WO2008054512A2 - Methods and systems for ic card application loading - Google Patents

Methods and systems for ic card application loading Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2008054512A2
WO2008054512A2 PCT/US2007/009776 US2007009776W WO2008054512A2 WO 2008054512 A2 WO2008054512 A2 WO 2008054512A2 US 2007009776 W US2007009776 W US 2007009776W WO 2008054512 A2 WO2008054512 A2 WO 2008054512A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
transformation unit
application
specific
plaintext
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2007/009776
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2008054512A3 (en
Inventor
Alan E. Johnson
Original Assignee
Stepnexus Holdings
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Stepnexus Holdings filed Critical Stepnexus Holdings
Priority to EP07867086A priority Critical patent/EP2016535A4/en
Publication of WO2008054512A2 publication Critical patent/WO2008054512A2/en
Publication of WO2008054512A3 publication Critical patent/WO2008054512A3/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • this application relates to smart card technology. More specifically, it relates to a systems and methods for smart card implementation of key encryption key - key transformation unit ("K2KTU").
  • K2KTU key encryption key - key transformation unit
  • an IC card (also referred to herein as a smart card) is the size of a conventional credit card or debit card and contains one or more integrated circuits, which can be in the form of one or more computer chips, including, for example, a processing element, a read-only-memory (ROM) element, an electrically erasable programmable read only-memory (EEPROM) element, an input/output (I/O) mechanism and other circuitry as may be required to support the smart card in its operations.
  • ROM read-only-memory
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read only-memory
  • I/O input/output
  • an IC card may contain a single application (e.g., a debit or credit application, a purse or electronic money application, an affinity or loyalty program application, and the like) or it may contain multiple independent applications in its memory.
  • MULTOSTM is one example of an operating system that runs on smart cards, as well as other platforms, and allows multiple independent applications to be executed on a smart card. This allows a card user to run one or more of the multiple programs stored on the card regardless of the type of terminal (e.g., an ATM, an airport kiosk, a telephone, a point of sale (POS) device, and the like) into which the card may be inserted or swiped for use.
  • a conventional single application IC card such as a telephone card or an electronic cash card, is loaded with a single application at its personalization stage.
  • that single application cannot be modified or changed after the card is issued even if the modification is desired by the card user or card issuer.
  • a card user wanted a variety of application functions to be performed, such as both an electronic purse and a credit/debit function, the card user would be required to carry multiple physical single application cards on his or her person, which would be quite cumbersome and inconvenient.
  • a card user may have both a purse application and a credit/debit application on the same card so that the user could select which type of payment (i.e., by electronic cash or credit card) to use when making a purchase. It would be further beneficial to provide multiple applications to an IC card, where sufficient memory existed and in which an operating system capable of supporting multiple applications was present on the card. Although multiple applications could be pre-selected and placed in the memory of the card during its production stage, it would also be beneficial to have the ability to load and delete applications for the card post-production as needed.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a typical, secure application load process used in conjunction with the MULTOSTM IC card system.
  • an application load unit prime 10 is created to include an encrypted application load unit 100 using the application provider secret key ("AP_SK") 11 in combination with a key transformation unit (“KTU") prime 102.
  • KTU prime 102 is created by performing a triple DES operation (i.e., key-encryption-key, key encryption key (“KEK”), operation) on the standard KTU using a transport key.
  • the application load unit prime is then transmitted via typical methods to be loaded onto an IC card 18.
  • the KTU prime 102 must be translated (i.e., decrypted) at 152 back to the regular KTU 154.
  • This operation requires that a hardware security module (“HSM”) 15 be located locally at the personalization bureau.
  • the HSM 15 communicates securely with the application provider to perform a secure key ceremony 14 whereby the KEK 12, 12' transport key is exchanged. Once the HSM 15 has the transport key 12, it can translate the KTU prime 102 back to the regular KTU 154. Then, the regular application load unit can be used load the application to the target card.
  • HSM hardware security module
  • Figure 1 illustrates an example of a typical, secure application load process used in conjunction with the MULTOSTM IC card system
  • Figure 2 illustrates an example of a novel secure application load process used in conjunction with an IC card system according to certain embodiments.
  • the terms application provider and personalization bureau are used as a matter of convenience, for consistency and clarity. However, as will become evident to those skilled in the art, the functions of both can be performed at either one of the facilities or even at a completely different facility including, for example, at the card issuer. Such variations are accommodated in many embodiments and fall within the scope of the invention.
  • Certain embodiments propose a new type of application load unit ("ALU") for use in the secure loading of applications and/or data onto IC cards (or smart cards).
  • ALU application load unit
  • This new type of ALU will be referred to as a confidential ALU prime.
  • the ALU prime can be created using combinations of conventional techniques augmented according to certain aspects of the invention.
  • the encrypted ALU can be combined with the KTU prime, which is an encrypted KTU using a KEK.
  • a new component can also be created and combined in the ALU prime. This new component, as discussed herein, will be referred to as a card-specific KEK KTU (K2KTU).
  • This new type of KTU is also a type of card-targeted KTU, but instead of the KTU containing the keys that were used to encrypt the ALU (as the regular KTU and KTU prime contain), the K2KTU contains the KEK used to create the KTU prime. In this way, no HSM will be necessary at the personalization facility.
  • one K2KTU can be created for each smart card to be loaded with a particular application; that is, the KEK may be individually encrypted under each Public Key of each target smart card.
  • a KEK can be provided that is common to all KTU primes and an application provider may create a K2KTU for a plurality smart cards independent of related ALU primes.
  • the KEK used should match and will typically remain constant over time although, in certain embodiments the KEK may be permitted to change on occasion.
  • the application provider can digitally sign each K2KTU using the same application provider secret key (AP_SK) that was used to create the application signature. This will ensure that only genuine K2KTUs are ultimately processed.
  • AP_SK application provider secret key
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a novel secure application load process used in conjunction with an IC card system according to certain aspects of the invention.
  • an application provider can create one or more ALU primes 20 using the AP_SK 21 and KEK 22 as described above and as is currently performed.
  • the application provider can then additionally create one or more K2KTUs 23, one for each target IC card 28 using the public key (MKD_PK) 240 of the target card 28, which can be obtained from storage 24 such as a database of card public keys that can be provided, for example, by a key management authority.
  • the application provider can further digitally sign each K2KTU 23 using its AP SK 21. Having secured the set of K2KTUs 23 for an application, the application provider can transmit the ALU primes 20 and the K2KTUs 23 to the personalization bureau via any secure or non-secure transmission means.
  • an ALU prime 25 can be selected for loading on a desired smart card 28.
  • a correct K2KTU 262 can be selected from the one or more K2KTUs 260 created for that application.
  • the K2KTU 262 can be loaded.
  • the order of these loads can be altered within the scope of certain embodiments.
  • load initiation e.g., using a "CREATE MEL" command
  • the certificate can be checked and the AP_PK extracted.
  • the application signature may then be checked.
  • the K2KTU signature can be verified using AP PK.
  • the K2KTU 262 can be decrypted using the smart card's secret key (MKD SK). Then the K2KTU 262 can be checked to ensure that this particular ALU is intended for the desired IC card 28.
  • the regular KTU can be decrypted using the KEK 22 contained within K2KTU 262. Once the regular KTU is translated from the KTU prime25 using the KEK 22, application load proceeds as normal.
  • no HSM need be present at the location of the card application terminal (i.e., no key ceremony is required) when the K2KTU component is used.
  • the application provider can create multiple K2KTUs 23 for an application or create multiple sets of K2KTUs 23 for an associated set of multiple applications and distribute the one or more confidential ALU primes 20 to a personalization bureau for more efficient batch processing of multiple IC cards.
  • the proper K2KTU can be selected from the proper set of K2KTUs (i.e., where each set of K2KTUs can be representative of a particular application, and each member K2KTU within a set is associated with a particular card to receive that application).
  • Certain embodiments of the invention provide methods for securely loading an application, comprising the steps of maintaining a plurality of cryptographic keys in an electronically addressable device, communicating one or more applications to the device, the one or more applications encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using a common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider and the common key is common to a plurality of devices, and communicating the common key to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys.
  • each of the communicating the one or more applications and the communicating the common key is secured using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider-specific key.
  • the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific public transport key.
  • the common key is communicated to the device upon verification of the device-specific public transport key by a key management authority.
  • the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific secret transport key operative to extract the common key from the second plaintext key transformation unit.
  • the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key and wherein the second plaintext key transformation unit is digitally signed using a secret key of the provider.
  • the communicating includes communicating one or more of the plurality of cryptographic keys to the provider, the one or more cryptographic keys including a device-specific public transport key, and identifying the device to the provider.
  • the device is one of a plurality of devices and further comprising the steps of encrypting each of the one or more applications using keys associated with the each application, encrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit using the common key, the plaintext key transformation unit including the associated keys and corresponding application-specific information, and for each of the plurality of devices, encrypting second plaintext key transformation units using public transport keys associated with each of the plurality of devices, the second plaintext key transformation units including the common key, information specific to the each application and device-specific information, and digitally signing each second key transformation unit using a private key of the provider.
  • the second plaintext key transformation units are encrypted using symmetric encryption.
  • the symmetric encryption is Triple DES.
  • the symmetric encryption is AES.
  • the plurality of cryptographic keys includes keys associated with the plurality of devices.
  • the device-specific secret key and the device-specific public key are provided using an asymmetric technique.
  • the asymmetric technique is RSA.
  • the plurality of cryptographic keys includes certified public and secret keys furnished by a certification authority, and further comprising the steps of encrypting a provider-specific public key using a certified secret key to obtain a provider-specific public key certificate, signing the encrypted application using a provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature, and signing the second key transformation unit using the provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature.
  • the step of verifying the provider-specific public key certificate with the certified public key is provided by a certification authority.
  • the method also comprises deriving the provider- specific public key from a decrypted public key certificate associated with the provider, and verifying the digital signatures of the application and second key transformation unit based on the derived provider-specific public key.
  • the decrypted public key certificate contains application-specific information.
  • the method also comprises decrypting the verified second plaintext key transformation unit using a verified device-specific private transport key, and verifying the resultant first plaintext key transformation unit is intended for the device, the verifying including comparing the identity of the device with a device identification in the first plaintext key transformation unit, confirming that the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key, decrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit associated with the application using the first key, associating the first plaintext key transformation unit with the decrypted second plaintext key transformation unit, and decrypting the application using the plurality of keys contained within the first plaintext key transformation unit.
  • a device comprising a computing device and storage, the device configured to receive an encrypted application, wherein the storage maintains a plurality of cryptographic keys including a device-specific private transport key and a common key and the computing device is configured to decrypt the encrypted application using the device-specific private transport key and the common key.
  • the encrypted application is encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using the common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider.
  • the common key is provided to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys.
  • the encrypted application and the common key are provided to the device using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider- specific key to secure communication of the encrypted application and the common key.
  • a method for secure application loading of an application to electronically addressable devices may comprise the steps of maintaining a plurality of cryptographic keys within the device, providing the device with one or more applications, encrypted using a plurality of cryptographic keys within a plaintext key transformation unit and said plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using a non-device-specif ⁇ c key, each application and non-device-specific key being furnished by a provider, providing the device with the non-device-specific key within a plaintext key transformation unit, encrypted using a device-specific transport key resulting in the key-encryption-key key transformation unit.
  • the communication of the application and non-device-specific key are secured using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys, including a provider-specific key associated with a provider.
  • the method may further comprise encrypting a plurality of applications intended for different devices using a plurality of keys, formatting the plurality of keys and application-specific information into a plaintext key transformation unit and encrypting said key transformation unit using a single non-device-specific key, formatting the non-device-specific key, application-specific information and device-specific information into a plaintext key transformation unit and encrypting said key transformation unit using each of the device-specific public transport keys of the plurality of devices resulting in the key-encryption-key key transformation units, digitally signing each key- encryption-key key transformation unit using a provider private key.

Abstract

Systems and methods are described that provide a new type of application load unit for use in the secure loading of applications and/or data onto integrated circuit cards or smart cards. Plaintext key transformation units can be created for each of a plurality of smart cards that are to be loaded with a desired or selected application. A plaintext key transformation unit may be individually encrypted using the public keys associated with target smart cards. An application provider can create one or more application load unit using known means and can then create one or more additional plaintext key transformation unit, one for each target smart card using corresponding public keys which can be obtained taken from a database of card public keys.

Description

METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR IC CARD APPLICATION LOADING
BACKGROUND
Claim of Priority
[0001] This application claims priority to and incorporates by reference herein U.S. Provisional Application Serial No. 60/793,543 filed April 19, 2006 entitled "Methods and Systems for IC Card Application Loading."
Field of the Application
[0002] Generally, this application relates to smart card technology. More specifically, it relates to a systems and methods for smart card implementation of key encryption key - key transformation unit ("K2KTU").
Description of the Related Art
[0003] Integrated circuit ("IC") cards are becoming increasingly used for many different purposes in the world today. Typically, an IC card (also referred to herein as a smart card) is the size of a conventional credit card or debit card and contains one or more integrated circuits, which can be in the form of one or more computer chips, including, for example, a processing element, a read-only-memory (ROM) element, an electrically erasable programmable read only-memory (EEPROM) element, an input/output (I/O) mechanism and other circuitry as may be required to support the smart card in its operations. In addition to its native operating system, an IC card may contain a single application (e.g., a debit or credit application, a purse or electronic money application, an affinity or loyalty program application, and the like) or it may contain multiple independent applications in its memory. MULTOS™ is one example of an operating system that runs on smart cards, as well as other platforms, and allows multiple independent applications to be executed on a smart card. This allows a card user to run one or more of the multiple programs stored on the card regardless of the type of terminal (e.g., an ATM, an airport kiosk, a telephone, a point of sale (POS) device, and the like) into which the card may be inserted or swiped for use.
[0004] A conventional single application IC card, such as a telephone card or an electronic cash card, is loaded with a single application at its personalization stage. Typically, that single application cannot be modified or changed after the card is issued even if the modification is desired by the card user or card issuer. Moreover, if a card user wanted a variety of application functions to be performed, such as both an electronic purse and a credit/debit function, the card user would be required to carry multiple physical single application cards on his or her person, which would be quite cumbersome and inconvenient. Further, if an application developer or card user desired two different applications to interact or exchange data with each other, such as a purse application interacting with a frequent flyer loyalty application, the card user would be forced to swap multiple single application cards in and out of the card-receiving terminal, making the transaction difficult, lengthy and inconvenient.
[0005] Therefore, it would be beneficial to have the ability store multiple applications on the same IC card. For example, a card user may have both a purse application and a credit/debit application on the same card so that the user could select which type of payment (i.e., by electronic cash or credit card) to use when making a purchase. It would be further beneficial to provide multiple applications to an IC card, where sufficient memory existed and in which an operating system capable of supporting multiple applications was present on the card. Although multiple applications could be pre-selected and placed in the memory of the card during its production stage, it would also be beneficial to have the ability to load and delete applications for the card post-production as needed.
[0006] The increased flexibility and power of storing multiple applications on a single card create new challenges to be overcome concerning the integrity and security of the information (including application code and associated data) exchanged between the individual card and the application provider, as well as within the entire system when loading and deleting applications and associated data. It would be beneficial to have the capability in the IC card system to exchange data among cards, card issuers, system operators and application providers securely and to load and delete applications securely at any time from either a terminal or remotely over a telephone line, Internet or intranet connection or other wired or wireless data conduit. Because these data transmission lines are not typically secure lines, a number of security and entity-authentication techniques must be implemented to make sure that applications being sent over the transmission lines are only loaded on the intended cards.
[0007] However, typical processes used in the art today for securely transmitting data and/or applications to an IC card do not handle batch loading of the data and/or applications well because the information is targeted to an individual IC card using that IC card's public card. If a transmitting entity were desirous of populating multiple IC cards with the same data and/or application, an encrypted set of data would have to be created for each IC card separately. One example of this typical process is illustrated in commonly-owned U.S. Patent No. 6,230,267, which is also fully incorporated herein for all purposes. Another example is illustrated in commonly-owned U.S. Patent No. 6,632,888, which is also fully incorporated herein for all purposes.
[0008] Figure 1 illustrates an example of a typical, secure application load process used in conjunction with the MULTOS™ IC card system. As shown in Figure 1, an application load unit prime 10 is created to include an encrypted application load unit 100 using the application provider secret key ("AP_SK") 11 in combination with a key transformation unit ("KTU") prime 102. Typically the KTU prime 102 is created by performing a triple DES operation (i.e., key-encryption-key, key encryption key ("KEK"), operation) on the standard KTU using a transport key. The application load unit prime is then transmitted via typical methods to be loaded onto an IC card 18. However, prior to loading, the KTU prime 102 must be translated (i.e., decrypted) at 152 back to the regular KTU 154. This operation requires that a hardware security module ("HSM") 15 be located locally at the personalization bureau. The HSM 15 communicates securely with the application provider to perform a secure key ceremony 14 whereby the KEK 12, 12' transport key is exchanged. Once the HSM 15 has the transport key 12, it can translate the KTU prime 102 back to the regular KTU 154. Then, the regular application load unit can be used load the application to the target card.
[0009] A need exists for systems and methods that facilitate fast, efficient and inexpensive secure smart card application and data addition and deletion.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0010] Aspects and features of this application will become apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art from the following detailed description of certain embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:
[0011] Figure 1 illustrates an example of a typical, secure application load process used in conjunction with the MULTOS™ IC card system; and
[0012] Figure 2 illustrates an example of a novel secure application load process used in conjunction with an IC card system according to certain embodiments.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0013] Embodiments will now be described in detail with reference to the drawings, which are provided as illustrative examples of certain embodiments so as to enable those skilled in the art to practice the embodiments and are not meant to limit the scope of the application. Where aspects of certain embodiments can be partially or fully implemented using known components or steps, only those portions of such known components or steps that are necessary for an understanding of the embodiments will be described, and detailed description of other portions of such known components or steps will be omitted so as not to obscure the embodiments. Further, certain embodiments are intended to encompass presently known and future equivalents to the components referred to herein by way of illustration.
[0014] As used herein, the terms application provider and personalization bureau are used as a matter of convenience, for consistency and clarity. However, as will become evident to those skilled in the art, the functions of both can be performed at either one of the facilities or even at a completely different facility including, for example, at the card issuer. Such variations are accommodated in many embodiments and fall within the scope of the invention.
[0015] Certain embodiments propose a new type of application load unit ("ALU") for use in the secure loading of applications and/or data onto IC cards (or smart cards). This new type of ALU, as discussed herein, will be referred to as a confidential ALU prime. In certain embodiments, the ALU prime can be created using combinations of conventional techniques augmented according to certain aspects of the invention. For example, the encrypted ALU can be combined with the KTU prime, which is an encrypted KTU using a KEK. In addition, a new component can also be created and combined in the ALU prime. This new component, as discussed herein, will be referred to as a card-specific KEK KTU (K2KTU). This new type of KTU is also a type of card-targeted KTU, but instead of the KTU containing the keys that were used to encrypt the ALU (as the regular KTU and KTU prime contain), the K2KTU contains the KEK used to create the KTU prime. In this way, no HSM will be necessary at the personalization facility.
[0016] In certain embodiments, one K2KTU can be created for each smart card to be loaded with a particular application; that is, the KEK may be individually encrypted under each Public Key of each target smart card. In certain embodiments, a KEK can be provided that is common to all KTU primes and an application provider may create a K2KTU for a plurality smart cards independent of related ALU primes. However, it will be appreciated that in certain embodiments, the KEK used should match and will typically remain constant over time although, in certain embodiments the KEK may be permitted to change on occasion.
[0017] In certain embodiments, to ensure the integrity of the K2KTU, the application provider can digitally sign each K2KTU using the same application provider secret key (AP_SK) that was used to create the application signature. This will ensure that only genuine K2KTUs are ultimately processed. This signature feature provides advantages including, for example, the ability to overcome one of the existing security weaknesses of the MULTOS™ application loading system whereby, in the current system, the regular KTUs (and thus the KTU primes) are not digitally signed by the application provider.
[0018] Figure 2 illustrates an example of a novel secure application load process used in conjunction with an IC card system according to certain aspects of the invention. As shown in Figure 2, an application provider can create one or more ALU primes 20 using the AP_SK 21 and KEK 22 as described above and as is currently performed. However, the application provider can then additionally create one or more K2KTUs 23, one for each target IC card 28 using the public key (MKD_PK) 240 of the target card 28, which can be obtained from storage 24 such as a database of card public keys that can be provided, for example, by a key management authority. The application provider can further digitally sign each K2KTU 23 using its AP SK 21. Having secured the set of K2KTUs 23 for an application, the application provider can transmit the ALU primes 20 and the K2KTUs 23 to the personalization bureau via any secure or non-secure transmission means.
[0019] As shown in Figure 2, at the personalization bureau, an ALU prime 25 can be selected for loading on a desired smart card 28. Based on the card ID (MCD_ID) 282, and, as applicable, an application ID, a correct K2KTU 262 can be selected from the one or more K2KTUs 260 created for that application. After loading the KTU prime 252 from the ALU prime 25 into the target IC card 28, the K2KTU 262 can be loaded. However, the order of these loads can be altered within the scope of certain embodiments. After load initiation (e.g., using a "CREATE MEL" command), the certificate can be checked and the AP_PK extracted. The application signature may then be checked. Following application signature check, the K2KTU signature can be verified using AP PK. The K2KTU 262 can be decrypted using the smart card's secret key (MKD SK). Then the K2KTU 262 can be checked to ensure that this particular ALU is intended for the desired IC card 28. Finally, the regular KTU can be decrypted using the KEK 22 contained within K2KTU 262. Once the regular KTU is translated from the KTU prime25 using the KEK 22, application load proceeds as normal.
[0020] In certain embodiments, no HSM need be present at the location of the card application terminal (i.e., no key ceremony is required) when the K2KTU component is used. Further, the application provider can create multiple K2KTUs 23 for an application or create multiple sets of K2KTUs 23 for an associated set of multiple applications and distribute the one or more confidential ALU primes 20 to a personalization bureau for more efficient batch processing of multiple IC cards. For a particular application (e.g., based on an applications ID) and a particular card (i.e., based on the card's ID), the proper K2KTU can be selected from the proper set of K2KTUs (i.e., where each set of K2KTUs can be representative of a particular application, and each member K2KTU within a set is associated with a particular card to receive that application).
Additional Descriptions of certain Aspects of the Invention
[0021] Certain embodiments of the invention provide methods for securely loading an application, comprising the steps of maintaining a plurality of cryptographic keys in an electronically addressable device, communicating one or more applications to the device, the one or more applications encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using a common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider and the common key is common to a plurality of devices, and communicating the common key to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys. In some of these embodiments, each of the communicating the one or more applications and the communicating the common key is secured using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider-specific key. In some of these embodiments, the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific public transport key. In some of these embodiments, the common key is communicated to the device upon verification of the device-specific public transport key by a key management authority.
[0022] In some of these embodiments, the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific secret transport key operative to extract the common key from the second plaintext key transformation unit. In some of these embodiments, the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key and wherein the second plaintext key transformation unit is digitally signed using a secret key of the provider. In some of these embodiments, the communicating includes communicating one or more of the plurality of cryptographic keys to the provider, the one or more cryptographic keys including a device- specific public transport key, and identifying the device to the provider. In some of these embodiments, the device is one of a plurality of devices and further comprising the steps of encrypting each of the one or more applications using keys associated with the each application, encrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit using the common key, the plaintext key transformation unit including the associated keys and corresponding application-specific information, and for each of the plurality of devices, encrypting second plaintext key transformation units using public transport keys associated with each of the plurality of devices, the second plaintext key transformation units including the common key, information specific to the each application and device-specific information, and digitally signing each second key transformation unit using a private key of the provider.
[0023] In some of these embodiments, the second plaintext key transformation units are encrypted using symmetric encryption. In some of these embodiments, the symmetric encryption is Triple DES. In some of these embodiments, the symmetric encryption is AES. In some of these embodiments, the plurality of cryptographic keys includes keys associated with the plurality of devices. In some of these embodiments, the device-specific secret key and the device-specific public key are provided using an asymmetric technique. In some of these embodiments, the asymmetric technique is RSA. In some of these embodiments, the plurality of cryptographic keys includes certified public and secret keys furnished by a certification authority, and further comprising the steps of encrypting a provider-specific public key using a certified secret key to obtain a provider-specific public key certificate, signing the encrypted application using a provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature, and signing the second key transformation unit using the provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature. In some of these embodiments, the step of verifying the provider-specific public key certificate with the certified public key.
[0024] In some of these embodiments, the method also comprises deriving the provider- specific public key from a decrypted public key certificate associated with the provider, and verifying the digital signatures of the application and second key transformation unit based on the derived provider-specific public key. In some of these embodiments, the decrypted public key certificate contains application-specific information. In some of these embodiments, the method also comprises decrypting the verified second plaintext key transformation unit using a verified device-specific private transport key, and verifying the resultant first plaintext key transformation unit is intended for the device, the verifying including comparing the identity of the device with a device identification in the first plaintext key transformation unit, confirming that the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key, decrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit associated with the application using the first key, associating the first plaintext key transformation unit with the decrypted second plaintext key transformation unit, and decrypting the application using the plurality of keys contained within the first plaintext key transformation unit.
[0025] In some of these embodiments, a device is employed that comprises a computing device and storage, the device configured to receive an encrypted application, wherein the storage maintains a plurality of cryptographic keys including a device-specific private transport key and a common key and the computing device is configured to decrypt the encrypted application using the device-specific private transport key and the common key. In some of these embodiments, the encrypted application is encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using the common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider. In some of these embodiments, the common key is provided to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys. In some of these embodiments, the encrypted application and the common key are provided to the device using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider- specific key to secure communication of the encrypted application and the common key.
[0026] In some of these embodiments, a method for secure application loading of an application to electronically addressable devices is provided. The method may comprise the steps of maintaining a plurality of cryptographic keys within the device, providing the device with one or more applications, encrypted using a plurality of cryptographic keys within a plaintext key transformation unit and said plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using a non-device-specifϊc key, each application and non-device-specific key being furnished by a provider, providing the device with the non-device-specific key within a plaintext key transformation unit, encrypted using a device-specific transport key resulting in the key-encryption-key key transformation unit. In some of these embodiments, the communication of the application and non-device-specific key are secured using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys, including a provider-specific key associated with a provider.
[0027] In some of these embodiments, the method may further comprise encrypting a plurality of applications intended for different devices using a plurality of keys, formatting the plurality of keys and application-specific information into a plaintext key transformation unit and encrypting said key transformation unit using a single non-device-specific key, formatting the non-device-specific key, application-specific information and device-specific information into a plaintext key transformation unit and encrypting said key transformation unit using each of the device-specific public transport keys of the plurality of devices resulting in the key-encryption-key key transformation units, digitally signing each key- encryption-key key transformation unit using a provider private key. [0028] Although the application has been particularly described with reference to embodiments thereof, it should be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutes and deletions are intended within the form and details thereof, without departing from the spirit and scope of the application. Accordingly, it will be appreciated that in numerous instances some features of certain embodiments will be employed without a corresponding use of other features. Further, those skilled in the art will understand that variations can be made in the number and arrangement of inventive elements illustrated and described in the above figures. It is intended that the scope of the appended claims include such changes and modifications.

Claims

WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:
1. A method for securely loading an application, comprising the steps of: maintaining a plurality of cryptographic keys in an electronically addressable device; communicating one or more applications to the device, the one or more applications encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using a common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider and the common key is common to a plurality of devices; and communicating the common key to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys, wherein each of the communicating the one or more applications and the communicating the common key is secured using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider-specific key.
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific public transport key.
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein the common key is communicated to the device upon verification of the device-specific public transport key by a key management authority.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the plurality of cryptographic keys includes a device-specific secret transport key operative to extract the common key from the second plaintext key transformation unit.
5. A method according to claim 1, wherein the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key and wherein the second plaintext key transformation unit is digitally signed using a secret key of the provider.
6. A method according to claim 1, wherein the communicating includes communicating one or more of the plurality of cryptographic keys to the provider, the one or more cryptographic keys including a device-specific public transport key; and identifying the device to the provider.
7. A method according to claim 1, wherein the device is one of a plurality of devices and further comprising the steps of encrypting each of the one or more applications using keys associated with the each application; encrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit using the common key, the plaintext key transformation unit including the associated keys and corresponding application-specific information; and for each of the plurality of devices, encrypting second plaintext key transformation units using public transport keys associated with each of the plurality of devices, the second plaintext key transformation units including the common key, information specific to the each application and device-specific information; and digitally signing each second key transformation unit using a private key of the provider.
8. A method according to claim 4, wherein the second plaintext key transformation units are encrypted using symmetric encryption.
9. A method according to claim 8, wherein the symmetric encryption is Triple DES.
10. A method according to claim 8, wherein the symmetric encryption is AES.
11. A method according to claim 8, wherein the plurality of cryptographic keys includes keys associated with the plurality of devices.
12. A method according to claim 4, wherein the device-specific secret key and the device- specific public key are provided using an asymmetric technique.
13. A method according to claim 12, wherein the asymmetric technique is RSA.
14. A method according to claim 7, wherein the plurality of cryptographic keys includes certified public and secret keys furnished by a certification authority, and further comprising the steps of: encrypting a provider-specific public key using a certified secret key to obtain a provider-specific public key certificate; signing the encrypted application using a provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature; and signing the second key transformation unit using the provider-specific secret key to obtain a digital signature.
15. A method according to claim 14, and further comprising the step of verifying the provider-specific public key certificate with the certified public key.
16. A method according to claim 15, and further comprising the steps of: deriving the provider-specific public key from a decrypted public key certificate associated with the provider; and verifying the digital signatures of the application and second key transformation unit based on the derived provider-specific public key.
17. A method according to claim 16, wherein the decrypted public key certificate contains application-specific information.
18. A method according to claim 16, and further comprising the steps of: decrypting the verified second plaintext key transformation unit using a verified device-specific private transport key; and verifying the resultant first plaintext key transformation unit is intended for the device, the verifying including comparing the identity of the device with a device identification in the first plaintext key transformation unit, confirming that the plurality of cryptographic keys includes the common key, decrypting the first plaintext key transformation unit associated with the application using the first key, associating the first plaintext key transformation unit with the decrypted second plaintext key transformation unit, and decrypting the application using the plurality of keys contained within the first plaintext key transformation unit.
19. A device comprising a computing device and storage, the device configured to receive an encrypted application, wherein: the storage maintains a plurality of cryptographic keys including a device-specific private transport key and a common key; and the computing device is configured to decrypt the encrypted application using the device-specific private transport key and the common key.
0. A device according to claim 19, wherein: the encrypted application is encrypted using cryptographic keys provided in a first plaintext key transformation unit, the first plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using the common key, wherein the common key and the one or more applications are furnished by a provider; the common key is provided to the device in a second plaintext key transformation unit, the second plaintext key transformation unit being encrypted using one or more device-specific transport keys; and the encrypted application and the common key are provided to the device using selected ones of the plurality of cryptographic keys including a provider-specific key to secure communication of the encrypted application and the common key.
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EP2016535A2 (en) 2009-01-21

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