WO2000023954A1 - Verification method - Google Patents
Verification method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2000023954A1 WO2000023954A1 PCT/GB1999/003377 GB9903377W WO0023954A1 WO 2000023954 A1 WO2000023954 A1 WO 2000023954A1 GB 9903377 W GB9903377 W GB 9903377W WO 0023954 A1 WO0023954 A1 WO 0023954A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- goods
- public data
- verification
- data
- security code
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
- G07F17/42—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for ticket printing or like apparatus, e.g. apparatus for dispensing of printed paper tickets or payment cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
- G07F7/122—Online card verification
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a verification method and in particular, but not exclusively, to a method of verifying products to ensure that they are genuine and not counterfeit.
- the invention also relates to a method of marking goods for verification purposes and to goods marked for verification purposes.
- counterfeiting is enormous and affects a wide range of goods including, for example, pharmaceuticals and spare parts for aircraft.
- Counterfeiting is not only bad for the producer of genuine goods, resulting in lost sales and possible damage to reputation and goodwill, but can also result in danger to the public if the counterfeit goods are not up to the quality of the genuine goods.
- counterfeit pharmaceuticals may be ineffective or contain harmful substances and counterfeit aircraft parts may fail during use.
- a set of public data and a security code are applied to the goods, said security code having been derived from said public data by means of a predetermined encryption algorithm;
- the set of public data and the security code may be applied to the goods themselves or to packaging for the goods and the invention as defined by claim 1 is intended to include both of these possibilities.
- the method allows the authenticity of the goods to be verified very quickly and simply, for example by means of a telephone call to the verifier. Counterfeiting of the goods is made very difficult by the fact that each goods item carries a unique security code number.
- the security code can be applied to the goods by ordinary printing processes at nrinimal cost. The need for expensive security devices such as holograms is avoided.
- said security code is derived from said public data applied to the goods and private data held by the verifier and, upon receiving a request for verification, the public data applied to the goods and private data held by the verifier are entered into said predetermined encryption algorithm to generate a verification code, and said verification code is compared with the security code applied to the goods to assess the authenticity of goods.
- the verifier may be either the manufacturer or any other body authorised by the manufacturer and the term "verifier" as used in the claims is intended to include any such body.
- the private data may be related to public data, for example to batch number, so enabling the verifier to assign different sets of private data to different batches of products. Then, when a request for verification is received, the verifier can select the appropriate set of private data for the particular goods for which verification has been requested.
- said private data includes a plurality of private data sets and, upon receiving a request for verification, each private data set is entered into said predetenriined encryption algorithm together with the public data applied to the goods to generate a list of verification codes, and said list of verification codes is compared with the security code applied to the goods to assess the authenticity of goods.
- Each set of private data may be unique for each goods item, enabling the item number to be identified. This can help the verifier to track the activities of counterfeiters.
- the public data may include a batch number and/or date information, for example the expiry date or the manufacturing date and time.
- the private data may include an item number, allowing the verifier to identify the goods item in question, or it may be a random or pseudo-random number.
- the public data and the private data is applied to the goods by means of a digital printing process and is incorporated into the design printed onto the goods. This makes it more difficult for the goods to be counterfeited using plate-based printing techniques.
- the public data and the private data is incorporated into the design printed onto the goods as reversed out characters, blends or tints. This makes it more difficult for the goods to be counterfeited using over-printing or over-coding techniques.
- a method of marking goods to enable the authenticity of those goods to be verified wherein a set of public data and a security code are applied to the goods, said security code having been derived from said public data by means of a predetermined encryption algorithm.
- each of said goods including a set of public data and a security code applied to the goods, said security code having been derived from said public data by means of a predetermined encryption algorithm.
- Fig. 1 is a perspective view of a medicine packet that has been marked for verification purposes
- Fig. 2 represents schematically a method of marking goods for verification purposes
- Fig. 3 represents schematically a method of verifying the marked goods.
- FIG. 1 An example of a product, in this case a medicine packet 2, that has been marked for verification purposes is shown in Fig. 1.
- the packet has been marked by the manufacturer with information such as the expiry date 4, which in this case includes both the date and a time, and a lot or batch number .
- This information which is printed on the packet in such a way that it can be read by the public, will be referred to hereinafter as the "public data" 8.
- This public data 8 may be either unique to each packet (for example, an item number may be included or the expiry date may include a time code based on the exact time of manufacture), or alternatively all packets manufactured in the same batch may carry identical public data.
- the packet carries a security code 10.
- the security code 10 is unique to that packet and every packet therefore carries a different security code.
- the provision of a unique security code provides a first obstacle to counterfeiting, since printing different codes on each pack demands adaptable printing techniques and the provision of identical security codes on any two packets will immediately indicate that the goods are not genuine.
- the usual method of marking packets with information that varies from pack to pack, or from batch to batch, is to stamp or print that variable information onto pre-printed packets in a separate printing process. This process is known as over-coding. This method can be copied relatively easily by counterfeiters.
- variable information including the public data and the security code is incorporated into the design in such a way that would affect as many plates of a conventional printing process as possible.
- the security code number 10 has been positioned to overlap areas of two different background colours.
- the variable information has been incorporated into the design as "reversed out" characters, i.e. characters produced by leaving the shapes of those characters unprinted against a background of solid colour so that the base material shows through. This helps to prevent that iriformation being added in a subsequent over-coding process.
- the effect of this process is illustrated in Fig. 1. the variable information 8,10 being shown as white characters on a coloured background.
- the characters may be printed as blends or tints, which are also difficult to reproduce using conventional printing processes.
- the security code 10 applied to each packet is derived directly from unique information associated with each pack by means of a secret encryption algorithm.
- the security code 10 may be derived either from a combination of the public data 8 printed on the packet 2 and private data held by the manufacturer or an authorised verifying organisation, or alternatively it may be derived solely from the public data, if that data is unique.
- the processes for deriving and verifying the security codes applied to the packets are described below with reference to F s. 2 and 3.
- Fig.2 illustrates schematically a process for deriving the security codes and applying them to the packets using a combination of the public data 8 printed on the packet 2 and private data 12 held by the manufacturer or an authorised verifying organisation.
- the public data 8 consists for example of the batch number 6 and the expiry date 4. This data need not be unique.
- the private data 12 is not printed on the packet and is held either by the manufacturer or an authorised verifying organisation.
- the private data 12 is unique and may represent, for example, the item number of each packet in a given batch, or may be a random or pseudo-random number.
- the security code 10 for each packet is derived automatically during the printing process by subjecting the private data 12 and the public data 8 to an encryption process 14, such as a one-way hash function or a merge digest, as described in Applied Cryptography, second edition by Bruce Schneier, page 30, section 2.4 "one-way hash functions” (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996) ISBN 0471117091.
- This generates a unique security code 10, which is printed onto the packet 2 together with the public data 8 by means of a digital printer 18.
- a data record 20 is kept of the public data 8 and the associated private data 12 used in the encryption process. This data record 20 is supplied to the verifying authority, for example on a floppy disk or by electronic data transfer.
- the verification process is illustrated schematically in Fig. 3.
- the verifying authority which may the manufacturer or an outside body authorised by the manufacturer, uses an identical encryption algorithm 14 to that used during printing and is supplied with the data record 20 of public data 8 and private data 12.
- the verifying authority receives a request for verification, for example from a member of the public who has purchased the goods, the requester is asked to provide the public data 8 printed on the packet 2.
- This public data 8 is entered into the encryption algorithm 14 together with the private data 12 associated with that public data 8, as retrieved from the data record 20. This generates a list 24 of possible verification codes and the private data associated with each of those codes.
- the requester is then asked to provide the security code 10 printed on the packet 2 and this code 10 is compared 26 with the list 24 of verification codes generated by the encryption algorithm 14. If that security code 10 matches a verification code on the list 24. the authenticity of the goods is verified 28: if a match is not found, the authenticity of the goods is denied.
- the verifier may keep a log 30 of all requests for verification, which stores the public and private data for each item that has been verified. During the verification step, the log 30 may be checked to see whether a request for verification has been received previously in respect of that item. If so, verification may be denied since this suggests that the item has been copied.
- the log 30 may also contain other information 32, for example the date and time of the request and the identity and geographical location of the requester. If two requests for verification are made for the same item, it may be possible to discount any likelihood of the item being counterfeit, for example if the requests are made first by a retail pharmacist and subsequently by a customer of that pharmacist.
- a request for verification may be made by post, fax or telephone or electronically, for example by accessing a Web Site.
- the security code 10 applied to each packet 2 may be derived solely from the public data 8 printed on the packet 2, if that data is unique.
- the public data may include a unique item number, the exact production time or a random number in addition to the normal batch number 6 and expiry date inforrnation 4.
- the security code 10 is derived directly from this combination of unique and non-unique data and by means of the encryption algorithm 14.
- the requester provides the public data 8 printed on the pack and this is entered into the encryption algorithm by the verifier, thereby generating a verification code.
- the requester then provides the security code 10 printed on the pack and, if this matches the verification code generated by the verifier, the authenticity of the goods is confirmed. If the security code provided by the requester does not match the verification code, authenticity is denied.
- a log may be kept of requests for verification and details of the requester.
- the verification process is not limited to pharmaceuticals or to goods sold in printed packs and is equally applicable to goods such as aircraft parts, on which the public data 8 and the security code 10 may be marked directly, for example by stamping.
- the use of digital printing methods is not essential, although it is preferred as this provides certain additional advantages as discussed above.
- the public data from which the security code is derived includes either the product batch number or date information.
- the public data may be entirely random or pseudo-random, or may be derived from the batch and item numbers, for example by means of a two-way algorithm.
- the public data and the security code can also be amalgamated into a single number according to a predetermined algorithm.
- the requester In order to verify' the authenticity of the goods, the requester only has to provide that number.
- the verifier can automatically separate the public data from the security code and then use the public data extracted from that number to generate a verification code, which can then be compared with the security code extracted from the number provided on the goods. Verification can thus be achieved in a single step.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP99947787A EP1121670A1 (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1999-10-11 | Verification method |
AU61152/99A AU767698B2 (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1999-10-11 | Verification method |
JP2000577626A JP2002528933A (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1999-10-11 | Confirmation method |
CA002346956A CA2346956A1 (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1999-10-11 | Verification method |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB9822626.9 | 1998-10-17 | ||
GB9822626A GB2342743B (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1998-10-17 | Verification method |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2000023954A1 true WO2000023954A1 (en) | 2000-04-27 |
Family
ID=10840711
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/GB1999/003377 WO2000023954A1 (en) | 1998-10-17 | 1999-10-11 | Verification method |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1121670A1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2002528933A (en) |
CN (1) | CN1149515C (en) |
AU (1) | AU767698B2 (en) |
CA (1) | CA2346956A1 (en) |
GB (1) | GB2342743B (en) |
WO (1) | WO2000023954A1 (en) |
Cited By (21)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2001015097A1 (en) * | 1999-08-25 | 2001-03-01 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for product assurance |
WO2001099063A1 (en) * | 2000-06-21 | 2001-12-27 | James Leigh Zorab | Remote authentication system |
WO2002039397A1 (en) * | 2000-11-07 | 2002-05-16 | Zhivko Georgiev Zhelev | A device for recording multi-dimensional coded markings upon products for protection and verification purposes |
JP2002226047A (en) * | 2001-01-31 | 2002-08-14 | National Food Research Institute | Identifier for information disclosure in distribution network |
WO2002095661A1 (en) * | 2001-05-18 | 2002-11-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Method for characterising products in order to determine the authenticity thereof |
EP1316925A1 (en) * | 2001-12-01 | 2003-06-04 | Scheidt & Bachmann Gmbh | Method for protecting permits against falsification |
FR2835128A1 (en) * | 2002-01-21 | 2003-07-25 | Patricia Etienne | Protective device used for tracking a product, uses transformation of lot number based on maker's serial number to provide code that can be entered to handheld terminal which communicates with central computer |
WO2003098543A1 (en) * | 2002-05-17 | 2003-11-27 | Aventis Pharma Deutschland Gmbh | Method for tamper-proof identification of products |
WO2004070682A2 (en) * | 2003-02-04 | 2004-08-19 | Dietrich Heinicke | Product security system and method therefor |
WO2006092544A1 (en) * | 2004-09-17 | 2006-09-08 | David William Elliott | Method of marking and apparatus |
EP1705618A1 (en) * | 2005-03-22 | 2006-09-27 | Userstar Information System Co., Ltd. | Method and system for verifying authenticity of an object |
WO2006131594A1 (en) * | 2005-06-10 | 2006-12-14 | Stockway Oy | Verification of a product identifier |
AU2005202296B2 (en) * | 2004-06-15 | 2007-01-18 | Userstar Information System Co., Ltd | Method and system for verifying authenticity of an object |
DE102006060065A1 (en) * | 2006-12-19 | 2008-06-26 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for authenticating product by verification of product code, fixed at product and generated with cryptographic code, involves storing multiple codes for generating or for verifying different product code by central office |
US7580895B2 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2009-08-25 | Tuev Rheinland Holding Ag | Product protection gateway and method for checking the authenticity of products |
WO2009121668A1 (en) * | 2008-03-31 | 2009-10-08 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Adhesive label and method for labelling and authenticating an item with adhesive labels |
WO2010140892A1 (en) | 2009-06-05 | 2010-12-09 | Kezzler As | Method and system for storage and retrieval of track and trace information |
US8140852B2 (en) * | 2008-06-16 | 2012-03-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Authenticating serialized commodities |
US8656166B2 (en) | 2002-07-02 | 2014-02-18 | The Ascent Group Ltd. | Storage and authentication of data transactions |
US10102532B2 (en) * | 2014-11-17 | 2018-10-16 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Tracking and verifying authenticity of items |
US10318962B2 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2019-06-11 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Authenticity label for items |
Families Citing this family (20)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2006229852A (en) * | 2005-02-21 | 2006-08-31 | Dainippon Printing Co Ltd | Product authentication system, server, program, and recording medium |
US9076188B2 (en) * | 2005-04-13 | 2015-07-07 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Method and system for shipment authentication |
GB0601700D0 (en) * | 2006-01-27 | 2006-03-08 | Claricom Ltd | Printing Method |
KR20070103993A (en) * | 2006-04-21 | 2007-10-25 | 김성수 | Imitation prevention system |
MX2008015832A (en) * | 2006-06-12 | 2009-01-09 | Procter & Gamble | A lotioned wipe product comprising an anti-stick agent and a performance enhancing agent. |
US8108309B2 (en) | 2007-05-29 | 2012-01-31 | Provalidate | Protecting a manufactured item from counterfeiting |
WO2010079465A2 (en) * | 2009-01-07 | 2010-07-15 | Ashish Anand | Anti-duplication mechanism for non-electronic consumer products verifiable by end consumer |
DE102009022233A1 (en) * | 2009-05-20 | 2010-11-25 | Feustel, Dietmar | Use of a character string in systems of cryptography, statistics, simulation, randomization, slot machines and the like. |
US8423770B2 (en) | 2009-09-24 | 2013-04-16 | Kezzler As | Method and system for providing secure codes for marking on items |
EP2306377A1 (en) | 2009-09-24 | 2011-04-06 | Kezzler AS | Method and system for providing secure codes for marking on items |
US8532506B2 (en) * | 2010-11-29 | 2013-09-10 | Xerox Corporation | Multiple market consumable ID differentiation and validation system |
EP2472451A1 (en) * | 2010-12-30 | 2012-07-04 | Philip Morris Products S.A. | Method and apparatus for marking manufactured items |
US20150278487A1 (en) * | 2014-03-28 | 2015-10-01 | Enceladus IP Holdings, LLP | Security scheme for authenticating digital entities and aggregate object origins |
US9619706B2 (en) * | 2014-03-28 | 2017-04-11 | Enceladus Ip Holdings Llc | Security scheme for authenticating object origins |
EP3051469A1 (en) | 2015-01-28 | 2016-08-03 | Philip Morris Products S.A. | Method and apparatus for unit and container identification and tracking |
PL3051372T3 (en) | 2015-01-31 | 2019-10-31 | Inexto Sa | Secure product identification and verification |
US20180205543A1 (en) | 2015-08-13 | 2018-07-19 | Inexto Sa | Enhanced obfuscation or randomization for secure product identification and verification |
US10579889B2 (en) | 2015-08-25 | 2020-03-03 | Inexto Sa | Verification with error tolerance for secure product identifiers |
US10594494B2 (en) | 2015-08-25 | 2020-03-17 | Inexto Sa | Multiple authorization modules for secure production and verification |
CN107657457B (en) * | 2016-08-10 | 2018-11-23 | 沈洪德 | The method, apparatus and system of multi-level two-dimension code anti-counterfeit Internet-based |
Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3833795A (en) * | 1971-08-05 | 1974-09-03 | Elscint Ltd | Method and means for ascertaining the authenticity of serially numbered objects |
WO1980002757A1 (en) * | 1979-06-06 | 1980-12-11 | H Winderlich | Process for protecting sound recording carrier and the labels and/or packages thereof against counterfeiting |
US5388158A (en) * | 1992-11-20 | 1995-02-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Secure document and method and apparatus for producing and authenticating same |
US5432506A (en) * | 1992-02-25 | 1995-07-11 | Chapman; Thomas R. | Counterfeit document detection system |
US5768384A (en) * | 1996-03-28 | 1998-06-16 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System for identifying authenticating and tracking manufactured articles |
EP0889448A2 (en) * | 1997-07-01 | 1999-01-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Method for preventing counterfeiting of articles of manufacture |
Family Cites Families (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE2350418A1 (en) * | 1973-10-08 | 1975-04-10 | Gretag Ag | PROCEDURE AND EQUIPMENT FOR CREATING AND EVALUATING FALSE-PROOF MACHINELY READABLE PAYMENT RECEIPTS |
JPS5239346A (en) * | 1975-09-23 | 1977-03-26 | Fujitsu Ltd | Ballot processor |
GB2101376B (en) * | 1981-07-11 | 1986-05-21 | John Gordon Lawrence | Method and apparatus for use against counterfeiting |
US4626669A (en) * | 1983-12-28 | 1986-12-02 | Fairview Partners | Intercept system for intercepting stolen, lost and fraudulent cards |
AU6034994A (en) * | 1993-02-19 | 1994-09-14 | Her Majesty In Right Of Canada As Represented By The Minister Of Communications | Secure personal identification instrument and method for creating same |
US5384846A (en) * | 1993-04-26 | 1995-01-24 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System and apparatus for controlled production of a secure identification card |
US5505494B1 (en) * | 1993-09-17 | 1998-09-29 | Bell Data Software Corp | System for producing a personal id card |
US6005960A (en) * | 1994-04-14 | 1999-12-21 | Moore; Lewis J. | Anti-counterfeiting system |
-
1998
- 1998-10-17 GB GB9822626A patent/GB2342743B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
1999
- 1999-10-11 CN CNB998133981A patent/CN1149515C/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1999-10-11 WO PCT/GB1999/003377 patent/WO2000023954A1/en active IP Right Grant
- 1999-10-11 CA CA002346956A patent/CA2346956A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 1999-10-11 JP JP2000577626A patent/JP2002528933A/en not_active Withdrawn
- 1999-10-11 AU AU61152/99A patent/AU767698B2/en not_active Ceased
- 1999-10-11 EP EP99947787A patent/EP1121670A1/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3833795A (en) * | 1971-08-05 | 1974-09-03 | Elscint Ltd | Method and means for ascertaining the authenticity of serially numbered objects |
WO1980002757A1 (en) * | 1979-06-06 | 1980-12-11 | H Winderlich | Process for protecting sound recording carrier and the labels and/or packages thereof against counterfeiting |
US5432506A (en) * | 1992-02-25 | 1995-07-11 | Chapman; Thomas R. | Counterfeit document detection system |
US5388158A (en) * | 1992-11-20 | 1995-02-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Secure document and method and apparatus for producing and authenticating same |
US5768384A (en) * | 1996-03-28 | 1998-06-16 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | System for identifying authenticating and tracking manufactured articles |
EP0889448A2 (en) * | 1997-07-01 | 1999-01-07 | Pitney Bowes Inc. | Method for preventing counterfeiting of articles of manufacture |
Cited By (27)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2001015097A1 (en) * | 1999-08-25 | 2001-03-01 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for product assurance |
WO2001099063A1 (en) * | 2000-06-21 | 2001-12-27 | James Leigh Zorab | Remote authentication system |
US7684652B2 (en) | 2000-06-21 | 2010-03-23 | The Ascent Group | Remote authentication system |
US7277601B2 (en) | 2000-06-21 | 2007-10-02 | The Ascent Group Limited | Remote authentication system |
WO2002039397A1 (en) * | 2000-11-07 | 2002-05-16 | Zhivko Georgiev Zhelev | A device for recording multi-dimensional coded markings upon products for protection and verification purposes |
JP2002226047A (en) * | 2001-01-31 | 2002-08-14 | National Food Research Institute | Identifier for information disclosure in distribution network |
WO2002095661A1 (en) * | 2001-05-18 | 2002-11-28 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Method for characterising products in order to determine the authenticity thereof |
EP1316925A1 (en) * | 2001-12-01 | 2003-06-04 | Scheidt & Bachmann Gmbh | Method for protecting permits against falsification |
FR2835128A1 (en) * | 2002-01-21 | 2003-07-25 | Patricia Etienne | Protective device used for tracking a product, uses transformation of lot number based on maker's serial number to provide code that can be entered to handheld terminal which communicates with central computer |
WO2003098543A1 (en) * | 2002-05-17 | 2003-11-27 | Aventis Pharma Deutschland Gmbh | Method for tamper-proof identification of products |
US8656166B2 (en) | 2002-07-02 | 2014-02-18 | The Ascent Group Ltd. | Storage and authentication of data transactions |
WO2004070682A2 (en) * | 2003-02-04 | 2004-08-19 | Dietrich Heinicke | Product security system and method therefor |
DE10305430A1 (en) * | 2003-02-04 | 2004-08-19 | Dietrich Heinicke | Product assurance system and procedures therefor |
WO2004070682A3 (en) * | 2003-02-04 | 2004-12-09 | Dietrich Heinicke | Product security system and method therefor |
US8606716B2 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2013-12-10 | Tuev Rheinland Holding Ag | Product protection identifier for checking the authenticity of products |
US7580895B2 (en) | 2003-06-25 | 2009-08-25 | Tuev Rheinland Holding Ag | Product protection gateway and method for checking the authenticity of products |
AU2005202296B2 (en) * | 2004-06-15 | 2007-01-18 | Userstar Information System Co., Ltd | Method and system for verifying authenticity of an object |
WO2006092544A1 (en) * | 2004-09-17 | 2006-09-08 | David William Elliott | Method of marking and apparatus |
EP1705618A1 (en) * | 2005-03-22 | 2006-09-27 | Userstar Information System Co., Ltd. | Method and system for verifying authenticity of an object |
WO2006131594A1 (en) * | 2005-06-10 | 2006-12-14 | Stockway Oy | Verification of a product identifier |
DE102006060065A1 (en) * | 2006-12-19 | 2008-06-26 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for authenticating product by verification of product code, fixed at product and generated with cryptographic code, involves storing multiple codes for generating or for verifying different product code by central office |
WO2009121668A1 (en) * | 2008-03-31 | 2009-10-08 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Adhesive label and method for labelling and authenticating an item with adhesive labels |
US8140852B2 (en) * | 2008-06-16 | 2012-03-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Authenticating serialized commodities |
WO2010140892A1 (en) | 2009-06-05 | 2010-12-09 | Kezzler As | Method and system for storage and retrieval of track and trace information |
US8700501B2 (en) | 2009-06-05 | 2014-04-15 | Kezzler As | Method and system for storage and retrieval of track and trace information |
US10102532B2 (en) * | 2014-11-17 | 2018-10-16 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Tracking and verifying authenticity of items |
US10318962B2 (en) | 2014-11-17 | 2019-06-11 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Authenticity label for items |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1326578A (en) | 2001-12-12 |
AU6115299A (en) | 2000-05-08 |
AU767698B2 (en) | 2003-11-20 |
CN1149515C (en) | 2004-05-12 |
GB2342743A (en) | 2000-04-19 |
GB2342743B (en) | 2003-05-14 |
GB9822626D0 (en) | 1998-12-09 |
JP2002528933A (en) | 2002-09-03 |
CA2346956A1 (en) | 2000-04-27 |
EP1121670A1 (en) | 2001-08-08 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
AU767698B2 (en) | Verification method | |
CA2892566C (en) | Method and apparatus for marking manufactured items using physical characteristic | |
US10621392B2 (en) | Method and system for marking manufactured items to detect unauthorized refilling | |
JP5739876B2 (en) | Unique identifiers, methods for providing unique identifiers, and use of unique identifiers | |
EP0889448B1 (en) | Method for preventing counterfeiting of articles of manufacture | |
EP1719070B1 (en) | Methods and systems for marking, tracking and authentication of products | |
US8421593B2 (en) | Apparatus, systems and methods for authentication of objects having multiple components | |
US9721260B2 (en) | Method and apparatus for marking manufactured items | |
EP1577847A1 (en) | Method for the authentification of products | |
JP2009524128A (en) | Authentication method for products placed in circulation | |
WO2014014401A2 (en) | Authentication of a product | |
WO2009013078A1 (en) | Method and system for identifying a product as an original product of a product manufacturer | |
HU226286B1 (en) | Attestation label system for marking and checking the legally correct nature of products and method for indicating the legalized status of such products brought into commerce | |
CN111951031A (en) | Product code spraying anti-counterfeiting method and system based on code spraying machine | |
JP2003137348A (en) | Product with authenticity determination information, printing method and printer for authenticity determination, and authenticity determination device |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 99813398.1 Country of ref document: CN |
|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
DFPE | Request for preliminary examination filed prior to expiration of 19th month from priority date (pct application filed before 20040101) | ||
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2346956 Country of ref document: CA Ref document number: 2346956 Country of ref document: CA Kind code of ref document: A Ref document number: 2000 577626 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 1999947787 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: IN/PCT/2001/00493/KO Country of ref document: IN Ref document number: IN/PCT/2001/493/KOL Country of ref document: IN |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 61152/99 Country of ref document: AU |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 09807675 Country of ref document: US |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 1999947787 Country of ref document: EP |
|
REG | Reference to national code |
Ref country code: DE Ref legal event code: 8642 |
|
WWG | Wipo information: grant in national office |
Ref document number: 61152/99 Country of ref document: AU |