WO2007077324A1 - Procede de certification et d'authentification ulterieure de documents originaux papier ou numeriques pour constitution de preuves - Google Patents
Procede de certification et d'authentification ulterieure de documents originaux papier ou numeriques pour constitution de preuves Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2007077324A1 WO2007077324A1 PCT/FR2006/002799 FR2006002799W WO2007077324A1 WO 2007077324 A1 WO2007077324 A1 WO 2007077324A1 FR 2006002799 W FR2006002799 W FR 2006002799W WO 2007077324 A1 WO2007077324 A1 WO 2007077324A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- original
- document
- information
- seal
- bubble
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
- H04N1/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
- H04N1/32101—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
- H04N1/32128—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title attached to the image data, e.g. file header, transmitted message header, information on the same page or in the same computer file as the image
- H04N1/32133—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title attached to the image data, e.g. file header, transmitted message header, information on the same page or in the same computer file as the image on the same paper sheet, e.g. a facsimile page header
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
- G07F7/125—Offline card verification
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
- H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
- H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
- H04N2201/3225—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document
- H04N2201/3233—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document of authentication information, e.g. digital signature, watermark
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
- H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
- H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
- H04N2201/3225—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document
- H04N2201/3233—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document of authentication information, e.g. digital signature, watermark
- H04N2201/3235—Checking or certification of the authentication information, e.g. by comparison with data stored independently
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
- H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
- H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
- H04N2201/3225—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document
- H04N2201/3233—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document of authentication information, e.g. digital signature, watermark
- H04N2201/324—Selecting a particular authentication information from amongst a plurality of different authentication information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
- H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
- H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
- H04N2201/3269—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of machine readable codes or marks, e.g. bar codes or glyphs
Definitions
- a person may falsify or even develop for his own purposes a false individual record of civil status or a false extract
- FR2765144 relates to a method of authenticating a paper document and its authenticity control device.
- This document suggests giving the material constituting the paper document a random intrinsic feature during its manufacture and associating it with the document for later authentication.
- This intrinsic random feature embedded in the material is actually always unique, but it is not non-reproducible identically, it is in effect surface marking that it is quite possible to reproduce identically by performing for example a serigraphy tooling whose apertures and definition are a true copy of the intrinsic random feature. Then, it is enough to deposit magnetic particles (fibers or ink) or invisible ink in an identical way and thus it is possible to reproduce an infinite number of times the same document.
- the patent FR2013362 relates to a method of manufacturing and identifying a document as well as the device for identifying said document.
- the subject of this patent concerns a random deposit of finely divided particles invisible to the naked eye associated with information, the whole is stored in a memory. To verify the authenticity there is comparison with what is read on the document and what is stored in the memory.
- EPOl 61181 relates to a method and its device for remote identification and authentication of documents.
- an identification code barcode type
- a random distribution are printed using an ink invisible to the naked eye on the document that is to be authenticated by this method.
- Optoelectronic reading means stores the identification code, the random distribution as well as possibly an inherent intrinsic characteristic of the paper medium constituting the document in a memory after encoding the information. To verify the authenticity of a document, it is compared that the printed elements as well as possibly the inherent intrinsic characteristic of the support correspond to what has been stored.
- US 2005/038756 discloses a method of authenticating original documents whose support is an identifiable medium in the same way as in the previous patents. ' '
- the patent application FR2852413 describes an autonomous electronic archiving apparatus.
- This type of apparatus seems to be very well suited for use in the context of the method described in the present invention where it can be used as a recording means for proof as will be seen below.
- the evidence lies in the apparatus itself, which is both judge and party, and where before a court, anyone who may question the authenticity of such or such logical information must be used as evidence because the evolution of electronic technologies is such that what was inaccessible and unfalsifiable at one time may become so in another era.
- this original witness can not constitute proof that he is himself considered unfalsifiable.
- the present invention specifically aims to bring one or more proofs that will have legal and legal values to authenticate documents as being originals or copies in conformity with original or information as being original both in the integrity of their content, their date of production and incidentally of, their author or owner.
- the method according to the invention relates both to the procedure of certification of originals and the procedure of subsequent authentication of elements described as originals.
- the first characteristic of this invention is that it is applicable unlike anything that exists today, both in the authentication of documents in physical forms (paper) than in. digital data.
- This invention relies on the need for proof of original physical document and proof of a witness document timestamped logic and reciprocally to a strictly logical information to provide a proof of original physical witness stamped.
- the method implements. in particular, an association of known means, in particular means making it possible, on the one hand, to mark physical and logical documents and to record them, and on the other hand means for capturing or reading, archiving and coding, requiring or not particular adaptations. , all acting in a combined way by producing a synergy leading us to the desired result which is to propose a very high security process encompassing the certification of original paper or digital documents and the authentication of said originals during their restitution.
- the proof of authenticity of an original physical document or of original digital information is provided by
- the operating principle is as follows: two independent databases are used.
- One BDl is a third in which are authenticated the authenticating parties of physical seals, which will be associated with the documents or with the information to be authenticated, possibly with an assignment to a person and / or an organization.
- the other base BD2 is a recording system type "electronic safe” or CD or DVD type (-R) or (+ R), non-rewritable where any information can be added and timestamped but can not not be modified, BD2 stores the documents or information certified by its issuer and the corresponding associated seals.
- the non-rewritable CD or DVD media are made unique by means of a very high security seal integrated in the medium so that the original data recorded in this medium can be sealed and not another.
- a scanning device of the scanner type enables the simultaneous acquisition of the physical document to be certified and its associated seal. In the case of computer data, the reading scanner is only used for the acquisition of the seal knowing that the association with the data takes place via the computer in which they are stored.
- the acquisition device is connected on the one hand with BD1 in order to interrogate it on the validity and the assignment of the seal used on the document or the information to be certified and on the other hand with BD2 in order to transfer the documents or information and associated seals read and certified for registration and timestamping purposes.
- the trusted third party BD1 can reject any seal that has already been assigned considering that it is used.
- the supposed authentic document is read by the reading device connected to BDl and BD2 then at first, the The device authenticates the physical seal associated with the document by querying BD1, then queries BD2 asking what is the logical document associated with that seal. Finally, a comparison is made between the alleged authentic document and its digital witness. If there is identity of the information, the proof is made that the document is authentic.
- the original document authentication process is by comparison of the presumed original physical document or the original information from a computer with its total or condensed digital representation stored in a database or system registration no editable, non-rewritable and non-duplicable. This comparison can be visual or automatic.
- the method comprises the following steps: a) the original document or the original information whose integrity of the content is certified by the issuer is associated with a unique and non-reproducible mark constituting a seal of both certification and authentication integrated or reported in the form of a seal previously registered in a database and issued by an authorized authority or trusted third party indicating the membership of the issuer or its trustee of the original document 1 or the information original that must be certified, the said mark is affixed directly on the document by the issuer of the said original document when it is a physical reality of the paper type, photo or on a blank sheet support appendix when it comes to certify computer data.
- This mark constituting an authenticator may possibly be a chaotic intrinsic characteristic of the medium itself (paper fibers for example) with however a preference as will be seen hereafter for the markings impossible to reproduce in order to avoid any future contestation and d provide a high level of security and timelessness.
- the original physical document or, similarly, the blank carrier sheet associated with the unique and non-reproducible mark is digitized opto-electronically by a device that allows in a single operation to link the contents of the original physical document or original computer data with the said unique mark and
- the reading apparatus is connected directly or indirectly via a wired or radio or internet communication network to a local or remote secure BD2 computer recording system or any added information is time stamped, non-modifiable and not rewritable, (c) The original document or information, and the associated unique and non-reproducible mark, are sent, stored and homed in the BD2 registration system.
- EP 1252616 of the same applicant and the same inventors, describes a bubble authenticator which is a means of marking documents very well suited to the aims of the present invention.
- This type of authenticator containing self-generated bubbles is not only always unique but also impossible to reproduce by natural or artificial means. Man as a potential actor of counterfeiting is thus excluded from any possibility of influence or influence or direct or indirect action on the proof object and on its measure.
- This authentic bubble volume therefore three-dimensional, has indeed remarkable optical properties, which make the bubbles perfectly visible although they are transparent as the polymer in which they are included. These are different diffraction indices that provide this discriminating feature.
- the security solution that allows to certify and subsequently authenticate by providing indisputable evidence is no longer built on exclusively digital foundations which everyone knows are not sustainable and they open the way to counterfeiting for at least two reasons, on the one hand they originate in the man who can always disclose his secrets, on the other hand computing powers evolving with those computers, no encryption algorithm can guarantee a retention period of the secrets which poses a real problem when one pretends to certify and to authenticate documents or information for which there is no limit of duration.
- the security solution no longer relies on a digital virtual reality developed by the man but on a physical reality not controlled by
- Patent application PCT / FR2005 / 002706 of the same inventors evokes the use of a bubble authenticator to form a seal.
- this type of seal is ideally suited as a system for marking the paper, the reading scanner and the digital archiving media of the CD-R or DVD-R type used for the BD2 database, nevertheless it requires that it be physically suitable for use on these types of media to 'it is inseparable of these without losing their integrity.
- the bubble authenticator is chemically bonded to a support itself adhesive but partially destructible during tearing.
- this form of physical integration makes it possible to directly stick the bubble seal on the paper support or on the plastic support of a CD or DVD, thus any attempt at recovery or removal to substitute said bubble seal for another original document or DVD becomes impossible because its integrity is lost which constitutes an alarm.
- the adhesive support of the bubble seal is reflective, for example silver-colored.
- this seal may be associated with an identity in the form of alphanumeric code, barcode or 2D or RFID tag or even a unique signature extracted from the characterizing part of the authenticator. This signature or identity constitutes the address in the BD2 storage system.
- the authenticating part and the identity of the seals is pre-registered in a central database BD1 constituting a trusted third party.
- This bubble seal is listed in this BDl database and indicates the membership to its holder or his trustee, the original document that must be authenticated. For example, a laboratory, institution, administration, notary, lawyer or company will order and dispose of its own seals. These seals are therefore not anonymous but already assigned to an organism independently of their future uses by said organism. It should be noted that bubble seals are a preferred mode but it could be used another form knowing that as will be seen below, the level of security depends on the performance of the authenticator used in its ability to not be able to be copied.
- the reading device is identifiable and unitarily authenticatable in order to prove its membership and its origin of emission during comparison by proof.
- This feature can be very useful for drawing the document, it may be possible to equip this device with a Geolocation system GPS type in the case of nomadic devices and communication systems type GPRS or Internet for full autonomy.
- This system may be a bubble seal of the same nature as that on the document to be authenticated but could be of a different nature.
- the bubble seal of the reading device built into the device is read and recorded simultaneously with the reading of the original document and its seal.
- the acquisition device is a scanner that can simultaneously read a paper document with its seal; this mode of use is adapted when the document is prepared separately.
- the acquisition apparatus will only be a seal reader; The method of use is adapted when the document is
- the general method of implementation is as follows. It consists of two main steps: the first step is a procedure for acquiring and registering the original document for certification and the second step is a procedure for authenticating the document when it is necessary to constitute proof of the quality of the document. 'origin.
- Pre-registration I and user assignment or organization owns adhesive bubble seals for authenticating each original document or original information in BDl database constituting a trusted third party.
- the base BD1 does not record the contents of the document but records the use of the bubble seal, and possibly but not necessarily its date and time of use.
- This invention requires for its implementation, a device for capturing or reading the original document and the unique seal and inreproductible associated such as a bubble seal as has already been explained.
- the read operation is the pre-registration phase in the appropriate secure and inviolable system called BD2, as previously defined.
- BD2 secure and inviolable system
- this device allows in a single capture phase to associate the authentication seal whose characterizing parts are unique and inreproductible with the content of the document constituting the original information.
- the device makes it possible to prove that the authenticator is valid, for a bubble seal it makes it possible to prove that the authenticating part with bubbles is three-dimensional and that this seal is well registered in BD1.
- This capture operation is preferably optical but it is conceivable that it is of any other nature, for example magnetic, X-ray or any other combination.
- the optical capture device is a scanner.
- the preferred solution for the choice of the authentication element of the acquisition device is a bubble authenticator itself implemented in the form of a seal which makes it inseparable from the device at the risk of causing its destruction.
- This choice of bubble seal is applicable to both the original document and the reading device inside which it is integrated. This bubble seal is placed in such a way that it can be captured compulsorily and systematically at each launch of the acquisition procedure of the original document for certification. This therefore results in an association of the two bubble seals, namely that of the reading apparatus and that of the original document.
- the digitizing device is equipped with a controlled spot light bar capable of generating several successive illuminations during the movement of said bar in order to cause reflections on the bubbles of the seals. These reflections are captured as the bar of light moves towards the bubbles. Subsequently, an analysis of the generated reflections proves that these are indeed real bubbles and not any lure or a photocopy.
- any other scanning means for authenticating the veracity of the authentic part of the seal and in this case in this case the volume aspect of the bubbles can be used.
- this type of conventional scanner can be equipped with a second CCD or CMOS optical sensor adapted to shooting the bubble seal and intervening only for this function.
- a conventional scanner can suffice knowing, that it is the author or the owner of the documents or the information which wants to certify his own originals, so he will not try to use a false seal bubble (for example a photocopy of a real) whose scanner could not prove its three-dimensional aspect knowing that during a check for evidence, fraud would be detected. and the owner of the original would lose all his rights which amounts to defrauding oneself.
- the acquisition apparatus makes it possible, by another operation, to read back the original document to perform an automatic comparison with the corresponding document stored in the computer storage device BD2 and to decide in objectivity if both documents can be considered identical. If the documents are not identical, the system can also automatically provide that they are the differences between the presumed original document and its representation stored in BD2. During the comparison operation for proof, it must be in the presence of an acquisition system and the original document. From this state, it is possible to edit and / or send true copies to the original. The knowledge of the signature of access to BD2 resulting from the seal makes it possible to edit the logical and certified document which is associated with said signature. According to a particularly secure usage feature, the logical content of the document or information stored in the BD2 system is associated with the signature
- the acquisition device it is possible to process the original information directly on the device via a keyboard and a computer associated or fully integrated with said acquisition device.
- the issuer can authenticate that information as original, it is i ⁇ i then proceeded in the same way as above by combining the unique and irreproducible sealed (type bubble seal) prerecorded in BDl but capturing only the sealed knowing that the association is carried out automatically at the initiative of the issuer by sending the set to the BD2 recording system.
- this version of the device and in order to constitute the original physical unit it is then possible to edit a paper version of the document and paste on it the authentication seal that was used for its transfer and storage in BD2.
- Another preferred way for the materialization of computer data without having to print all the sheets is to apply a hash function including content, date,
- the database BD2 can be a device of the electronic safe type or a digital recording medium type optical disk CD or DVD type writable once, non-erasable and non-modifiable or a USB type key with non-erasable memory.
- electronic vault devices incorporate an internal clock inside them to time stamp each recording. With regard to the recording by burning an optical disk, the time stamp of each recording is made from a
- NTP servers network time protocol
- the database BD2 is a single-time writable CD or DVD medium which is equipped with a bubble seal glued for example in the central ring or directly integrated by overmoulding in the plastic material around its center of rotation.
- This appropriately shaped bubble seal is similar in function to those used for documents.
- This bubble seal permanently associated with a DVD medium is prerecorded and assigned to its owner in BDl.
- the identity of the bubble seal and its owner or organization of assignment. are initially engraved in the
- the DVD before any recording, 1 'there is therefore correspondence between the information stored in BDl and those engraved on the optical medium.
- the original pVD remains unique by the mere presence of the bubble seal and is therefore the only evidence or witness valid.
- the DVD is personalized by the engraving of at least one biometric fingerprint of its owner for example a fingerprint.
- this engraved imprint conditions the opening of a recording session by the adequacy check between the recorded fingerprint and that captured by means of a sensor connected to the computer, this biometric fingerprint can advantageously be combined with other elements in the hash function applied and allows to make the property link with the registered originals.
- this access control to certify and prove ownership successively by registering and reading fingerprints; Digitals can also be applied to any archiving system fulfilling the function of BD2.
- FIG. 1 there is shown a scanner specially adapted to the acquisition of original documents prior to their registration and their subsequent authentication for proof.
- the top (1) of the scanner is a transparent pane that receives the document to be authenticated.
- the scanning scanning part (3) comprises, as for all the scanners, a CCD-type optical sensor with a set of mirrors and a uniform illumination ramp (4).
- This lighting ramp is associated in parallel with a light-emitting diode array (5) whose frequency and firing order are a function of the speed of movement and other undescribed factors making it possible to act on the formation. reflections at the border separating the bubbles from the transparent material, especially to prove the voluminal aspect of the bubbles, that is to say, their three-dimensionality.
- the scanner is equipped with a bubble authenticator (6) integrated in the transparent window. This always unique and non-reproducible authenticator is read each time and simultaneously at the reading of the original document
- a cover (2) makes it possible to cover the assembly in order to carry out the acquisition, any opening during the acquisition process blocks and cancels the latter in order to avoid any fraudulent maneuver.
- the corresponding security device may be of any kind and is not shown here.
- the scanner can integrate an electronic module allowing a secure connection via an Internet-like telecommunication network to each of databases BD1 and BD2. This scanner can be independent that is to say connected to a computer in the case of sedentary use or this scanner can be integrated into an autonomous set including the processing computer, the independent base link means
- BD1 and BD2 possibly a means for producing certified photocopies, an automatic paper feeding means and authentication seals, etc.
- This type of apparatus can also be used in two ways: the first way when acquisition of the document or documents for logical registration for proof, the second way as means of access to the BD2 recording system by means of the seal or its unique signature so as to be able for example to edit a paper copy conforming to the original by via a printer that can itself be an integral part of the device.
- This device version is particularly interesting for roaming applications.
- the scanning scanner must therefore at least verify the identity of the bubble seal and its authorization to use given by BDl, knowing that if remittance glue for example on the document a photocopy of the bubble seal in Thinking that it could retain the original seal for later use, this operation would be contrary to its interests because, on the one hand, during authentication, proof would be given that the document is not original and on the other hand when attempt to use the true seal later this could not be put into service because it would already be used in BDl.
- FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of the general operation of the method.
- the bubble seals (7) relating to the documents (8) or information (15), the bubble seals (6) relating to the scanners (1), the bubble seals (16) relating to the optical disks (13) are recorded and assigned to their respective owners in a BDl trusted third party database (9) accessible by telecommunications network.
- (7) are shown in the form of bubble seals adapted to authenticate the originals (8) (15).
- a bubble seal (7) is . stuck on a document to be certified (8) constituting the original or on a paper medium (20) which makes it possible to print the digest of a digital file to be certified. This document (8) (20) is then placed on the window of a scanner (1).
- the 'bubble seal (7) adapted to document (8) or (20) and the scanner-sealed bubble seals (6) are placed in such a way that they are seen by the capture element of the scanner as it is scrolled.
- the lid (2) is lowered and the capture process can start.
- a first traditional capture is performed, it allows to position the entire document and to geographically locate the positioning of bubble seals.
- a second capture is performed and this without lid opening (2) to analyze and interpret the authenticity of bubble seals through the combined action of light emitting diodes (5).
- This capture operation triggers the querying of the trusted third party database BDl (9) where the references and the 0 assignments of the seals (7), (6) relating to the originals (8) (15) and to the scanner ( 1).
- the scanner can then proceed to the operation of transferring all the captured elements, that is to say the contents of the document and bubble sealed to the BD2 recording system (10) (13).
- Communication between the acquisition device and BD1 and BD2 is via a local or remote public or private telecommunication network.
- the steps are as follows: the alleged original document (8) (20) is presented, a reader Automatic bubble seal (11) or a device identical to that having / permit the acquisition (1) makes it possible to formally acquire the bubble seal (7) on the presumed original (8) (20).
- the database BD2 (10) (13) is queried about the actual existence of this bubble seal " (7) and the content of the document or associated information. Then appears on the screen of the computer (12) or on a printer not shown, a document (8 ') which we will have to make the
- I- ' ' reference database BD1 (9) makes it possible to say what is the identity of the transmission scanner, its owner and possibly its place of emission.
- FIG. 3A shows an example of document (8) authenticated by the seal (7) and in FIG. 3B is shown the same document as it appears recorded in BD2 after the acquisition via the reading device (1). It appears in the stored document, the authenticator (6) of the acquisition device.
- FIG. 4A represents a bubble code constituting a seal where the volume aspect of the bubbles inside the material is clearly perceived, thus providing an authenticating characteristic that is both very easy to interpret and physically always unique and impossible to interpret. duplicate identically.
- FIG. 4B represents a top view of a bubble seal such that it can be affixed to an original document.
- Figure 4C shows a bubble seal which has been torn off and then glued again.
- Figure 5 shows the operating scheme of the recording procedure when BD2 is a DVD.
- This architecture is particularly interesting because it is completely autonomous and can be used with a standard computer environment connected to the Internet, the only elements that are specific are bubble seals to be associated with the physical or digital documents to be certified and a CD or DVD non-rewritable authenticated by a bubble seal.
- a non-rewritable DVD (13) is made unique by a bubble seal (16) placed in the central crown. Initially, this DVD is assigned to its owner (or institution) by the enrollment of fingerprints (19) through the sensor (14). The identity of the person (or representative of the institution) associated with the identity of the DVD provided by the bubble seal and at least one fingerprint are etched through
- the scanner (1) is the acquisition tool, on the one hand the sealed bubble association with physical document (8), on the other hand reading the bubble seal (7) carried by the sheet (20). ) provided with a printed mark (23) for automatically selecting the presence of a digital original (15) to be certified, which is available in the memory of the control computer (12).
- the hardware infrastructure is thus composed of the control computer (12) equipped with a DVD burner (21) connected to the Internet network allowing access to BD1 (9) and to a universal time server Q7.
- a simple finger application (19) on the fingerprint reader (14) after the introduction of the DVD (13) in the engraver (21) followed by the affixing of a seal (7) on the document (8) or (20) is sufficient to trigger ' all the procedure of certification and registration.
- a receipt relating to the recorded physical documents (8) is printed by the printer (22), it indicates the condensed summary resulting from the application of the function of.hachage including including the contents, the date , the signature or identity of the bubble seal assigned to the document, the signature or identity of the bubble seal assigned to the DVD, the identity and / or fingerprints of the rights holder, the file size.
- This receipt will then be reconciled with the physical original (8) containing the bubble seal (7).
- the paper medium (20) equipped with a bubble seal (7) which has just been scanned is placed in the printer.
- Figure 6 shows a non-rewritable DVD (13) equipped with a bubble seal (16) placed in the central ring.
- BD2 a means of archives, digital called BD2. Due to the presence of this seal with characteristics identical to those of the seals used for the documents, said DVD is made unique and impossible to reproduce identically. It is listed and assigned in the BDl database. At the head of the DVD is engraved either its identity, or the signature of the bubble seal, or 1 both. Similarly, the identity of its owner associated with one or more biometric fingerprints are initially etched only if one then wants to prove the property. These initial data are then combined and combined with the information and the bubble seals to be certified and then time stamped, the set is then encapsulated by the application of a hash function and then etched
- Figure 7 shows a procedure for dematerialization of physical documents.
- the goal is to build digital archives and destroy the physical originals.
- the question then arises of being able to qualify the digital archive of the original by providing proof of its integrity at the time of the need for restitution.
- this proof is brought by the application of a hash function that provides a summary that is then saved with the document.
- This summary can also be printed on an additional paper that will be physically archived and will serve as a witness when it will be necessary to prove the authenticity of the archived digital document.
- this process as it is, is very far from being unfalsifiable because it is enough to know the key of encryption to be able to modify the contents of the document while reconstituting an identical summary.
- this summary (23) is associated with the signature of a bubble seal (7) which in this case does not have necessarily need to be prerecorded in database BDl, to provide another summary with timestamp, this last summary called SHA 256_cert (26), is written in plain text next to the bubble seal and is saved in the same archived document ( 15).
- the bubble seal (7) used for certification with the SHA_256cert (or summary) written beside it is the rematerialized witness but especially tamper-proof archived document. Subsequently to prove the authenticity of the archived document (15) it is sufficient to recalculate the summary of the archived digital part in association with the signature of the bubble seal used (7) by applying the same SHA as during the certification and compare the abstract SHA_256cert of the scanned document with the one written next to the bubble seal. If there is identity the document is integrity.
- this method will make it possible to materialize and certify original logical information and to certify original physical documents, all of which can then be authenticated at the level of the integrity of the content, the date, and possibly the property.
- this process makes it possible to move safely from the physical world to the digital world by materially certifying information that becomes unfalsifiable and providing the tools and method to demonstrate this authenticity.
- the concept of; the proof rests on the duality of a physical information and a digital information, one being the witness of the other which is not modifiable at the risk of losing the proof.
- the bubble seal is the keystone of these two pieces of information.
- an original physical document associated with a bubble seal corresponds to a dematerialized witness counterpart stamped with a date stamped original document and corresponds to a witness counterpart materialized by a bubble seal.
- the bubble seal acts ' like a physical and logical gateway inaccessible to man otherwise than in reading and which is the safe keystone between the two physical worlds and logic. This gateway is impregnable because it is physically falsifiable and accessible only in read and not in writing and whose extracted signature is a constant that will be used in combination with all the other data to be certified to generate a unique hash code.
- the process according to the invention here also provides an answer to the constitution of certain evidence because it is constituted a counterpart materialized archived document (s) archived (s) knowing that the volume comparison between the original physical originals and the counter parts materialized following digital archiving can be divided by 10, by 100 or by 1000 or more depending on each processing unit (for example for an A4 page, the volume is divided by 20 and for a file of 100 pages it is divided by 2000)
- This process can also be used for issuing administrative documents of all kinds, in order to avoid the use of false documents for the delivery of truths. It can be used for the electronic delivery of authentic, certified notarized deeds.
- This process can be used to send registered or certified electronic mail where the seal is the seal of certification but also the key of calculation and verification of authenticity.
- the method according to the invention makes it possible to go beyond the conventions of evidence. between the parties to secure the dematerialized exchanges by bringing new proof materialized and which therefore become effective against third parties.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US12/158,409 US8056822B2 (en) | 2005-12-21 | 2006-11-09 | Method for certifying and subsequently authenticating original, paper of digital documents for evidences |
EP06847079A EP1964077A1 (fr) | 2005-12-21 | 2006-12-19 | Procede de certification et d'authentification ulterieure de documents originaux papier ou numeriques pour constitution de preuves |
CN200680048632.9A CN101346746B (zh) | 2005-12-21 | 2006-12-19 | 用证据的构造证明并鉴别原始纸质文件或数字文件的方法 |
US13/252,572 US8256688B2 (en) | 2005-12-21 | 2011-10-04 | Method for certifying and subsequently authenticating original, paper or digital documents for evidences |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR05/12985 | 2005-12-21 | ||
FR0512985A FR2895125B1 (fr) | 2005-12-21 | 2005-12-21 | Procede d'authentification de documents et dispositif de lecture desdits documents a des fins d'enregistrement pour preuve |
Related Child Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US12/158,409 A-371-Of-International US8056822B2 (en) | 2005-12-21 | 2006-11-09 | Method for certifying and subsequently authenticating original, paper of digital documents for evidences |
US13/252,572 Continuation US8256688B2 (en) | 2005-12-21 | 2011-10-04 | Method for certifying and subsequently authenticating original, paper or digital documents for evidences |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2007077324A1 true WO2007077324A1 (fr) | 2007-07-12 |
WO2007077324A8 WO2007077324A8 (fr) | 2007-08-30 |
Family
ID=36716599
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/FR2006/002799 WO2007077324A1 (fr) | 2005-12-21 | 2006-12-19 | Procede de certification et d'authentification ulterieure de documents originaux papier ou numeriques pour constitution de preuves |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (2) | US8056822B2 (fr) |
EP (1) | EP1964077A1 (fr) |
CN (1) | CN101346746B (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2895125B1 (fr) |
RU (1) | RU2409861C2 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2007077324A1 (fr) |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN101346746B (zh) | 2012-12-19 |
WO2007077324A8 (fr) | 2007-08-30 |
CN101346746A (zh) | 2009-01-14 |
RU2008129716A (ru) | 2010-01-27 |
US8256688B2 (en) | 2012-09-04 |
EP1964077A1 (fr) | 2008-09-03 |
US8056822B2 (en) | 2011-11-15 |
RU2409861C2 (ru) | 2011-01-20 |
FR2895125B1 (fr) | 2008-12-12 |
US20120061461A1 (en) | 2012-03-15 |
US20080267511A1 (en) | 2008-10-30 |
FR2895125A1 (fr) | 2007-06-22 |
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