WO2002054356A2

WO2002054356A2 - Valuable document having an integrated circuit, method for checking authenticity and method for monitoring the quality of said valuable document

Info

Publication number: WO2002054356A2
Application number: PCT/EP2001/015336
Authority: WO
Inventors: Michael Lamla
Original assignee: Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority date: 2001-01-02
Filing date: 2001-12-27
Publication date: 2002-07-11
Also published as: WO2002054356A3; AU2002235815A1; DE10100063A1

Abstract

The invention relates to a valuable document (1) having an integrated circuit (5) or chip in which information about particular characteristics of valuable documents (2, 3, 4, 6) is stored many times and in various forms. Said pieces of information differ from each other in that they are coded differently. The first piece of coded information (RSAsec1) is stored in the chip by the producer of the valuable document. The second piece of coded information (RSAsec2) is stored in the chip by a central authority which emits the valuable document. Each coding is carried out by different secret keys (sec1, sec2). During an ensuing examination by a valuable document processing authority, the pieces of information (RSAsec1, RSAsec2) stored in a coded manner are decoded by means of corresponding public keys (Pub 1, Pub 2) and are compared with corresponding pieces of information which are concretely determined in situ by the valuable document processing authority, in order to see whether they match. Said corresponding pieces of information are then likewise stored in the chip in a coded manner.

Description

Security with an integrated circuit as well as a method for checking the authenticity and a method for monitoring the quality of the security

The invention relates to a security with an integrated circuit in which information relating to a security feature of the security is stored. The invention also relates to a method for checking the authenticity and a method for monitoring the quality of such a security.

From DE 19630648 AI a bank note is already known in which a transponder chip with an antenna is integrated.

In WO 00/07151 it is proposed to embed an electronic circuit with a contactless data transmission device in a security paper, for example a banknote, the electronic circuit being designed in such a way that an input signal in the electronic circuit triggers the transmission of a specific output signal, whereby it is the input signal as well as the output signal is a carrier frequency oscillation modulated with the relevant signal information. The signal information can relate to an authenticity feature of the bank note, for example the serial number of the bank note or also an authenticity feature of the bank note that can be detected magnetically or by light that is not in the visible area. The information content corresponding to the detected authenticity feature is entered into the circuit during the authenticity check and compared there with reference information, the circuit only outputting the authenticity-confirming output signal if the test is positive. For the purpose of detecting money laundering, the electrical circuit provides a read / write memory in which each time the security paper is checked, information about the checking body and, if appropriate, also the date of the check is written. WO 97/33252 proposes a method for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards or smart cards. There, the carrier material of the chip card is displaced with optically and / or electronically (eg infrared, magnetism, ultrasound) detectable foreign bodies, their local position (coordinates) is recorded and stored in the chip of the card as non-readable, encrypted information. When the document is checked, the local position of the foreign bodies is determined again and internally compared to the information that was previously not readable, in order to verify the authenticity of the document.

The object of the present invention is now to improve the security against forgery of securities of the type mentioned, in particular banknotes. Further aspects of the present invention are based on the objects of proposing a method for checking the authenticity of such a security and a method for monitoring the quality of such a security.

These tasks are solved by a security as well as by a procedure for the authenticity check of the security and a procedure for quality monitoring of the security with the characteristics of the attached independent claims. Advantageous refinements and developments of the invention are specified in claims dependent thereon.

Accordingly, certain information relating to at least one security feature is stored in a memory of the integrated circuit (hereinafter: “chip”) of the security not only once but several times, each time ^• because filed in different forms. This significantly increases security against counterfeiting of the security.

In a first embodiment, the information stored several times in different forms differs at least in that it is encrypted in different ways. In a second embodiment, the information stored several times in different forms differs in that it has a different information content.

This is the case, for example, if the information relates to a time-varying physical property of the relevant security feature and the information stored several times in the memory each takes into account a measured value of this physical property measured at a different time. Both embodiments, that is to say different encryption and different information content, can also be combined with one another.

A preferred variant of the first embodiment with differently encrypted information provides that the securities manufacturer, for example a banknote manufacturer or a stock manufacturer, contains characteristic information of one or more security features by means of a first secret key known only to him in the integrated circuit, for example a transponder chip stores the first register of the chip. The banknotes, shares or other documents secured in this way are then delivered to an issuing authority, for example a central bank in the case of banknotes or another institution in the event of the issuance of stock securities, and this issuing instance again determines the information from the relevant security features and ^{■ also} saves it in encrypted form, but this time with a second secret key known only to the issuing instance in a second register of the chip. However, the issuing entity first checks whether the information it ascertains matches the information stored on the chip by the securities manufacturer. A public key of the security manufacturer, which is also stored in the first register of the chip, is used to decrypt the information stored by the security manufacturer. The central authority for issuing the security also stores its public key together with the information encrypted by it in the second register of the chip.

In order to ensure that the public key of the security manufacturer and the central issuing authority are authentic, a corresponding certificate for the respective public key is also stored in the two registers.

If a security processing instance, for example a bank, subsequently checks the authenticity of the security on the basis of the stored information in comparison with information which it has determined specifically on site, then two reference values are available to it, both of which must be identical and of which the security processing instance knows that the stored information originates authentically from the securities manufacturer and the central issuing authority, provided that the decryption of the information with the two certified public keys matches the information that it has specifically determined on site. This effectively protects the securities against counterfeiting. In addition, after a successful check, the same information, namely the information specifically determined by the money processing instance on site, can also be stored in encrypted form in a third register of the chip, a third secret key known only to the money processing instance and possibly other money processing instances being used for this encryption becomes. The information encrypted in this way is in turn stored with the associated public key of the money processing instance and the corresponding certificate in the third register.

As a rule, one can assume that there is only one security manufacturer and only one central issuing authority, but that there are numerous security processing instances. Since the securities are not necessarily processed by the same securities processing authority, but successively by different securities processing authorities, it is necessary that the information determined by the securities processing authorities on site is encrypted using an identical secret key before it is stored on the chip , For this purpose, signature chip cards are used on which at least the secret key, for example an RSA key, is stored.

According to the second embodiment of the invention, which is preferably used in combination with the aforementioned embodiment of the invention, the information relates to at least one of the

Security features a certain physical property that can change over a period of time. This information is first stored in the chip by the security manufacturer and / or by the central issuing authority. The securities processing instances in turn determine this Information from the relevant security feature and compare it with the information provided by the security manufacturer. Since the information relates to a time-varying physical property of the security feature, the information to be compared does not have to match. They only have to be within a specified tolerance range. If this is the case, the specifically determined information is also stored in the chip. On the other hand, if the information determined on site is outside the tolerance range, the security is retired.

The physical properties of the security features that change over time can be, for example, soft magnetism, hard magnetism, phosphorescence, fluorescence and other properties.

A history can be created by storing the time-varying information specifically determined on site by the securities processing instances on the chip, preferably chronologically, for example in a shift register. In order to increase the meaningfulness of the history, it is advantageous if a date, and preferably also information about the respective securities processing instance, is stored on the chip for all the information that has been specifically measured on site. In this way, the quality of the security can be monitored efficiently, which increases the security of such security against counterfeiting.

A preferred embodiment of the invention provides that at least one security feature on which information is stored in the chip is a machine-readable security feature that is randomly distributed on the banknote ^• is, for example, randomly distributed magnetic particles or particles with luminescent or phosphorescent properties. These features may be on the surface or inside the security and their reliable distribution may be due to the manufacturing process. The local position of such randomly distributed security features is determined and stored in the chip, for example in the form of coordinates. This storage is preferably carried out in encrypted form at least by the securities manufacturer and, if appropriate, additionally by the central issuing authority and / or the securities processing authorities. Such a secured security is thus protected against counterfeiting in several ways.

The invention is described below by way of example using a special embodiment with reference to the attached single figure.

The figure shows a banknote 1 with a denomination of 100 DM as a security. The banknote 1 has various security features, namely a security strip 2 embedded in the banknote paper 2, a hologram 3 applied to the surface of the banknote, fluorescent irregularly and randomly distributed on the surface Particle 4 and a serial number 6. Furthermore, the banknote 1 has a chip 5 embedded in the banknote paper with an antenna, not shown, for contactless data transmission from and to the chip 5.

In a first register of the chip 5, the security manufacturer stores information on some security features. First, the serial number 6 is encrypted using a key secl known only to the security manufacturer according to an RSA algorithm and stored in the first register as "RSA _sec ι (serial number)". Furthermore, the coordinates ^{• Detected} for the randomly distributed particles 4 and also coded in the same way in the register as "RSA _sec ι (variable coordinates)". In addition to the randomly distributed particles 4, the current fluorescence properties, which become weaker over time, are determined and, as time-varying parameters, are also encoded in the aforementioned manner and stored in the register as "RSAsecl (time-varying parameters) 11. The encrypted information is also abbreviated in the figure with RSA _sec [ ^a ) ^ ^sc ) Furthermore, other feature information is stored unencrypted in the first register, for example coordinates of machine-readable features or other features such as soft magnetic security elements, hard magnetic security elements, phosphorescent and / or fluorescent particles, hologram 3 and the like, which have predefined coordinates which are the same for all banknotes, that is to say, in contrast to the fluorescent particles 4, are not randomly distributed.

The register 1 also stores the public key pub 1 of the securities manufacturer and an associated certificate (pub 1), with which subsequent instances can decrypt the encrypted information and compare it with information that has been determined on the spot to see if it matches.

The banknotes prepared in this way are then transferred to a central securities issuing authority, for example a bank. There, the corresponding information is determined again from the individual security features 2, 3, 4, 6 and compared with the information stored by the securities manufacturer. For this purpose, the central output instance first reads out the encrypted information RSA _sec ι for the features a, b, c and the public key Pub 1 and the associated certificate (Pub 1) ^• decrypts the information. If appropriate, the other feature information is also read out, and all the read and decrypted information is then checked for correspondence with the information determined specifically on site from the security features for consistency.

If a match is found, this is proof of the authenticity of the banknote. The central output instance then encrypts the information that it has specifically determined with a secret RSA key sec2 known only to it and stores it as encrypted information RSA _sec 2. In the case shown, only the serial number is stored in encrypted form by the central output instance in a second register. The associated public key Pub 2 and the associated certificate (Pub 2) are simultaneously stored in the second register.

After the security has been issued by the central issuing authority, it comes into the power of a processing authority at irregular intervals, for example when a bank accepts cash and issues it again. The bank checks the received banknote for the presence of the security features and compares the information obtained therefrom with the information from the securities manufacturer and / or the central issuing authority stored in the chip, encrypted or not encrypted. For this purpose, the processing instance reads out the necessary information from the chip, namely the encrypted information RSA _sec ι on the features a, b and c from the first register, the encrypted information RSA _sec 2 on the feature a from the second register Associated public keys Pub 1 and Pub 2 as well as certificate (Pub 1) and certificate (Pub 2) and possibly other in the chip ^• stored feature information. If the check is positive, the accepted banknote can be issued again.

Before the banknote is issued again, however, the processing authority stores the information derived from the characteristics on site in a third register of the chip. In the example shown in the figure, this information relates on the one hand to the serial number 6 and on the other hand to a time-variable parameter, namely the fluorescence ability of the fluorescence particles 4. This information is in turn encrypted by the processing instance with a secret RSA key sec3 and are therefore designated in FIG. 1 with RSA-sec3 ( ^{+ c} ). The encrypted information RSA _sec 3, in particular insofar as this information relates to parameters that change over time, is stored in a shift register and is supplemented by new RSA _sec 3 values each time the banknote is next checked by a processing entity. At the beginning of the shift register there is thus always the most recent information about the state of the time-varying parameter, in the case of the example about the fluorescence ability of the fluorescent particles 4.

The RSA _sec 3 information stored in the shift register by previous processing instances can also be read out by other processing instances, for example in order to check the development over time of the fluorescence capability of the fluorescent particles. To decrypt the encrypted RSA _sec 3 information, only the associated public key Pub 3 and the corresponding certificate (Pub 3) are required, which can be stored in the third register together with the RSA _sec 3 information. In the event that all processing instances If you use the same secret key sec3 to encrypt RSA _sec 3 information, you already have the corresponding pub 3 public key and do not need the associated certificate (pub 3). The pub 3 public key can then also be kept secret. Signature chip cards, on which at least the corresponding secret keys are stored, are preferably used for encrypting and decrypting the data during the processing of the banknotes in the processing instances and also at the securities manufacturer and at the central issuing instance.

Claims

Patent claims

1. Security (1) comprising an integrated circuit (5) and at least one security feature (2, 3, 4, 6) for identifying the security (1), wherein information from at least one security feature to increase the security of the security against counterfeiting in addition are stored in a memory of the integrated circuit (5), characterized in that this information is stored several times in different forms.

2. Security according to claim 1, characterized in that the information stored several times in different forms is encrypted differently.

3. Security according to claim 2, characterized in that the stored information on the one hand in a first secret key (secl) of the security manufacturer in encrypted form (RSA _se cl) ^and d on the other hand in a second secret key (sec2) one for output of the central authority responsible for the security in encrypted form (RSA _sec 2).

4. Security according to claim 2 or 3, characterized in that the stored information is stored at least one more time in a form encrypted by means of a third secret key (sec3) of a security processing instance (RSA _sec 3).

5. Security according to one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the at least one security feature is a randomly arranged on or in the security feature (4).

6. Security according to claim 5, characterized in that the information relates to the local location of the randomly arranged feature (4).

7. Security feature according to one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the information relates to a serial number (6) of the security and / or other features (3) of the security.

8. Security according to one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that the information relates to a physical property selected from the following physical properties: soft magnetism, hard magnetism, phosphorescence, fluorescence.

9. Security according to one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that the information relates to a time-varying physical property of the security feature, the information stored several times in differently encrypted form each having a measured value measured at a different time for this physical property consider.

10. A method for checking the authenticity of a security with an integrated circuit according to one of claims 1 to 9, in which the information stored in the integrated circuit several times in different forms is encrypted differently, comprising the following steps:

Decrypting a first of the several pieces of information stored in different forms by means of a first public key (pub 1) of the security manufacturer, Decrypting a second and / or third of the several pieces of information stored in different forms by means of a second or third public key (pub 2 or pub 3) of a central authority responsible for issuing the security or one dealing with the processing of the security processing instance,

Determining the information directly from a security feature and

- Check whether the information determined directly from the security feature correlates with the decrypted information.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that the information relates to a serial number (6) of the security.

12. The method according to claim 10 or 11, characterized in that the information relates to the local location of a randomly arranged on or in the security feature (4).

13. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that the information relates to a time-varying physical property of a security feature (4) and that the information determined directly from the security feature (4) is stored encrypted in the integrated circuit (5) become.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that the security (1) is discarded when the information determined directly from the security feature (4) compared to the respective ent- keyed information is outside an approved tolerance range.

15. A method for quality monitoring of a security (1) with an integrated circuit (5) according to claim 9, in which the in the integrated

Circuit (5) several times, stored in different forms, relating to a time-varying physical property of a security feature (4), comprising the following steps:

Determine the information directly from the security feature

Check whether the information determined directly from the security feature (4) is in an approved tolerance range in comparison to previously stored information, and

if the test result is positive, the information determined directly from the security feature (4) is stored in the integrated circuit (5).

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that a history is created in the integrated circuit (5) about the time-changing information determined from the security feature (4).

17. The method according to claim 15 or 16, characterized in that in the event of a negative test result, the security (1) is retired.

18. The method according to any one of claims 15 to 17, characterized in that the information stored several times, in different forms, is stored in encrypted form.

19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that the decryption of the information by means of public keys (pub 1, pub 3).