic tag (TAG).
5. Procédé de lecture selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que l'étape de lecture (E1 ) par ledit module de lecture (ML) dudit identifiant (ID) est suivie d'une étape d'authentification (E2) de ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture (ML).5. Reading method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the reading step (E1) by said read module (ML) of said identifier (ID) is followed by an authentication step (E2) of said card emulation application (AC) by said read module (ML).
6. Procédé de lecture selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce que ladite étape d'authentification (E2) de ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture (ML) est précédée ou suivie d'une étape d'authentification (E3) dudit module de lecture (ML) par une entité (CG, AC) dudit élément sécurisé (ES).6. Reading method according to claim 5, characterized in that said authentication step (E2) of said card emulation application (AC) by said read module (ML) is preceded or followed by a step of authentication (E3) of said read module (ML) by an entity (CG, AC) of said secure element (ES).
7. Procédé de lecture selon la revendication 5 ou 6, dans lequel lorsque ledit élément sécurisé (ES) est une carte à puce insérée dans ledit terminal (T), lors de ladite étape (E2) d'authentification de ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte par ledit module de lecture (ML), les données d'authentification de ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte sont fournies par une passerelle d'authentification (CG) contenue dans le système d'exploitation de ladite carte à puce.7. Reading method according to claim 5 or 6, wherein when said secure element (ES) is a smart card inserted in said terminal (T), during said step (E2) authentication of said application (AC) of card emulation by said read module (ML), the authentication data of said card emulation application (AC) are provided by an authentication gateway (CG) contained in the operating system of said Smartcard.
8. Terminal mobile (T) muni d'un module de lecture (ML) radio courte distance, ledit terminal mobile (T) étant caractérisé en ce que ledit module de lecture (ML) comporte :8. Mobile terminal (T) provided with a short distance radio reading module (ML), said mobile terminal (T) being characterized in that said reading module (ML) comprises:
- des moyens de lecture d'un identifiant (ID) stocké dans une étiquette électronique (TAG), - et des moyens de fonctionnement comme serveur mandataire entre une application (AC) d'émulation de carte située dans un élément sécurisé (ES) et ladite étiquette électronique (TAG), lorsque ledit élément sécurisé (ES) est inséré dans ledit terminal mobile (T).means for reading an identifier (ID) stored in an electronic tag (TAG), and means for operating as a proxy server between a card emulation application (AC) located in an element secure (ES) and said electronic tag (TAG), when said secure element (ES) is inserted into said mobile terminal (T).
9. Carte à puce (ES) hébergeant une application (AS) d'émulation de carte associée à un identifiant (ID), caractérisée en ce qu'elle comporte :9. Smart card (ES) hosting a card emulation application (AS) associated with an identifier (ID), characterized in that it comprises:
- une passerelle d'authentification (CG) comportant des moyens d'authentification de ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte auprès d'une étiquette électronique (TAG) ou d'un module de lecture (ML) radio courte distance d'un terminal mobile (T), - des moyens d'établissement d'une session de communication avec ladite étiquette électronique (TAG), en utilisant ledit module de lecture (ML) radio courte distance comme serveur mandataire,an authentication gateway (CG) comprising means for authenticating said card emulation application (AC) with an electronic tag (TAG) or a short distance radio reading module (ML); a mobile terminal (T); means for establishing a communication session with said electronic tag (TAG), using said short distance radio reading module (ML) as a proxy server;
- et des moyens de lecture de données (DS) destinées à ladite application (AC) d'émulation de carte et stockées dans ladite étiquette électronique (TAG), au cours de ladite session de communication.and data reading means (DS) intended for said card emulation application (AC) and stored in said electronic tag (TAG), during said communication session.
10. Programme d'ordinateur comportant des instructions pour mettre en œuvre le procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 7, lorsqu'il est exécuté sur un circuit intégré, un microprocesseur, un processeur ou un ordinateur. A computer program comprising instructions for implementing the method of any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed on an integrated circuit, microprocessor, processor, or computer.
PCT/FR2008/052275 2007-12-21 2008-12-11 Method of reading an electronic tag by a terminal WO2009083679A2 (en)

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