WO2004114227A1 - Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles - Google Patents
Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004114227A1 WO2004114227A1 PCT/IB2004/050933 IB2004050933W WO2004114227A1 WO 2004114227 A1 WO2004114227 A1 WO 2004114227A1 IB 2004050933 W IB2004050933 W IB 2004050933W WO 2004114227 A1 WO2004114227 A1 WO 2004114227A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- small device
- signaling
- base station
- communication
- access
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
- G06K7/0008—General problems related to the reading of electronic memory record carriers, independent of its reading method, e.g. power transfer
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/0723—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips the record carrier comprising an arrangement for non-contact communication, e.g. wireless communication circuits on transponder cards, non-contact smart cards or RFIDs
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00785—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by light
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00801—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by acoustic waves
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
- G07C2209/62—Comprising means for indicating the status of the lock
Definitions
- the invention is based on a method and an arrangement of the kind defined in the main claim and relates to transponder systems or remote control systems employing high- frequency message transmission between a small device and a base station, which systems operate without being explicitly and deliberately actuated, at least in the case of certain functions. It is merely coming within the communication range that results in communication taking place and that is able to trigger the particular action concerned.
- passive systems Such systems are referred to as passive.
- passive keyless entry systems In the particular case of systems for giving access to automobiles, the term "passive keyless entry systems" is widely used.
- Systems that may be instanced as passive systems are, in particular, systems for giving access to automobiles, to other physical objects and areas, to electronic devices, machines, vehicles, installations and facilities and for giving authorizations for IT and telecommunication functions, but also systems for identifying people, for logging hours worked, and for logistics operations on objects and systems that perform ticketing and payment functions.
- Passive entry or access systems are notable for the particular convenience to the user of the procedure by which authorization for access is given electronically.
- the person authorized to have access generally carries or wears a small device for identification purposes in or on his clothing.
- the small device may be produced in various forms such as, for example, a chip card, key, remote control, key fob or badge.
- a transponder In the following context, it will also be referred to for short as a transponder. In the present connection it is immaterial whether the transponder does or does not have an energy source of its own (generally a battery).
- the base station is able to communicate with the transponder over a distance ranging from several decimeters to a few meters when the latter is in the access zone. In the case of access to automobiles, this zone is in front of a door of the automobile.
- cryptographic procedures are used in modern-day designs to achieve identification that is secure and difficult to imitate. If the identification process is successful, access is given without any additional action on the part of the wearer or carrier of the transponder.
- the electric central locking system of the automobile is opened, for example.
- the widespread introduction of passive entry systems in automobiles can be expected in the fairly near future and such equipment is already available for certain vehicle models.
- the term "Passive Keyless Entry", or PKE for short, is commonly used in this context.
- the invention can be implemented at considerably less cost and with considerably less circuitry than the majority of previously known solutions for safeguarding against relay attack. Appreciably higher reliability can also be expected than with many of the previously published solutions. No great exactness is called for on the part of components, frequencies or the like. As a result, inexpensive and well-proven means can be employed.
- the solution according to the invention does not call for any additional wireless communication that may possibly be subject to approval or may require some further infrastructure (such as mobile radio networks or GPS).
- the invention can be applied internationally without any changes, which is not possible with some of the known methods because of the different frequency bands and bandwidths for the radio transmission.
- the perception can be brought about in particular by the emission of sound and/or light as signaling. Where light is used, the transponder has to be worn or carried in an exposed position as a badge, identity-card tag or armband or on the surface of the clothing.
- the perceptible signaling may originate from the transponder and/or the access system (e.g. the automobile) and may be received and analyzed by whichever is on the other side. In the embodiments that are described below, this will be elucidated by way of example with reference to access to automobiles.
- the perceptible signaling is emitted by the base station. Provision may be made in this case for the small device to receive and analyze at least part of the signaling.
- the base station i.e. the automobile, emits perceptible signaling. When this is done, the signaling is both noticed by the human being and received by the transponder and included in the analysis made for the purposes of the accessing process.
- the wake-up function that is already standard for the transponder may, for example, be performed by means of sound signals rather than by means of high- frequency signals (long-wave transmission is often used). Provision may, however, also be made for the signaling only to begin if at least part of the identification has already been completed, to enable signaling to take place only if the transponder(s) is/are the relevant one(s) or the base station matches, as the case may be. For this purpose, provision is made for the small device to conclude the communication in a secure manner if the signaling too has been received.
- the perceptible signaling is emitted by the small device.
- the transponder device has a signaling means that emits a perceptible message whenever there is an accessing process - i.e. even if there is an illicit accessing process.
- the message may, for example, be a characteristic sequence of tones given by a piezo audio emitter. The effect of the sequence of tones may well be boosted by further types of signaling, for example by a pulsing vibratory message.
- Accessing processes that have not been concluded, are incomplete or have been broken off can also be signaled. Under certain circumstances this may be interpreted as an indication of attempted illicit access.
- the person authorized to have access can react in the light of the situation that exists. If he expects there to be a repeat, the transponder and hence the passive entry function can be switched off and/or action can be taken to have a check made and in certain cases even an arrest.
- the transponder may have an input function (e.g. a press-key) that sets the automobile to a state that wards off the intruder. This may include the triggering of an alarm system or the locking of the vehicle.
- the trunk lid, filler cap, glove compartment and all the doors may be locked in such a way that that they can only be unlocked again by an explicit action that is only possible for the person authorized to have access or for security personnel (use of a key, input of a code).
- the intruder it is conceivable for the intruder to be marked with dyes or odoriferous substances, for example by the emission of such at controls or handles.
- Something comparable may apply in cases where the immobihzer is put into operation or where valuable equipment, fittings and accessories are blocked. In this way, navigation systems, on-board computers, entertainment and information systems (radio, video, internet) may be stopped from functioning until unlocked, window lifters and belt locks may be closed, the pumping of fuel or the firing of the engine may be prevented, and the brakes and steering may be blocked.
- the person authorized to have access may bar the passive access function temporarily. This is useful at times when the signaling would be a nuisance, such as when going to the theater, for example. The same is true when the signaling cannot be noticed because the person is not carrying the transponder device with him.
- the place of the off-switch may be taken by a cover, case or box for the transponder that is impenetrable to high-frequency transmissions, or by a control function in the vehicle, such as, for example, a special long-term parking or holiday safeguard.
- a search or test mode can be set into which access is not allowed but the signaling is triggered as soon as a communication takes place. This may, for example, be implemented in the form of an incomplete or altered communication of the access data. This mode can be used to find the transponder or the vehicle from a sufficiently short distance. Also, special search devices may provoke only the signaling, at the time of hunts by the authorities or checks, for example. This function may be a major deterrent to potential thieves. In normal everyday use, the signaling is intended mainly to assist an ergonomic process. Because of the additional things that are perceived, the user learns the passive entry function more quickly. There is assistance with the movements that have to be performed because there is perceptible feedback. There are many cases where something comparable has proved a success, such as, for example, in the case of momentary-contact switches that give an additional audio signal or have indicator lights.
- the absence of the signaling, or its incompleteness or a difference from its normal course may indicate a problem on the high-frequency transmission path (interference in the transmission band, shadowing) and may for example cause further attempts to be made to gain access with a change in the position of the transponder.
- the signaling means may also assume responsibility for a diagnostic function for other purposes, and may for example give an indication that a battery is exhausted.
- Security against other electronic attacks can also be increased with the help of the signaling. Attacks of this kind include, in particular, ones aimed at gaining knowledge of the parameters, cryptological operation or codes of the transponder and/or base station by way of unnoticed tapping into their signals. With the help of this information, attempts could be made to imitate the signals or the operation, to re-radiate the signals, or to perform crypto- attacks (decryptions). At the present time, the view taken by experts generally is that risks of this kind are fairly small because all manufacturers are using well thought out cryptographic procedures, measures for ensuring secrecy and other organizational and technical safeguards.
- Implementation of the invention boosts the attentiveness of the user to the novel function, and makes it easier for him to become accustomed to day-to-day use of the convenient passive procedure for which there is no actuating function. It is not necessary for the purchaser of a vehicle to be given any detailed understanding of the exact nature of the threat posed by electronic attacks. The deterrent effect of the signaling comes into play even without such an understanding. It can be assumed that a potential attacker will have the appropriate specialized knowledge needed to recognize the resulting risk of discovery and the other points that provide safeguards. In the unlikely event of there still being a threat, the user too can be quickly acquainted with the appropriate rules of behavior and countermeasures. When journeying to countries or regions where there is a risk, the passive function could be selectively not used. For this purpose, provision may be made in the arrangement according to the invention for there to be on the small device a control for at least temporarily deactivating the wireless transmission.
- Access, identification, logging, ticket and payment systems employing wireless identification where no deliberate, active action has to be taken can also be improved by means of the invention. In this case too, comparable advantages from the point of view of security and operation can be achieved with little circuitry and cost by using the invention.
- Fig. 1 is a schematic representation of the signaling when emitted by the base station (the automobile in this case).
- Fig. 2 is a schematic representation of the signaling when emitted by the transponder.
- Fig. 3 is a schematic representation of the signaling when emitted both by the base station (the automobile in this case) and by the transponder.
- Fig. 4 shows an imaginary relay attack and the advantageous - deterrent - effect of the signaling
- Fig 5 is a schematic representation of an embodiment employing signaling in specific spatial access zones.
- Fig. 1 is a schematic representation of the first embodiment. From the vehicle
- perceptible signaling 4 such as, for example, a sequence of tones or a light signal
- This signaling is emitted by a signal emitter 3. It is perceived by the person 5 authorized to have access - the carrier or wearer of the transponder - and at the same time is received and analyzed by the transponder 6.
- the transponder 6 may be fitted with a suitable receiver, such as, for example, an opto-electrical or an acoustic one.
- the wireless communication 7 is further effected between the transponder 6 and the base station 8.
- This communication uses alternating fields in different frequency bands and it cannot be perceived. To save energy, provision may be made for the entire function not to be switched on until the door handle 2 has been operated. Other points to indicate that the access zone has been entered may also be used (light barriers, motion sensors, analysis of fields).
- the signal emitter 3 and the base station 8 may be fitted at different points in the vehicle or as a combined sub-assembly - e.g. in the door mirror or on the door handle 2.
- Fig. 2 is a schematic view of the second embodiment. From the transponder 11, perceptible signaling 10, such as, for example, a sequence of tones or a light signal, is emitted.
- This signaling is emitted by a signal emitter integrated into the transponder 11. It is perceived by the person 5 authorized to have access, who is carrying the transponder in his pocket, and at the same time is received and analyzed by a signal sensor 9 in the vehicle 1. The wireless communication 7 between the transponder 11 and the base station 8, which cannot be perceived, continues.
- Fig. 3 is a schematic representation of the third embodiment. From the transponder 6, perceptible signaling 14, such as, for example, a sequence of tones or a light signal, is emitted.
- This signaling is emitted by a signal emitter integrated into the transponder 11. It is perceived by the person 5 authorized to have access, and at the same time is received and analyzed by a combined signal emitter and sensor 12 in or on the vehicle 1.
- the combined signal emitter and sensor 12 may also emit signaling 13 that is then, once again, both perceived and also received and analyzed by the transponder 6.
- the transponder 6 has not only the signal emitter mentioned but also a signal sensor.
- the two signals 13 and 14 may be of the same kind or different. They may be particularly clearly noticeable as a result of further stimuli temporally connected with them, originating from the transponder 6 and the vehicle 1.
- Fig. 4 represents an imaginary electronic relay attack and the advantageous effect of the signaling.
- One of the two ends of the extended radio transmission path 19 used in the relay attack is situated at the vehicle. This end is shown here schematically as a relay station 17 that is hidden in the suitcase carried by a potential intruder 15.
- the signals 21 that are normally exchanged between the transponder and base station are now passed to the other end of the extended radio transmission path 19, and sent back again, via an intermediate point.
- the other end of the extended path takes the form of, for example, a relay station 18 disguised as a suitcase that is carried by an accomplice 16 of the intruder.
- the accomplice 16 is situated sufficiently close to the person 5 authorized to have access, at a time when the latter is no longer able to see his vehicle.
- the radio signals 22 that have been transmitted via an intermediate point are re-emitted, and picked up in the other direction.
- a base station in the immediate vicinity of the transponder 23 is simulated and the transponder 23 is inveigled into behaving in the appropriate way.
- the transmissions from the transponder are transmitted back to the actual base station.
- the vehicle 1 can be opened, without authority, even though the person 5 authorized to have access is a long way away from the access zone. Distances of between 10 m and 50 km or more are conceivable.
- the extended radio transmission path can employ any desired transmission mediums (radio link, co-axial cable, telephone) that have the requisite bandwidth.
- the accomplice 16 will be revealed in the above example.
- the attention of the person 5 authorized to have access will also be drawn by the emission 25 of the signal from the transponder 23 and he will be able to put in hand a range of countermeasures.
- Fig 5 is a schematic representation of an embodiment where the signaling function operates if a person enters or is in specific spatial access zones.
- a base station 26 or a plurality of antennas may be fitted round an automobile in the region of the doors (side and rear). As a result of the range of the transponders, access zones approximately 1 m to a maximum of approximately 5 m in extent are formed.
- signaling can take place as soon as these access zones 28 are entered.
- the person authorized to have access can be given a forceful reminder by the signaling that he is just being passively identified. He can operate the door handle 26 without having to take any further action, which handle 26 unlocks in the event of him being satisfactorily recognized as part of the identification.
- the passive identification function performed by the transponder can be deactivated by simple operation of a control. Instead of this, an alarm function can be triggered or other countermeasures put in hand. Provision may be made for the door handle not to be operable for the whole time after the signaling successfully activates the opening process but only in a given time slot. Permanent operation of the door handle should not be permitted anyway. From an ergonomic point of view, the signaling should be satisfactorily matched to the expiry of the period allowed for door opening.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2006516714A JP2007527961A (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2004-06-17 | Method and arrangement for improving the security of a transponder system, particularly for accessing a car |
US10/562,249 US20080024322A1 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2004-06-17 | Method and Arrangements for Increasing the Security of Transponder Systems, Particularly for Access to Automobiles |
EP04744363A EP1642242A1 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2004-06-17 | Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles |
CN200480018047.5A CN1813271B (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2004-06-17 | Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP03101873.2 | 2003-06-25 | ||
EP03101873 | 2003-06-25 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2004114227A1 true WO2004114227A1 (en) | 2004-12-29 |
Family
ID=33522403
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/IB2004/050933 WO2004114227A1 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2004-06-17 | Method and arrangements for increasing the security of transponder systems, particularly for access to automobiles |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20080024322A1 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1642242A1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2007527961A (en) |
CN (1) | CN1813271B (en) |
WO (1) | WO2004114227A1 (en) |
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WO2007003656A1 (en) * | 2005-07-05 | 2007-01-11 | Gemplus | Secured identification system and medium, and method for securing same |
US7791457B2 (en) | 2006-12-15 | 2010-09-07 | Lear Corporation | Method and apparatus for an anti-theft system against radio relay attack in passive keyless entry/start systems |
WO2011157920A1 (en) | 2010-06-15 | 2011-12-22 | Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives | Method of securing a wireless communication, receiver device and communication system implementing this method |
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WO2015100167A1 (en) | 2013-12-23 | 2015-07-02 | Assa Abloy, Inc. | Method for utilizing a wireless connection to unlock an opening |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20080024322A1 (en) | 2008-01-31 |
EP1642242A1 (en) | 2006-04-05 |
CN1813271B (en) | 2010-12-01 |
JP2007527961A (en) | 2007-10-04 |
CN1813271A (en) | 2006-08-02 |
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