WO2009015979A2 - Method, computerized device and computer program for efficient and low power encrypting or decrypting of data - Google Patents

Method, computerized device and computer program for efficient and low power encrypting or decrypting of data Download PDF

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WO2009015979A2
WO2009015979A2 PCT/EP2008/058572 EP2008058572W WO2009015979A2 WO 2009015979 A2 WO2009015979 A2 WO 2009015979A2 EP 2008058572 W EP2008058572 W EP 2008058572W WO 2009015979 A2 WO2009015979 A2 WO 2009015979A2
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sequence
binary
pseudo
data
encrypted
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PCT/EP2008/058572
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French (fr)
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WO2009015979A3 (en
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Frederic Bauchot
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International Business Machines Corporation
Compagnie Ibm France
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Publication of WO2009015979A3 publication Critical patent/WO2009015979A3/en

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/26Testing cryptographic entity, e.g. testing integrity of encryption key or encryption algorithm

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of computer data encrypting and decrypting, especially for compact or low performance or power devices such as smartcard or nomad and mobile computerized objects.
  • a further object of the invention is to provide a computerized device or system implementing such a method, and a computer program to be executed on it for implementing such a method.
  • Such objects are accomplished through a method for encrypting or decrypting data in a computer.
  • the method comprises processing at least one pseudo-random sequence of numbers generated from at least one first key for encrypting or decrypting this data.
  • First and second operations are two different arithmetical functions. They are selected so as, for at least one of these two operations, when a first number is processed through such operation issuing a second number, the result of the test condition on the second number is not systematically identical to the result of the test condition on the first number.
  • both first and second operations are selected under such a condition.
  • the test condition is a parity test
  • any function which may never cause a parity change cannot be chosen as such an operation.
  • adding an even number or multiplying with an even number may not be selected as such an operation.
  • This potential change of test condition between first and second number of the pseudo-random sequence is a factor for a more randomly distributed sequence.
  • the invention proposes to generate the second number through a function of the Collatz type, as defined hereafter.
  • the first number is an integer and the step of checking the test condition comprises calculating parity of this first number.
  • Parity computing is quite simple and fast done in binary circuits, and enables good performance with low complexity and power consumption.
  • the test condition may comprise calculating a value of this first number under a modular equality.
  • the method according to the invention may involve three cases and three operations, depending on a test condition of equality modulo 3.
  • the pseudo-random sequence of numbers is used for encrypting or decrypting binary data, through a method comprising the following steps: - generating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers from a first key data, termed starting number, treated as an initial first number for this pseudo-random sequence of numbers;
  • first and second operations are chosen such that the result of applying the first operation on the first number is greater than this first number, while the result of applying the second operation on this same first number is lesser than this first number, or reversely.
  • This feature enables the sequence to involve numbers staying relatively low, thus minimizing the need for large binary registers or memories. Also, it combines well with the conversion treatment described hereabove for issuing a more randomly distributed pseudo-random binary sequence.
  • the invention proposes using functions with the following features, as first and/or second operations:
  • - applying the first operation on the first number comprises dividing this first number by a determined number greater than one;
  • - applying the second operation on the first number comprises multiplying this first number by another number greater than one, the result of which being further added with an odd number.
  • test condition and first and second operations involve the following features.
  • the step of checking the test condition results in the first case when the first number parity is even.
  • the step of applying the first operation to this first number then comprises dividing this first number by an even integer.
  • the step of checking the test condition results in the second case when the first number parity is odd.
  • the step of applying the second operation to this first number then comprises multiplying this first number with another integer greater than one, the result of which being then added with one.
  • the function is selected so as to ensure that the function cannot "loop on itself", meaning that for any starting first number, the function will always, after multiple iterations, converge to the same fixed number.
  • the method moreover comprises a step of verifying that the function is not looping on itself, e.g. through verifying that the second number was not already obtained in the pseudo-random sequence of numbers.
  • first and second operations are defined as follows.
  • the step of applying the first operation to the first number further comprises dividing this first number by two.
  • the step of applying the second operation to the first number further comprises multiplying this first number with three, the result of which being then added with one.
  • the step of encyphering binary data, termed plain data, into encrypted binary data furthermore comprises the following steps:
  • word sequence a sequence of consecutive binary words, termed word sequence, of a length based on a second key data
  • the step of decyphering encrypted binary data into decrypted binary data furthermore comprises the following steps: - reading this encrypted data into a sequence of numbers, termed encrypted sequence;
  • word sequence a sequence of binary data words, termed word sequence, from this encrypted sequence, where at least one number of this encrypted sequence is used as an offset for reading, whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence, a binary word the length of which is based on a second key data, this number of this encrypted sequence being replaced with this binary word into this word sequence; - concatenating this word sequence into decrypted data.
  • a computerized device or system is also provided by the present invention, implementing such encrypting and/or decrypting method into software processing processor, or hardware or mixed circuits.
  • the invention also prvides a computer program the instructions of which carry out the steps of such a method, when this computer program is executed on a computer system.
  • FIGURE 1 schematically illustrates the progress of an encrypting process according to the invention
  • FIGURE 2 schematically illustrates the progress of a decrypting process according to the invention
  • FIGURE 3 is a block diagram illustrating an encrypted data transmission method between an emitter and a receiver, according to the invention
  • FIGURE 4 is a diagram illustrating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers for an example starting number value of 27, according to the preferred embodiment of the invention
  • - FIGURE 5 is a table showing the distribution pattern of available offsets, for all possible word values with an example word length value of 4 bits, for the 64 first starting numbers which enable all such values, according to the preferred embodiment of the invention
  • - FIGURE 6 is a table showing the distribution pattern of available offsets, for a binary word with an example value of 14, among the 64 first starting numbers which enable all values of binary words with an example length of 4 bits
  • FIGURE 7 is an histogram showing the distribution of the number of possible starting numbers for ciphering the example binary word of FIGURE 6, among the same 64 first starting numbers.
  • a preferred embodiment of the invention is based on a pseudo-random sequence generated by a function of a Collatz type.
  • This conjecture asks whether a sequence based on the Collatz function, or a certain kind of number sequence, always ends in the same way regardless of the starting number.
  • Each SN 1 is a stage of the flight.
  • the highest SN 1 is known as the maximal elevation of the flight. • The duration of the flight is the number of stages before reaching the value 1.
  • the expansion factor is the ratio between the maximal elevation and the starting value So.
  • This original function may be generalized into a type of functions called Collatz type.
  • the method according to the invention uses a function of Collatz type for generating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers .
  • Collatz type function is chosen for generating a pseudo-random sequence of numbers.
  • FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 respectively illustrate encrypting and decrypting of binary data according to the invention.
  • a starting number So HO is used as a secret key for encrypting plain binary data 114 comprising a sequence ⁇ bi ⁇ of binary bits.
  • This starting number 110 is used as an initial first number for generating 121 and memorizing a pseudo-random sequence of numbers (S 1 J 112, through iteration of the pseudo-random function .
  • the generated pseudo-random sequence 112 of numbers is then processed through a conversion treatment 122, resulting into a pseudo-random sequence 113 of binary digits ⁇ sbi ⁇ .
  • the conversion treatment 122 comprises the following steps:
  • Plain data 114 is converted 123 into a sequence 115 of consecutive binary words, termed word sequence ⁇ wi ⁇ , these words being of a length L based on a second key data 111.
  • This second key data may be used as a second secret key, possibly transmitted or detained separately from a first secret key based on the starting number 110.
  • the first 110 and second 111 key data may also be united or combined to form a unique secret key, which then need to be separated before use.
  • a encrypted sequence 116 of numbers ⁇ ni ⁇ is generated 124 through replacing each binary word W 1 with a number n ⁇ representing one position containing said binary word within the pseudo-random binary sequence 113.
  • the encrypted sequence of number 116 is then converted 125 into a sequence ⁇ cbi ⁇ of binary data 117, providing the encrypted data 117 issued from the initial plain data 114.
  • a starting number So 210 is used as a secret key for decrypting a encrypted binary data 214 comprising a sequence ⁇ cbi ⁇ of binary bits.
  • a pseudo- random binary sequence 213 is generated 221, 222 from the same starting number 210, which was once used for producing this encrypted binary data 214.
  • the resulting binary pseudo-random binary sequence 213 is then used for decyphering a sequence ⁇ cbi ⁇ of binary data 214, termed encrypted data, into a plain sequence ⁇ bi ⁇ of binary data 217.
  • the decyphering process comprises comes as follows.
  • the encrypted data 214 is read 223 into a sequence of numbers ⁇ ni ⁇ , termed encrypted sequence 215.
  • a sequence of binary data words ⁇ wi ⁇ , termed word sequence 216 is generated 224 from the encrypted binary sequence 213.
  • Each number from this encrypted sequence of numbers 215 is used as an offset for selecting a reading position whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence 213. Starting from this reading position, a binary word is read of a length L corresponding to the same second key data 211, which was once used for producing this encrypted binary data 214 .
  • decrypted data 217 a sequence of binary data ⁇ bi ⁇ , termed decrypted data 217, which is then identical to the binary data that was once used for producing the encrypted binary data 214.
  • FIGURE 3 illustrates more specifically a transmitting process of binary data 300 between an emitting device 301 and a receiving device 302.
  • the binary information 300 to be shared from A to B is represented by a sequences of N bits ⁇ ] ⁇ f .
  • N is a multiple of L
  • the proposed method for ciphering the binary information is based on the following steps:
  • both parties A 301 and B 302 build (312, respectively 322) build the binary pseudo-random sequence [S 1 ] defined by:
  • emission from A 301 to B 302 comprises the following steps:
  • the B party 302 receives 323 the series ⁇ ⁇ _ from the A party. - For each offset n ⁇ , the B party reconstructs 324 each word
  • FIGURE 4 shows the flight corresponding to the pseudo-random sequence 112, 212 generated for this value of "27" for the secret key.
  • the same pseudo-random binary sequence 113, 213 built by both parties A and B may be written as :
  • the ciphered information ⁇ ni ⁇ 116 sent, e.g. under a standard binary form, from A to B is: 5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 24, 8, 31, 12 ⁇ .
  • the B party receives this sequence, e.g. under its binary form, and uses it as a sequence 215 of offsets for generating the plain binary data 217.
  • the party B applies each number of the encrypted sequence V 1 J jZ 1 215 to the binary form 113, 213 of the pseudo random sequence [S 1 ] 112, 212, for deriving the sequence of words Jw 7 J I ⁇ 216. Concatenation of the binary words from this word sequence 216 thus provides a binary sequence 217 identical to the genuine information 300, 114:
  • ⁇ bXJ ⁇ 1011111110101011011011011001101011011101 ⁇ .
  • a third party C wants to break the ciphered information, but ignoring both the secret key So and the secret length L. This third party C assumes that the secret key is equal to 91 (wrong choice) and that the secret key is equal to 4 (right choice) . Under these assumptions, we have for the party C:
  • the ciphered information 117, 214 is indeed a encrypted form af the genuine plain data 114, 217. According to selected combinations of length L and starting number So, strength and flexibility of the encryption may vary.
  • breaking the code may be easier than if several offsets are possible .
  • FIGURE 5 to FIGURE 7 illustrates an example of distribution for the coding possibilities for a word length L of 4 bits.
  • a 4 bits-word may takes 72 different values, ranging from ⁇ 0000 ⁇ to ⁇ 1111 ⁇ .
  • FIGURE 5 is a table showing a distribution pattern of available offsets, for all possible word values with length value of 4 bits. This table shows the 64 first starting numbers which may be used as full keys for such a word.
  • the top title line 501 shows the values of these 64 first full keys. All possible decimal value of a 4 bits binary word stand in the left title column 502, while the total number of possible offset for each word value stands in the right column 503.
  • starting number 27 results in a pseudo-random binary sequence which offers 7 different offsets corresponding to the word ⁇ 1110 ⁇ , i.e. with value 14.
  • this word value 14 may be coded in 422 possibilities for the 64 first full keys.
  • offsets from 1 to 72 stand on the bottom line 701, while each bar of the histogram 702 shows the number of possible starting numbers for ciphering the same binary word of value 14, among the same 64 first full keys.
  • This example is one among several simulations that gave similar results, thus indicating an interesting encryption performance when balanced with the low need in power or speed resources .
  • selection of any starting number as a key may be validated through checking that this starting number is indeed a full key for the word length selected.
  • starting numbers may be selected as keys even if not a full key.
  • the encrypting method may then comprise a step of changing this key into another, through an algorithm shared between parties, e.g. by automatically selecting the next full key when encountering a word with no available offset in the initial key.
  • Such a key modification may also be triggered on a test issuing a strength quality too low for the selected key, for some words or for all of them.
  • Such a strength quality evaluation may be based on a low number 608 of possible keys for a given word at a given offset 607 of the pseudo-random binary sequence 113, 213.
  • First and/or second operation may also be changed or modified, for the generation of the whole pseudo-random sequence or in the course of such a generation.
  • pseudo-random sequences may also be used together, alternatively or interleaved.

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of computer data encrypting and decrypting, especially for mobile equipments like PDA, mobile phones, smart cards and the like, which need a good trade-off between computing speed, power consumption and security strength. The invention provides an encrypting/decrypting method implementing simple data operation. This method is based on generating a pseudo-random sequence through a function of the Collatz (or Syracuse) family from a starting number used as a secret key. Binary words of a secret length, extracted from the plain data, are encrypted into a sequence of encrypted numbers representing the offsets of these words whithin the binary form of the pseudo-random sequence.

Description

Method, computerized device and computer program for efficient and low power encrypting or decrypting of data
Field of the invention
The present invention relates to the field of computer data encrypting and decrypting, especially for compact or low performance or power devices such as smartcard or nomad and mobile computerized objects.
Background of the invention
In encryptography, more and more processing power is required to encipher or decipher texts or data. This often calls for dedicated "hardware assist" components which need substantial computer resources (memory, CPU cycles) which themselves ask for significant energy sources. On mobile equipment such as PDAs, mobile phones, smart cards and the like, it is desirable to have systems which present a good trade-off between power consumption and security strength.
Objects of the invention
It is an object of the present invention to provide a encryptography method, and devices or systems implementing it, with a good trade-off between power consumption, computing speed and security strength, enabling low power consumption values and enhanced autonomy. It is also an object to provide such a method which may be implemented in low speed or simple arithmetic modules or controllers or processors, while retaining a certain level of encryptographic security strength.
A further object of the invention is to provide a computerized device or system implementing such a method, and a computer program to be executed on it for implementing such a method.
Summary of the invention
The invention is disclosed as defined in the appended claims .
Such objects are accomplished through a method for encrypting or decrypting data in a computer. The method comprises processing at least one pseudo-random sequence of numbers generated from at least one first key for encrypting or decrypting this data.
Generation of this pseudo-random sequence of numbers comprises an iteration of a function termed pseudo-random function, which is defined as comprising the following steps:
- testing a determined test condition on a first number from this sequence;
- in at least a first case of said test condition, applying on said first number a first operation;
- in at least a second case of this test condition, applying on this first number a second operation;
- using result of this first operation or second operation for obtaining a second number, this second number taking place in this sequence after this first number.
First and second operations are two different arithmetical functions. They are selected so as, for at least one of these two operations, when a first number is processed through such operation issuing a second number, the result of the test condition on the second number is not systematically identical to the result of the test condition on the first number. Preferably, both first and second operations are selected under such a condition. As an example, if the test condition is a parity test, any function which may never cause a parity change cannot be chosen as such an operation. Thus, adding an even number or multiplying with an even number may not be selected as such an operation. This potential change of test condition between first and second number of the pseudo-random sequence is a factor for a more randomly distributed sequence.
Preferably, the invention proposes to generate the second number through a function of the Collatz type, as defined hereafter.
In a preferred embodiment, the first number is an integer and the step of checking the test condition comprises calculating parity of this first number.
Parity computing is quite simple and fast done in binary circuits, and enables good performance with low complexity and power consumption.
In alternative embodiments, the test condition may comprise calculating a value of this first number under a modular equality. As an example, the method according to the invention may involve three cases and three operations, depending on a test condition of equality modulo 3.
According to the invention, the pseudo-random sequence of numbers is used for encrypting or decrypting binary data, through a method comprising the following steps: - generating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers from a first key data, termed starting number, treated as an initial first number for this pseudo-random sequence of numbers;
- processing this pseudo-random sequence of numbers through a conversion treatment resulting into a pseudo-random of binary digits;
- applying a encyphering or decyphering treatment, using this binary pseudo-random sequence as a seed for encrypting or respectively decrypting computer data. Preferably, first and second operations are chosen such that the result of applying the first operation on the first number is greater than this first number, while the result of applying the second operation on this same first number is lesser than this first number, or reversely.
This feature enables the sequence to involve numbers staying relatively low, thus minimizing the need for large binary registers or memories. Also, it combines well with the conversion treatment described hereabove for issuing a more randomly distributed pseudo-random binary sequence.
For a better device simplicity and an optimal trade-off between different technical constraints, as well as a better
"random quality" or unpredictability of the pseudo-sequences generated, the invention proposes using functions with the following features, as first and/or second operations:
- applying the first operation on the first number comprises dividing this first number by a determined number greater than one;
- applying the second operation on the first number comprises multiplying this first number by another number greater than one, the result of which being further added with an odd number.
Furthermore, according to the invention, the test condition and first and second operations involve the following features. The step of checking the test condition results in the first case when the first number parity is even. The step of applying the first operation to this first number then comprises dividing this first number by an even integer.
Meanwhile, the step of checking the test condition results in the second case when the first number parity is odd. The step of applying the second operation to this first number then comprises multiplying this first number with another integer greater than one, the result of which being then added with one. Also, the function is selected so as to ensure that the function cannot "loop on itself", meaning that for any starting first number, the function will always, after multiple iterations, converge to the same fixed number. Alternatively, the method moreover comprises a step of verifying that the function is not looping on itself, e.g. through verifying that the second number was not already obtained in the pseudo-random sequence of numbers.
In the preferred embodiment described hereafter, first and second operations are defined as follows.
In the first case, i.e. when first number is even, the step of applying the first operation to the first number further comprises dividing this first number by two.
In the second case, I.e. when first number is odd, the step of applying the second operation to the first number further comprises multiplying this first number with three, the result of which being then added with one.
According to the preferred embodiment, the step of encyphering binary data, termed plain data, into encrypted binary data furthermore comprises the following steps:
- splitting the plain data into a sequence of consecutive binary words, termed word sequence, of a length based on a second key data;
- generating a sequence of numbers, termed encrypted sequence, from this word sequence, where at least one binary word from this word sequence is replaced with an number representing at least one position containing this binary word within the pseudo-random binary sequence;
- generating this encrypted binary data from this encrypted sequence.
In the reverse way, the step of decyphering encrypted binary data into decrypted binary data furthermore comprises the following steps: - reading this encrypted data into a sequence of numbers, termed encrypted sequence;
- generating a sequence of binary data words, termed word sequence, from this encrypted sequence, where at least one number of this encrypted sequence is used as an offset for reading, whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence, a binary word the length of which is based on a second key data, this number of this encrypted sequence being replaced with this binary word into this word sequence; - concatenating this word sequence into decrypted data.
A computerized device or system is also provided by the present invention, implementing such encrypting and/or decrypting method into software processing processor, or hardware or mixed circuits. The invention also prvides a computer program the instructions of which carry out the steps of such a method, when this computer program is executed on a computer system.
Brief description of the drawings
The new and inventive features believed characteristic of the invention are set forth in the appended claims. The invention itself, however, as well as a preferred mode of use, further objects and advantages thereof, will best be understood by reference to the following detailed description of an illustrative detailed embodiment when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:
FIGURE 1 schematically illustrates the progress of an encrypting process according to the invention; - FIGURE 2 schematically illustrates the progress of a decrypting process according to the invention;
FIGURE 3 is a block diagram illustrating an encrypted data transmission method between an emitter and a receiver, according to the invention; FIGURE 4 is a diagram illustrating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers for an example starting number value of 27, according to the preferred embodiment of the invention; - FIGURE 5 is a table showing the distribution pattern of available offsets, for all possible word values with an example word length value of 4 bits, for the 64 first starting numbers which enable all such values, according to the preferred embodiment of the invention; - FIGURE 6 is a table showing the distribution pattern of available offsets, for a binary word with an example value of 14, among the 64 first starting numbers which enable all values of binary words with an example length of 4 bits; FIGURE 7 is an histogram showing the distribution of the number of possible starting numbers for ciphering the example binary word of FIGURE 6, among the same 64 first starting numbers.
In the following specifications, elements common to several figures are referenced through a common identifier.
Preferred embodiment of the invention
A preferred embodiment of the invention is based on a pseudo-random sequence generated by a function of a Collatz type.
Collatz functions
The original Collatz function is defined as follows: Consider the following operation on an arbitrary positive integer:
* If the number is even, divide it by two.
* If the number is odd, triple it and add one.
For example, if this operation is performed on 3, the result is 10; if it is performed on 28, the result is 14. There is an unsolved conjecture in mathematics, based on this function, called the Collatz conjecture. It is named after
Lothar Collatz, who first proposed it in 1937. This conjecture is also known as the "3n + 1" conjecture, the Ulam conjecture (after Stanislaw Ulam) , or the Syracuse problem.
This conjecture asks whether a sequence based on the Collatz function, or a certain kind of number sequence, always ends in the same way regardless of the starting number.
Paul Erdos said about the Collatz conjecture: "Mathematics is not yet ready for such problems." He offered $500 for its solution .
In mathematical notation, we can define the Syracuse (or Collatz) function "S" in its original form as follows:
Figure imgf000010_0001
Starting with an initial number So, it is possible to generate the sequence of "Syracused Numbers" as defined below, until the value 1 is reached:
SN0=S0 SN1+1=S(SN1)
In the Syracuse conjecture literature, the following jargon is usually adopted:
• This sequence [SN1] is known as the flight of S.
• Each SN1 is a stage of the flight.
• The highest SN1 is known as the maximal elevation of the flight. • The duration of the flight is the number of stages before reaching the value 1.
• The flight in elevation is the number of stages before going under the initial value So.
• The expansion factor is the ratio between the maximal elevation and the starting value So. Some examples of sequence characteristics for the original Syracuse/Collatz function:
Figure imgf000011_0002
This original function may be generalized into a type of functions called Collatz type.
A function G is called an Collatz type function if there is an integer n together with rational numbers Ja1 : i < n}, Jb1 : i < n} such that: whenever x = i mod p then G(x) = axx + bx is integral.
The method according to the invention uses a function of Collatz type for generating the pseudo-random sequence of numbers .
In a preferred embodiment described hereafter, the following Collatz type function is chosen for generating a pseudo-random sequence of numbers.
Figure imgf000011_0001
Some examples of sequence characteristics for this modified Syracuse/Collatz function, as used in the preferred embodiment described hereafter:
Figure imgf000011_0003
Figure imgf000012_0001
Principles of the encrypting/decrypting
The present inventor here assumes that the Syracuse conjecture is true. However, even in the opposite case, such functions nevertheless provide various pseudo-random sequences that are sufficiently numerous for building an encrypting/decrypting method with a good trade-off between security and power or speed performances. FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 respectively illustrate encrypting and decrypting of binary data according to the invention.
In FIGURE 1, a starting number So HO is used as a secret key for encrypting plain binary data 114 comprising a sequence {bi} of binary bits.
This starting number 110 is used as an initial first number for generating 121 and memorizing a pseudo-random sequence of numbers (S1J 112, through iteration of the pseudo-random function .
The generated pseudo-random sequence 112 of numbers is then processed through a conversion treatment 122, resulting into a pseudo-random sequence 113 of binary digits {sbi}.
Preferably, the conversion treatment 122 comprises the following steps:
- if said second number is greater than said first number, adding to the binary pseudo-random sequence a binary digit of a type, e.g. a bit with value "one"; or
- if said second number is lesser than said first number, adding to the binary pseudo-random sequence a binary digit of the other type, e.g. a bit with value "zero". The resulting binary pseudo-random binary sequence 113 is then used as a seed for encyphering a sequence {bi} of binary data 114, termed plain data, into a encrypted sequence {cbi} of binary data 117. This encyphering process comprises the following steps.
Plain data 114 is converted 123 into a sequence 115 of consecutive binary words, termed word sequence {wi }, these words being of a length L based on a second key data 111. This second key data may be used as a second secret key, possibly transmitted or detained separately from a first secret key based on the starting number 110. The first 110 and second 111 key data may also be united or combined to form a unique secret key, which then need to be separated before use.
From this word sequence 115, a encrypted sequence 116 of numbers {ni} is generated 124 through replacing each binary word W1 with a number n± representing one position containing said binary word within the pseudo-random binary sequence 113.
The encrypted sequence of number 116 is then converted 125 into a sequence {cbi} of binary data 117, providing the encrypted data 117 issued from the initial plain data 114.
In FIGURE 2, a starting number So 210 is used as a secret key for decrypting a encrypted binary data 214 comprising a sequence {cbi} of binary bits.
In a manner that may be the same as in FIGURE 1, a pseudo- random binary sequence 213 is generated 221, 222 from the same starting number 210, which was once used for producing this encrypted binary data 214.
The resulting binary pseudo-random binary sequence 213 is then used for decyphering a sequence {cbi} of binary data 214, termed encrypted data, into a plain sequence {bi} of binary data 217.
The decyphering process comprises comes as follows.
The encrypted data 214 is read 223 into a sequence of numbers {ni}, termed encrypted sequence 215. A sequence of binary data words {wi}, termed word sequence 216 is generated 224 from the encrypted binary sequence 213. Each number from this encrypted sequence of numbers 215 is used as an offset for selecting a reading position whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence 213. Starting from this reading position, a binary word is read of a length L corresponding to the same second key data 211, which was once used for producing this encrypted binary data 214 .
All the binary words of the resulting word sequence 216 are then concatenated 225 into a sequence of binary data {bi}, termed decrypted data 217, which is then identical to the binary data that was once used for producing the encrypted binary data 214.
Although such ciphering and deciphering algorithm provides a good optimization when combined with pseudo-random sequences defined above, different algorithms may also be used for ciphering and deciphering plain data based on using such a pseudo-random binary sequence.
Detailed description
FIGURE 3 illustrates more specifically a transmitting process of binary data 300 between an emitting device 301 and a receiving device 302.
Two parties "A" 301 and "B" 302 need to exchange a binary information 300 in a secret way. The following assumptions are made and the following notations are used in the rest of this example :
• Both parties A and B know 309 a secret key So.
• Both parties A and B know 309 a secret length L. • The binary information 300 to be shared from A to B is represented by a sequences of N bits {^}]~f .
• N is a multiple of L The proposed method for ciphering the binary information is based on the following steps:
In an initialisation stage 307, both parties A 301 and B 302 build (312, respectively 322) build the binary pseudo-random sequence [S1] defined by:
Figure imgf000015_0001
In its binary form [S1], this sequence specifies the behavior of the Syracuse suite: does it go up (bit at "1") or down (bit at "0") at each successive step? For each plain data 300 they wish to share, emission from A 301 to B 302 comprises the following steps:
- The A party 301 splits 313 the plain text [b,]]!" 300 as a sequence of words
Figure imgf000015_0002
, defined as:
Figure imgf000015_0003
- For each word w} , the A party searches 314 in the sequence [st] a series of L successive bits starting with offset n} such that: Wj =[s1}'ii"n J+L~1 • If multiple solutions exist, the A party takes any of them in any way, possibly using a random or pseudo-random selection. - The A party sends 315 to the B party 302 the series {n^'1 representing the genuine information {^}]~f 300, enciphered by the "Syracuse Secret Key" So.
- The B party 302 receives 323 the series ψΛ~_ from the A party. - For each offset n} , the B party reconstructs 324 each word
Figure imgf000015_0004
- From the sequence of words r the B party reconstructs
Figure imgf000015_0005
325 the original information {δ,})"^ 300.
These steps can be implemented in various ways (hardware, software, hybrid) , all following the logic described in the diagram of FIGURE 3. A person skilled in the art will easily understand that the proposed method and system asks for very few IT resources for its implementation. The required processing power is very low (simple operations like additions and shifts are needed) , and the required memory is also very low (several bytes of ROM memory and few bytes of RAM memory are needed) .
Example of a data transmission The secret first key 110, 210 of a value S0 = 27 is secretly known by both parties A 301 and B 302.
FIGURE 4 shows the flight corresponding to the pseudo-random sequence 112, 212 generated for this value of "27" for the secret key. The same pseudo-random binary sequence 113, 213 built by both parties A and B may be written as :
1100001001} .
The secret second key 111, 211 of a value L=4 is known by both parties A and B, is used as a length for the words W1 of the word sequence 115.
In this example, the genuine information 300, 114 that party A wants to transmit to party B under a encrypted form is defined as : felllf= {1011111110101011011011011001101011011101}.
This genuine length N=40 is known by A. Thus, the party A splits 123 this information 300, 114 into a sequence 115 of ten words, each of 4 bits. Each word is then encrypted according to the pseudo-random binary sequence 113. The party A performs the following operations:
Figure imgf000016_0001
{2, 10, 13, 17, 29, 32}; the value
Figure imgf000016_0002
is randomly selected. • W2 = [IlIl], so that rc2e {4, 5, 19, 34, 35, 36, 42}; the value n2=5 is randomly selected.
• W3 = (IOlOj so that Π3G [8, 22, 49, 51}; the value «3=8 is randomly selected. • W4 = (IOlIj so that ΠAG [2 , 10, 13, 17, 29, 32}; the value
Figure imgf000017_0001
is randomly selected.
• W5 = (OIlOj so that n5 G {11, 30}; the value n5=\\ is randomly selected.
• W6 = (IlOIj so that Π6G [1, 7, 12, 16, 21, 28, 31}; the value «6 =16 is randomly selected.
• W7 = (IOOIj so that /?7e {24, 39, 57, 67}; the value nη=2A is randomly selected.
• W8 = (IOlOj so that n8e{8, 22, 49, 51}; the value W8 =8 is randomly selected. • W9 = (IlOIj so that H9G [I, 7, 12, 16, 21, 28, 31}; the value W9 =31 is randomly selected.
• W10 = (IlOIj so that U10G [I, 7, 12, 16, 21, 28, 31}; the value
W10 =12 is randomly selected.
Thus, the ciphered information {ni} 116 sent, e.g. under a standard binary form, from A to B is:
Figure imgf000017_0002
5, 8, 10, 11, 16, 24, 8, 31, 12}.
B party receives this sequence, e.g. under its binary form, and uses it as a sequence 215 of offsets for generating the plain binary data 217. Thus, the party B applies each number of the encrypted sequence V1 JjZ1 215 to the binary form 113, 213 of the pseudo random sequence [S1] 112, 212, for deriving the sequence of words Jw7J I^^ 216. Concatenation of the binary words from this word sequence 216 thus provides a binary sequence 217 identical to the genuine information 300, 114:
{bXJ= {1011111110101011011011011001101011011101}. Assume that a third party C wants to break the ciphered information, but ignoring both the secret key So and the secret length L. This third party C assumes that the secret key is equal to 91 (wrong choice) and that the secret key is equal to 4 (right choice) . Under these assumptions, we have for the party C:
• S0 = 91
• 1001} • the value H1=Il gives W1 = (IlOIj,
• the value n2=5 gives W2 = (IlOIj,
• the value H3=S gives W3 = (IIlIj;
• the value
Figure imgf000018_0001
gives W4 = (IlOIj;
• the value n5=\\ gives W5 = (IOlOj; • the value ^6 =16 gives W6 = (IIlOj;
• the value H1 =24 gives W7 = (IIlIj;
• the value n% =8 gives W8 = (IIlIj;
• the value n9=3l gives W9 = (IIlIj;
• the value nw=l2 gives W10 = (OlOOj The resulting deciphered information is:
{ I] 1Ol 110_l 11111101101011] 1Ol]J11111111110_l 0 Cl } where underscored digits are wrong (18 out of 40) .
Thus it can be seen that the ciphered information 117, 214 is indeed a encrypted form af the genuine plain data 114, 217. According to selected combinations of length L and starting number So, strength and flexibility of the encryption may vary.
Flexibility must be sufficient for encryption of the genuine data intended to be transmitted, i.e. each binary word to be encrypted 115 must be found at least once under its binary form whithin the generated 122 binary pseudo-random sequence 113.
Furthermore, when only one offset exists for such a word, breaking the code may be easier than if several offsets are possible .
FIGURE 5 to FIGURE 7 illustrates an example of distribution for the coding possibilities for a word length L of 4 bits. A 4 bits-word may takes 72 different values, ranging from {0000} to {1111} .
Whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence generated from an integer taken as starting number, it is not always possible to find an offset with every combination of such a 4 bits-word. The more long the word, the harder it becomes.
Thus, only a part of the possible keys SO enable to code any value of such a word. Such keys may be termed "full keys", for a given word length.
FIGURE 5 is a table showing a distribution pattern of available offsets, for all possible word values with length value of 4 bits. This table shows the 64 first starting numbers which may be used as full keys for such a word.
The top title line 501 shows the values of these 64 first full keys. All possible decimal value of a 4 bits binary word stand in the left title column 502, while the total number of possible offset for each word value stands in the right column 503.
For instance, starting number 27 results in a pseudo-random binary sequence which offers 7 different offsets corresponding to the word {1110}, i.e. with value 14. Also, this word value 14 may be coded in 422 possibilities for the 64 first full keys.
It can be seen that numerous possibilities exist even for starting numbers quite low, thus enabling simple and compact computing or memorizing. In the table of FIGURE 6, cells in grey show the distribution pattern of these 422 available offsets n± for the same 4-bits word value 14.
Offsets from 1 to 72 stand on the left title column 602, while the starting numbers stand on the top title line 601. For instance the offset pattern for the value SN0=27 (ref.604) is equal to the set {6, 15, 20, 27, 37, 43, 60}.
On the right column 603 is reported, for each line, the number of starting numbers that may code this value 14 with the same offset. Thus, the value 14 coded at offset 6 (ref.605) still leaves 8 (ref.606) different possible keys among the 64 first full keys. These 8 possible keys are in the set {27, 82,83, 103, 121, 194, 195, 233}.
In this specific example, it can be seen that different keys do not result in the same possible offsets, meaning that knowledge of the length and position of one specific word is usually not sufficient for retrieving the secret key.
There are only a few similarities between different starting numbers. In this example, there are no more than 4 keys that have a similar distribution pattern (e.g. keys 193, 194, 195, 199) .
Also, all the possible offset values (on the left) are more or less equally visited, as seen in FIGURE 7.
In FIGURE 7, offsets from 1 to 72 stand on the bottom line 701, while each bar of the histogram 702 shows the number of possible starting numbers for ciphering the same binary word of value 14, among the same 64 first full keys.
This example is one among several simulations that gave similar results, thus indicating an interesting encryption performance when balanced with the low need in power or speed resources .
In a preferred embodiment, selection of any starting number as a key may be validated through checking that this starting number is indeed a full key for the word length selected.
Alternative embodiments
While the invention has been particularly shown and described mainly with reference to a preferred embodiment, it will be understood that various changes in form and detail may be made therein without departing from the spirit, and scope of the invention.
In other embodiments, possibly combined with the preferred one, starting numbers may be selected as keys even if not a full key. The encrypting method may then comprise a step of changing this key into another, through an algorithm shared between parties, e.g. by automatically selecting the next full key when encountering a word with no available offset in the initial key. Such a key modification may also be triggered on a test issuing a strength quality too low for the selected key, for some words or for all of them. Such a strength quality evaluation may be based on a low number 608 of possible keys for a given word at a given offset 607 of the pseudo-random binary sequence 113, 213.
First and/or second operation may also be changed or modified, for the generation of the whole pseudo-random sequence or in the course of such a generation.
Several pseudo-random sequences may also be used together, alternatively or interleaved.

Claims

CLAIMSWhat is claimed is:
1. A method for encrypting or decrypting data (114, 214) in a computer, said method comprising generating (121) at least one pseudo-random sequence of numbers (112, 212) from at least one first key (110, 210) for encrypting or decrypting said data, generating (121, 221) said pseudo-random sequence of numbers comprising an iteration of the steps of:
- testing a determined test condition on a first number from said sequence;
- in at least a first case of said test condition, applying on said first number a first operation the result of which may present a test condition different from said first number test condition;
- in at least a second case of said test condition, applying on said first number a second operation the result of which may present a test condition different from said first number test condition;
- using the result of said first operation or second operation for obtaining a second number, said second number taking place in said sequence after said first number.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the generating (121, 221) of said pseudo-random sequence of numbers (112, 212) furthermore comprises an iteration of the step of:
- from a first number from said pseudo-random sequence, using a function of the Collatz type for calculating a second number of said pseudo-random sequence.
3. The method according to any one of claims 1 or 2, wherein the first number is of integer type and the step of checking the test condition comprises calculating parity of said first number, or a value of said first number under a modular comparison .
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the result of applying the first operation on the first number is greater than said first number, while the result of applying the second operation on same said first number is lesser than said first number.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the step of applying the first operation on the first number comprises dividing said first number by a determined number greater than one.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the step of applying the second operation on the first number comprises multiplying said first number by another number greater than one, the result of which being further added with an odd number.
7. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 6, wherein :
- on the one hand, the first case occurs when the first number parity is even, the step of applying the first operation to said first number further comprising dividing said first number by an even integer; and
- on the second hand, the second case occurs when the first number parity is odd, the step of applying the second operation to said first number further comprising multiplying said first number with another integer greater than one, the result of which being then added with one.
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the step of applying the first operation to the first number further comprises dividing said first number by two.
9. The method according to any one of claims 7 or 8, wherein the step of applying the second operation to the first number further comprises multiplying said first number with three, the result of which being then added with one.
10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, furthermore comprising the steps of:
- generating (121, 221) the pseudo-random sequence (112, 212) of numbers from a first key data (110, 210) treated as a initial first number for said pseudo-random sequence of numbers; - processing (122, 222) said pseudo-random sequence (112, 212) of numbers through a conversion treatment resulting into a pseudo-random sequence (113, 213) of binary digits;
- applying a encyphering or decyphering treatment (308), using said binary pseudo-random sequence (113, 213) as a seed for encrypting or respectively decrypting computer data (114, 214, 300) .
11. The method according to claim 10, wherein the conversion treatment (122, 222), at least for a first number and a second number from the pseudo-random sequence of numbers (112, 212), furthermore comprises the steps of: - if said second number is greater than said first number, adding to the binary pseudo-random sequence (113, 213) a binary digit of one type; or - if said second number is lesser than said first number, adding to the binary pseudo-random sequence a binary digit of the other type.
12. The method according to any one of claims 10 or 11, wherein the step of encyphering (308) binary data (114, 300), termed plain data, into encrypted binary data (117) furthermore comprises the steps of: - splitting (123, 313) said plain data into a sequence of consecutive binary words, termed word sequence (115), of a length based on a second key data (111);
- generating (124) a sequence of numbers, termed encrypted sequence (116), from said word sequence, where at least one binary word from said word sequence is replaced with an number representing at least one position containing said binary word within the pseudo-random binary sequence (113);
- generating (125) said encrypted binary data (117) from said encrypted sequence (116).
13. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein the step of decyphering (308) encrypted binary data (214) into decrypted binary data (217) furthermore comprises the steps of:
- reading (223) said encrypted data (214) into a sequence of numbers, termed encrypted sequence (215) ;
- generating (224) a sequence of binary data words, termed word sequence (216), from said encrypted sequence of numbers (215), where at least one number of said encrypted sequence is used as an offset for reading, whithin the pseudo-random binary sequence (213) , a binary word the length of which is based on a second key data (211), said number of said encrypted sequence being replaced with said binary word into said word sequence;
- concatenating words of said word sequence (216) into said decrypted data (217).
14. A computer system comprising means adapted for carrying out the steps of the method according to anyone of claims 1 to 13.
15. A computer program comprising instructions for carying out the steps of the method according to anyone of claims 1 to 13, when said computer program is executed on a computer system or a computerized device.
16. A computer readable medium having encoded thereon a computer program according to claim 15.
PCT/EP2008/058572 2007-08-02 2008-07-03 Method, computerized device and computer program for efficient and low power encrypting or decrypting of data WO2009015979A2 (en)

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