WO1996034368A1

WO1996034368A1 - Tamper protection and activation method for an electronic gaming device and device therefor

Info

Publication number: WO1996034368A1
Application number: PCT/FR1996/000645
Authority: WO
Inventors: François BERNHARD; Patrice Bremaud
Original assignee: Info Telecom
Priority date: 1995-04-28
Filing date: 1996-04-26
Publication date: 1996-10-31
Also published as: DK0824732T3; AU5767396A; ATE181609T1; DE69603023T2; CA2219634A1; GR3030973T3; EP0824732A1; EP0824732B1; FR2733613B1; FR2733613A1; DE69603023D1; ES2132920T3

Abstract

An electronic gaming device has one or more housings with at least one result-encryption key stored therein, as well as a portable article adapted for co-operating with the housing and with a set of authenticatable digital game data representative of a game stored therein. The portable article is made to co-operate with the housing. The set of game data is authenticated in the housing and stored in a working memory of the housing so as to authorise the progression of the game in the housing. After completion of at least part of the game, result information dependent on said game is encrypted in the housing by means of at least one result-encryption key, and the encrypted result information is stored in a result memory of the portable article, which then co-operates with a validation station capable of accessing the result-encryption key, whereafter said station verifies the result information.

Description

Method for activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic game device, and corresponding device.

The invention relates to the activation and anti-fraud protection of an electronic gaming device and the corresponding device.

Various games are currently known, in particular games of chance, allowing a player to win sums of money by paying a starting bet. Thus, for example in the game called "Loto" (registered trademark) the player ticks a series of figures on a ticket which he has validated with a specialized body by paying a price corresponding to the starting bet. A subsequent draw is carried out under control in a chosen place and, players in possession of a winning ticket can withdraw their winnings from a paying agency.

Other games consist in obtaining a ticket and scratching it in designated places so as to discover information making it possible to define whether the ticket in question is a winner or a loser. Compared to these classic games requiring a paper support, it has already been envisaged to propose, in French patent n ° 92 13 239, a radically different concept of a game of chance device.

According to this concept, there is provided a portable box intended to allow a player to perform one or more tests of games of chance, success or failure in said tests conditioning a score or a level of gain according to predetermined rules of the game . This box then also constitutes the transaction element for the payment of the gain and includes all the elements necessary for the verification thereof. However, by design and in particular for security reasons, each autonomous unit can be used only once. This naturally poses an economic and ecological problem due to this unit use combined with an estimated distribution of the order of several tens of millions of units per month.

Besides the fact that this type of box can only be used once, it is also associated with a unique type of game. However, the current market for games of chance shows that the lifespan of a type of game is generally short and that these must be renewed often which then leads the manufacturer of the case to constantly design new external forms for the product as well as new software interfaces.

The invention aims to provide a solution to these problems. An object of the invention is to propose an electronic game device capable of being usable several times with possibly different types of game.

A very important problem inherent in such gaming devices resides in anti-fraud security, in particular when certain types of gaming are associated with significant gains.

The invention therefore aims to integrate this concept of security in a multi-application and multi-use game device.

The invention therefore first of all proposes a method of activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic game device comprising at least one box in which at least one encryption-result key has been stored, as well as at minus a portable object capable of cooperating with the box, and in which has been stored a set of digital game data that can be authenticated and representative of a game. According to this method, the portable object is made to cooperate with the box. within the box the authentication of the game data set and this set of game data is stored in a working memory of the box, so as to authorize the progress of the game at the level of the box. Then, after the progress of at least part of the game, we encrypt within the box a result information dependent on said game, using at least said encryption-result key. This encrypted result information is stored in a result memory of the portable object. Then, the portable object is made to cooperate with a validation station having access to said encryption-result key, said station carrying out validation processing from at least said encrypted result information and said encryption-result key.

Thus, according to the invention, the digital game data, that is to say the application or the game software, are deported outside the electronic unit and incorporated into an object memory. portable which can come in different forms, such as credit card, domino, token, etc.

As for the electronic unit, it can be sold only once and can be used several times with any portable object containing game software.

According to the invention, it is therefore the portable object which is intended to contain both the digital game data defining the game itself, as well as the result information allowing the player to validate this result so as to touch possibly his gain. In other words, the portable object here constitutes the transaction element while the box is only used by the player for playing.

The concept of "encryption" must be interpreted very broadly as being "protection using cryptographic means". However, for simplification purposes, only the terms encryption, decryption, encrypt, decrypt will be used in the rest of the text.

The result information which will be encrypted in the box before being transferred to the portable object, naturally depends on the nature of the game. This can for example be binary information of the "won" or " lost ", or even, for example, information representative of a gain level.

For security reasons, the digital game data set stored in the portable object can be authenticated so as to allow verification of its auditing within the housing. Within the meaning of the present invention, the word "authentifiable" must inteφrété be broadly by including ^"instance storage in" clear "digital data set themselves jointly obtained a certificate of authentication from these digital data set by an appropriate algorithm, or even encryption at least partial of this set, or for example encryption of the authentication certificate.

The verification of the authenticity of the set of game data can be carried out before, during or after the storage of the latter in the working memory of the box. It should also be noted here that, according to the invention, all of the digital game data is transferred to the working memory of the box (in practice this data is for example read in the portable object then copied into the memory of work of the case) so that the cooperation between the portable object and the case could possibly be suppressed during the course of the game at the case.

The invention therefore thus avoids the use of complex software means that would require the direct operation of the game software of the portable object by the processing unit of the box without transfer to the memory of the box. Also, according to an embodiment of the method according to the invention, it is advantageously provided that the set of game data of a portable object is read via a serial protocol between the portable object and The box. This minimizes the hardware and software resources of the portable object. The game software is directly operated by the unit's processing unit directly in its working memory.

Generally speaking, the validation processing carried out by the validation station must make it possible to determine and / or verify the result information from the content of the portable object. Indeed only this memorized content must be authentic to authorize a possible payment of a gain.

The validation processing carried out by the validation station may include a decryption of the encrypted result information stored in the result memory of the portable object, using the encryption-result key.

As a variant, this validation processing can be carried out in a different manner. More precisely, it is possible to store in the portable object, together with the encrypted result information, the unencrypted result information, that is to say "in the clear". The station then verifies said result information by re-encrypting, using the encryption-result key, the unencrypted result information which is stored in the portable object and by comparing this re-encrypted result information with the information. results encrypted and stored in the result memory of the portable object.

In order to further increase security, it is advantageously provided that when the authentication of the game data set of the portable object has been verified and that said set has been stored in the working memory of the box, it is prohibited any subsequent use by the unit of the set of game data for this portable object.

This makes it possible in particular to prevent a player from training to play a type of game, in particular when the latter is in fact a reflex game. Within the meaning of the present invention, the prohibition of any subsequent use must be understood in a very broad sense, meaning for example that either the box can no longer read the data set, or it can no longer verify its authentication. In other words, the box will then be unfit for play with this portable object.

The device according to the invention generally comprises several boxes and several portable objects. Also, when the authentication of the set of game data of one of the portable objects has been verified and that said set has been stored in the working memory of one of the boxes, any subsequent operation is advantageously prohibited. by any of the boxes, from the set of game data for this portable object.

According to one embodiment of the method according to the invention, the set of game data stored in the portable object can be authenticated by adding a linked authentication certificate to it. in a one-to-one way to the digital game data. The verification of the authentication of the game data set then comprises a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the box and a comparison between the recalculated authentication certificate and the certificate d authentication stored in the portable object.

Thus, any subsequent use of a set of game data can be prohibited by altering in the corresponding portable object, at least partially said authentication certificate and / or at least partially the game data itself. We can for this purpose consider arbitrarily modifying the value of some of the bits of the authentication certificate and / or of some of the digital game data. Therefore, if a player tries to replay with the same portable object, the unit the box will recalculate an authentication certificate which will differ from the altered authentication certificate, which will prevent any activation of the game.

Still with the aim of increasing security, in particular with regard to the payment of possible winnings, the storage of the encrypted result information in the portable object is advantageously authorized only if all further use of the play data set for this portable object.

According to an embodiment of the method, it is possible to store in the box at least one game encryption key. The authentication of the set of game data stored in the portable object can then comprise at least partial encryption of this set of game data, or of information linked to this set of game data (for example the authentication certificate), using the game encryption key, and this, before reading by the unit's processing unit, of the game data set of the portable object. The verification of the authentication of the game data set then includes a decryption within the box using the game encryption key. In other words, the encrypted transfer of the application, or of the associated authentication certificate, makes it possible to avoid the loading of a fraudulent application leading inevitably to obtaining a gain. You can possibly only encrypt and decrypt the authentication certificate.

When a box-encryption key is stored in the box, the game-encryption key which has been previously encrypted using the box-encryption key can be stored in the box. This further increases security and makes it even more difficult for a third party to know the game encryption key.

The game encryption key can be common to all boxes and all portable objects. The encryption-box key is preferably different for each box. The encryption key-housing of a housing is stored therein before the storage of the encryption key-game, for example during its manufacture. Furthermore, the set of game data of a portable object can be stored therein, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with information already at least partially encrypted, using the encryption key. Game. In other words, during the manufacture of portable objects in the factory, it is possible, for example, to determine the corresponding authentication certificate in situ, encrypt the latter, and store the data in the portable object, before dissemination to the public. proper games followed by their encrypted authentication certificate.

In general, the encryption-result key can be the encryption-box key, or the encryption-game key, or can be obtained from a combination of these two keys.

When the encryption-result key is the encryption-game key, any validation station knows this encryption-game key since it is common to all the elements of the device. This being so, when the encryption-result key is not known in advance by the validation station, provision is made for storing in the portable object cooperating with the box, key information associated so one-to-one with said encryption-result key, the validation station then having access to said encryption-result key by reading said key information stored in the portable object.

Thus, if for example the encryption-result key is the encryption-box key, it can advantageously be provided to associate with each box an identifier defining it uniquely, and thereby identifying the encryption-box key that has been stored in the box. A table of identifiers can for example be stored in a protected manner in a central computer to which all the validation stations are linked. The box identifier is then stored with the encrypted result information in the portable object.

The validation station then having access to the identifier as well as to the correspondence table can determine the encryption-result key and decrypt the encrypted result information.

The subject of the invention is also an electronic game device. According to a general characteristic of the invention, this electronic game device comprises at least one housing, at least one portable object and at least one validation station. The portable object comprises a game memory containing a set of authenticated game data representative of a game, a result memory capable of containing encrypted result information, a first communication interface capable of cooperating with a communication interface -box, and a second communication interface able to communicate with a communication-station interface. The housing comprises a key memory containing at least one encryption-result key, a working memory accessible in writing and in reading, and a processing unit connected to these memories as well as to the communication-housing interface. The processing unit is capable, during cooperation between the communication interface-box and the first communication interface of the object, of verifying the authentication of the set of game data stored in the object and to store said assembly in the working memory so as to allow the progress of the game at the level of the housing. The processing unit of the box is also capable of encrypting result information dependent on said game, using the encryption-result key, and of communicating this encrypted result information to the communication-box interface for the purposes of its storage in the result memory of the object. The validation station includes means able to determine said encryption-result key and processing-station means able to read the encrypted result information via the communication interface. -

station, during a cooperation between the portable object and the station, and to carry out a validation processing from at least the encrypted result information and the encryption-result key.

In the case where the electronic game device comprises several boxes, several portable objects and several validation stations, any of the portable objects is capable of cooperating with any of the boxes and with any of the validation stations .

According to one embodiment of the device according to the invention, the first communication interface of the portable object is a serial interface. Furthermore, and for reasons of economy, it is possible to provide that the portable object has only one and the same communication interface capable of cooperating with the communication-box interface or with the communication interface. - station.

The station processing means may include station decryption means capable of decrypting the encrypted result information for the purpose of its determination.

As a variant, the processing unit of the box is able to also communicate the unencrypted result information to the communication-box interface for the purpose of its storage in the result memory of the object. The station-processing means are then further able to read the unencrypted result information via the station-communication interface. They then include station-encryption means capable of encrypting said unencrypted result information using the encryption-result key, as well as comparison means for comparing the recalculated encrypted result information with the information. result result stored in the result memory of the portable object. This comparison thus makes it possible to verify the result information.

When the set of playable game data is associated with an authentication certificate, the means for verifying the authentication of this set of game data then preferably comprise certificate calculation means capable of recalculating said certificate d authentication within the box, from the set of game data, and comparison means capable of comparing the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in the game memory of the portable object.

According to one embodiment of the device, it is possible to provide encryption means capable of at least partially encrypting the set of authenticated game data, or information linked to this set of game data (for example the certificate of authentication), using at least one game encryption key. The key memory of the box is then able to contain this game encryption key while the means for verifying the authentication of the game data set comprise decryption means connected to the key memory. These encryption means may only encrypt the authentication certificate. These encryption means can be incorporated within a manufacturing unit so as to directly deliver a set of at least partially encrypted game data or an authentication certification already at least partially encrypted, which will be intended to be stored as is in the portable object. However, it can alternatively be provided for the encryption means to be incoφorated to the portable object, in particular when the latter comprises a microcontroller containing these encryption means in software.

Likewise, the fact of providing an "intelligent" portable object, that is to say provided with a central unit for example, also makes it possible to incorporate into the portable object means making it possible to prohibit any subsequent use of '' a set of play data of a portable object after a first exploitation. These means, which can be implemented for example in software, are thus for example capable of modifying the value of some of the bits of the set of game data or of its authentication certificate. Other advantages and characteristics of the invention will appear on examining modes of implementation and embodiment of the invention, in no way limitative, and the appended drawings in which:

FIG. 1 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a portable object of a device according to the invention, FIG. 2 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a housing of the device according to the invention,

FIG. 3 very schematically represents the hardware architecture of a validation station of the device according to the invention, FIGS. 4a and 4b schematically illustrate an embodiment of the method according to the invention, and

- Figures 5 and 6 illustrate two alternative embodiments of the method according to the invention.

The device according to the invention comprises several autonomous electronic boxes BT, several portable objects OB and several validation stations ST.

As illustrated in FIG. 1, each portable object OB, for example a card of the smart card type, a token, or a module, comprises, for example within an ASIC (Application Specifies Integrated Circuit) a micro- CPU controller connected via a bus to a serial type ESC input / output interface, to a game memory MJ, as well as to a result memory MR, such as a register.

As will be seen in more detail below, the game memory MJ, for example a read only memory, is intended to receive a set of digital game data, or game software, representative of a particular type of game.

The register MR is intended for its part to receive encrypted result information coming from the BT box after the progress of at least part of the game.

The ESC interface includes means of cooperation with a homologous interface ESB of the box BT (FIG. 2) and a homologous interface ESS of the station ST (FIG. 3). These cooperation means may consist of a mechanical connector or alternatively of capacitive / inductive, or optical coupling means.

As illustrated more particularly in FIG. 2, the hardware electronic structure of the portable box BT is articulated around a processing unit UT, such as a microprocessor or a microcontroller. This processing unit UT is connected via a bus to a working memory MT, accessible by writing and reading, for example a random access memory (RAM), to a program memory MM as well as to a standard memory of key MC which is a protected memory which can be a part of the memory MM- The unit of processing is also connected to a liquid crystal display screen AF as well as to a keyboard C1 comprising for example keys for controlling movements in two orthogonal directions. Finally, the processing unit is connected to a communication interface-ESB box capable of cooperating with the communication interface ESC, and which can for example include a mechanical connector disposed in a housing in which the connector of the portable object. The ESB interface also includes serial / parallel conversion means connected to the internal bus of the box. All of the means of this box are supplied by autonomous supply means AL such as batteries. All or part of the components of this case can be made in the form of an Asia.

The working memory MT is dimensioned so as to be able to receive the game application stored in the memory MJ of the object while the memory MM contains the program for internal management of the box (management of inputs / outputs, management of the keyboard, of the screen, program for loading the application into the working memory ...). According to the embodiment described with reference to the figure

3, each validation station ST comprises a processing block articulated around a processor PR connected to an input / output interface ESS capable of cooperating with the input / output interface ESC of the portable object. Furthermore, the station is connected via an appropriate link, to a central file TB containing information necessary, as will be seen in more detail below, for the verification of the result information contained in the portable object.

The station's PR processor software embeds the various functional means necessary for its operation (encryption, decryption, comparison, reading, etc.). We will now describe in more detail, with particular reference to Figures 4a to 4b, a first embodiment of the method according to the invention.

On a manufacturing site, the digital game data set JE, forming the game application software, is processed by processing means comprising a well-known authentication certificate calculation algorithm of the SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) type. of the skilled person. The latter may however, for more details, refer to publication 180-1 of May 31, 1994 issued by the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards).

These calculation means determine a CTF audit certificate from logical functions operating on the bits of the digital game data (step 1). Thus, for a block of 1 kilobyte of application, the authentication certificate comprises for example 120 bits.

From a Km encryption-game key, common to all portable objects, to all boxes and to all validation stations, encryption means, for example using the DES encryption algorithm (Data Encryption Standard) perform an encryption of the CTF authentication certificate (step 2) so as to issue an encrypted authentication certificate CTFc. The digital game data and the encrypted authentication certificate are then stored in the game memory MJ of the portable object (step 3).

The portable object is then ready to be distributed to the public. As for the box, there is stored in the key memory MC thereof, for example during its manufacture on site, an encryption-box key Kf (step 4). The box is then also ready for distribution to the public.

A player can obtain such a box from a validation station of the ST station type. During this operation, the box and the station are made to cooperate by means of respective communication interfaces so as to read (step 5) the encryption key-box Kf stored in the key memory of the box. These interfaces can be, in particular when they are of the capacitive / inductive coupling type, the same as the ESB and ESS interfaces. They can also be distinct from the latter, for example of the mechanical connector type. The processor PR of the validation station knowing the encryption key-set Km, (for example stored in the central file TB) then performs by means of encryption means of the DES type an encryption (step 6) of the key Km using the encryption key / box Kf. This encryption-game key encrypted under Kf, and referenced Kmc, is then stored (step 7) in the key memory of the box.

When the player wishes to play a particular game, he obtains from a specialized retailer a portable object containing the corresponding game software. The player then inserts the portable object into the corresponding housing of the housing so as to make the respective ESC and ESB interfaces of the object and the housing cooperate.

The decryption means, for example of the DES type, software incorporated in the processing unit UT of the box decrypt the encrypted game encryption key Kmc. The processing unit reads the digital game data as well as the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc stored in the portable object, via a serial protocol via the ESB interface. The processing unit UT then recalculates an authentication certificate from the digital game data JE, decrypts the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc using the game encryption key Km, compares the recalculated authentication certificate and the authentication certificate stored so as to verify the authenticity of the game software (step 8). The digital game data set JE is stored in the working memory MT of the box so that it can be used subsequently and directly by the processing unit UT for the purpose of executing the game.

It should be noted here that, especially when using a SHA type certificate, the authentication verification of the JE game software can be done either "on the fly", or when all of the software has been transferred in the working memory MT, this latter solution requiring a greater capacity of random access memory.

At this stage, the box is ready for play and the player can play using its box (step 9). At the end of the game, or during it depending on the type of game used or the outcome of it, IFR result information is delivered by the game software, and this is encrypted (step 10 ) by the processing unit UT using an encryption-result key which is, in this case, identical to the encryption-game key Km. We then obtain an encrypted result information IFRc which is transferred via the respective interfaces of the housing and of the portable object so as to be stored (step 11) in the result memory MR of the object. The player can then go to validate his result so as to possibly touch his gain.

To do this, the player removes the portable object from the box, and communicates it to a validation station, which can be the same as that from which he obtained his box, or else another. Cooperation is then established between the portable object and the station. The processor PR of the station then reads in the result memory of the portable object (step 12) the encrypted result information IFRc and the decryption means of this station, for example of the DES type, knowing the encryption key. game Km, decipher the IFRc information so as to obtain the IFR result information and allow the payment of the gain.

If the player subsequently decides to play again, he just needs to get another portable object containing a game of the same type or a different type and have him cooperate with his box to play.

In the variant implementation illustrated in FIG. 5, and intended to increase the security of the device, there is provision for an alteration 20 of the encrypted authentication certificate CTFc of the portable object after the verification of the authentication of the game software was carried out by the housing processing unit. This alteration consists for example of a modification of the value of at least some of the bits of the audit certificate.

Furthermore, before storing Tir-formation of encrypted result IFRc in the result memory of the object, it is checked whether this alteration has taken place (step 21). If so, allow the storage in the result memory MR ^' and if not, this storage is prohibited.

Generally, the portable object is supplied via the housing or the station. All the functions which have just been described in relation to the data stored or to be stored in the portable object, in particular the alteration of the authentication certificate, can be performed directly by software by the processing unit of the box. In this case, the microprocessor CPU of the portable object can be omitted. This being the case, the existence of such a microprocessor makes it possible to carry out these alteration (or invalidation) operations and to verify alteration and then possibly prohibit the writing of the encrypted result information, directly to the portable object level. Similarly, the existence of a microprocessor CPU on the portable object possibly allows encryption of the game software at the portable object before transfer to the working memory of the box.

It may also be that the encryption-result key used to encrypt the result information is not the Km encryption-game key and is not known in advance by the validation station. This can be the case when the encryption-result key is simply the encryption-box key Kf. In this case, the mode of implementation illustrated in FIG. 6 provides not only for the storage of the encrypted result information IFRc in the result memory of the object (step 11) but also for the storage, in this memory of result or in another memory (step 30) of key information

ICR allowing later to determine the encryption-result key which was used to encrypt the result information.

This ICR information can be, for example, the encryption-result key proper or else an identifier of the box which is associated in a one-to-one fashion with the box and consequently the encryption-box key Kf which has been stored.

The processor of the validation station then reads (step 31) the key information ICR and determines from a correspondence table between the identifiers and the encryption-box keys, stored, preferably in a protected manner, in the TB file, the key to encryption-result Kr (in this case the key Kf) which was used (step 32).

The result information can then be decrypted (step 13).

This variant of the invention also makes it possible to precisely identify the boxes having led to winning games and to possibly carry out statistics. This offers an additional possibility of detecting a possible fraud if one realizes that the same box very often leads to winning games.

Claims

1. Method for activating and anti-fraud protection of an electronic game device comprising at least one box (BT) in which at least one encryption-result key has been stored, as well as at least one portable object ( OB) capable of cooperating with the box and in which a set of digital audible playable data (JE) and representative of a game has been stored, method in which the portable object is made to cooperate with the box, we verify (8 ) within the box the authentication of the game data set and this set of game data is stored in a working memory (MT) of the box, so as to authorize the progress (9) of the game at the level of the box, then, after the progress of at least part of the game, there is encrypted (10) within the box a result information (IFR) dependent on said game using at least said encryption-result key, and we store (11) this encrypted result information (IFRc ) in a result memory (MR) of the portable object, then, the portable object is made to cooperate with a validation station (ST) having access to said encryption-result key, said station carrying out validation processing ( 13) from at least said encrypted result information and said encryption-result key.

2. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the validation processing includes a decryption of the encrypted result information.

3. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the portable object is stored, together with the encrypted result information, the unencrypted result information, and in that the validation processing comprises a re-encryption of the unencrypted result information stored in the portable object and a comparison of this encrypted result information with the encrypted result information stored in the result memory of the portable object.

4. Method according to one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that when the authentication of the data set of game of the portable object has been verified and that said set has been stored in the working memory of the box, it is prohibited (20) any subsequent use, by the box, of the set of game data of this portable object.

5. Method according to claim 4, characterized in that, the device comprising several boxes and several portable objects, when the authentication of the set of game data of one of the portable objects has been verified and that said set has been stored in the working memory of one of the boxes, any subsequent use, by any of the boxes, of the game data set of this portable object is prohibited.

6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the set of game data stored in the portable object is authenticated by adding to it an authentication certificate (CTF) linked in a one-to-one manner to said set of game data (JE) and by the fact that the verification of the authentication of the game data set comprises a recalculation of the authentication certificate within the housing and a comparison between the recalculated authentication certificate and the certificate authentication stored in the portable object.

7. Method according to claim 4 or 5 taken in combination with claim 6, characterized in that it prohibits any further exploitation of a set of game data by altering, in the corresponding portable object, at least partially said certificate of authentication and / or at least partially the set of game data.

8. Method according to one of the preceding claims taken in combination with claim 4, characterized in that one authorizes (21) the storage of the encrypted result information in the portable object only if one has, beforehand, prohibits any further use of the game data set for this portable object.

9. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a housing-encryption key (Kf) is stored in the housing.

10. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by the fact that at least one game encryption key (Km) is stored in the box, by the fact that the authentication of the game data set stored in the portable object includes at least partial encryption of this set of game data, or of information (CTF) linked to this set of game data, using the game encryption key (Km), before reading by the box, and thereby that the verification of the authentication of this set of game data includes a decryption within the box using the game encryption key.

11. Method according to claims 6 and 10, characterized in that one encrypts and only decrypts the certificate of authentication (CTF).

12. Method according to claim 9 taken in combination with claim 10 or 11, characterized in that the game encryption key (Km) having been encrypted using the encryption key is stored in the housing. -box (Kf) -

13. Method according to claim 9 taken in combination with one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that, the device comprising several boxes and several portable objects, a different encryption-box key (Kf) is associated with each case while the encryption-game key (Km) is common for all cases and all portable objects, by the fact that the case-encryption key of a case is stored in it before the storage of the encryption-game key, and by the fact that the set of game data of a portable object is stored therein, already at least partially encrypted, or associated with information (CTFc) already at least partially encrypted, using the game encryption key.

14. Method according to claim 9 or one of claims 10 to 13, characterized in that the encryption-result key (Kr) is the encryption-box key (Kf), or the encryption-game key ( Km), or is obtained from a combination of the encryption-box key and the encryption-game key.

15. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that there is stored in the portable object cooperating with the housing, key information (ICR) associated so one-to-one with said encryption-result key, and that the validation station has access to said encryption-result key by reading said key information stored in the portable object.

16. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the set of game data (JE) of a portable object is read by means of a serial protocol between the portable object and the box. .

17. Electronic game device, characterized in that it comprises at least one box (BT), at least one portable object (OB), and at least one validation station (ST), by the fact that the object portable comprises a game memory (MJ) containing a set of authenticated game data (JE) representative of a game, a result memory (MR) capable of containing encrypted result information (IFRc), a first interface for communication (ESC) able to cooperate with a communication-box interface (ESB), and a second communication interface (ESC) able to communicate with a communication-station interface (ESS), by the fact that the box has a memory key (MC) containing an encryption-result key, a working memory (MT) accessible for writing and reading, and a processing unit (UT) connected to these memories as well as to the communication-box interface , the processing unit being capable, during a e cooperation between the communication interface-box and the first communication interface of the object, to verify the authentication of the set of game data stored in the object and to store said set in the working memory of so as to allow the progress of the game at the level of the box, then to encrypt result information (IFR) dependent on said game, using the encryption-result key, and to communicate this encrypted result information (IFRc) to the communication-box interface for the purpose of its storage in the result memory of the object, and by the fact that the validation station (ST) comprises means (PR) capable of determining said encryption-result key and station-processing means (PR) capable of reading the encrypted result information via the station-communication interface, during cooperation between the portable object and the station, and perform validation processing on the basis of at least this encrypted result information and the encryption-result key.

18. Device according to claim 17, characterized in that the station-processing means comprise decryption-station means capable of decrypting the encrypted result information.

19. Device according to claim 17, characterized in that the processing unit of the box is able to also communicate the unencrypted result information to the communication-box interface for the purpose of its storage in the memory of result of the object, and by the fact that the processing-station means are further able to read the unencrypted result information via the communication-station interface, and include encryption-station means capable of encrypting said result information not encrypted using the encryption-result key, as well as comparison means for comparing the recalculated encrypted result information with the encrypted result information stored in the object's result memory portable.

20. Device according to one of claims 17 to 19, characterized in that the first communication interface (SEC) of the portable object is a serial interface.

21. Device according to one of claims 17 to 20, characterized in that the set of authenticated game data is associated with an authentication certificate and in the fact that the means for verifying the authentication of this set of game data comprise means for calculating a certificate capable of recalculating said authentication certificate from the set of game data, and comparison means capable of comparing the recalculated certificate and the certificate stored in the game memory of the portable object.

22. Device according to one of claims 17 to 21, characterized in that it comprises encryption means able to at least partially encrypt the set of authenticated game data (JE), or information (CTF) connected to this set of game data, from at least one game encryption key, and by the fact that the key memory of the box is capable of containing said key game encryption while the means for verifying the authentication of the game data set include decryption means connected to the key memory.

23. Device according to claims 21 and 22, characterized in that the encryption means encrypt only the certificate of auditification (CTF).

24. Device according to claim 22 or 23, characterized in that the encryption means (CPU) are incorporated in the portable object.

25. Device according to one of claims 22 to 24, characterized in that the game encryption key is stored encrypted and in that the processing unit (UT) of the housing includes means for decrypting this key encryption-game.

26. Device according to one of claims 17 to 25, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) for invalidating the set of authenticated game data of a portable object.

27. Device according to one of claims 17 to 26, characterized in that it comprises means (CPU) for prohibiting the writing of the encrypted result information in the result memory of the portable object .

28. Device according to claim 26 or 27, characterized in that the invalidation means (CPU) and / or the prohibition means (CPU) are incorporated in the portable object.

29. Device according to one of claims 17 to 28, characterized in that it comprises several boxes, several portable objects and several validation stations, any of the portable objects being capable of cooperating with any of boxes and with any of the validation stations.