US8423766B2 - Authentication method, authentication apparatus, and computer product - Google Patents
Authentication method, authentication apparatus, and computer product Download PDFInfo
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- US8423766B2 US8423766B2 US11/368,601 US36860106A US8423766B2 US 8423766 B2 US8423766 B2 US 8423766B2 US 36860106 A US36860106 A US 36860106A US 8423766 B2 US8423766 B2 US 8423766B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0838—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using one-time-passwords
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/081—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying self-generating credentials, e.g. instead of receiving credentials from an authority or from another peer, the credentials are generated at the entity itself
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/067—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using one-time keys
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a technology for an authentication processing for authenticating a communication party or a user in an information communication system.
- an authenticator server
- a password authentication method is widely used, in which the server requests the user to input a password, and authenticate the user with a validity of the input password.
- a one-time password method in which a password valid for only one authentication is used, or an authentication method in which authentication information created from a password is used instead of the password itself is used.
- a simple and secure password authentication protocol Ver. 2 (SAS-2) authentication method is an example of the password authentication method in which a server authenticates a user based on following procedures (see, for example, Information and Communication Engineers, OIS2002-30, Vol. 102, No. 314, pp. 7-11, 2002, The Institute of Electronics, “Simple and secure password authentication protocol, Ver. 2 (SAS-2)” by Takasuke Tsuji, et. al.).
- FIG. 10 and FIG. 11 are flowcharts of a processing procedure for a user authentication in the SAS-2 authentication method.
- ⁇ indicates a substitution to a left-hand side by a right-hand side
- S represents a password that is privately held by a user
- ID represents an identifier for a user
- XOR represents an exclusive-OR operator
- n is the number of authentication
- N n is a random number (n is a positive integer equal to or greater than “1”, and is used for specifying the random number).
- F and H represent one-way functions that do not use the password S
- X is a one-way function that uses the password S and the random number N n
- X n X(ID, S XOR N n ).
- FIG. 10 is a flowchart of the initial registration of a user, according to the conventional technology.
- the user possesses a user identifier ID and a password S in advance.
- the user creates a random number N 1 and stores the created random number N 1 (step S 1001 ).
- the user calculates initial authentication information A 1 defined by Equation 1 using the random number N 1 , the password S that is held privately, and the user identifier ID (step S 1002 ), and transmits the authentication information A 1 with the user identifier ID via a safe means (step S 1003 ).
- the safe means includes a dedicated line for the authentication information, and a mailing of a recording medium in which the authentication information is stored.
- a 1 ⁇ X 1 (ID, S XOR N 1 ) (1)
- the server stores the authentication information A 1 in association with the user identifier ID, which is transmitted at step S 1003 (step S 1004 ). In this manner, the initial registration of the user is completed.
- the user calculates A n defined by Equation 2, from the stored random number N n (step S 1101 ).
- a n is current authentication information used for a current authentication process
- C is next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process
- D is another next authentication information obtained by unidirectional conversion of the next authentication information C.
- the server Upon receiving ⁇ AND ⁇ from the user, the server calculates D defined by Equation 7 using the current authentication information An that is registered corresponding to ID, and calculates C defined by Equation 8 using calculated D and the current authentication information, with respect to received ⁇ AND ⁇ (step S 1105 ).
- the server denies the authentication of the user (step S 1108 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server determines whether to authenticate a user who calls for an authentication.
- the authentication process is carried out based on transmission information that is mask-processed using the current authentication information A that is registered in the server. Therefore, it is possible to create the transmission information with ease by stealing the current authentication information stored in the server, and as a result, a malice third party can carry out an illegal authentication.
- a server installed in a public place or a server installed by a person who does not have enough knowledge of a security is apt to be a target of a malice, and the current authentication information can be easily stolen.
- the malice can take on the position of a legal user to be authenticated by using the current authentication information stored in the server.
- the malice can succeed to obtain an illegal authentication by taking on the position of the legal user, private information can be leak, or information of the legal user can be illegally modified. Once information is disclosed, it cannot be returned to a private state, resulting in a serious damage to both the authenticator and the user.
- a method of authenticating a subject device to be authenticated includes acquiring current authentication information that is created using an arbitrary value, and that is used for a current authentication process, from the subject device; receiving first transmission information in which next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process is hidden using the current authentication information, and second transmission information in which the arbitrary value is hidden using the next authentication information, from the subject device; calculating the next authentication information based on the first transmission information and the current authentication information; calculating the arbitrary value based on calculated next authentication information and the second transmission information; and determining whether to authenticate the subject device based on calculated arbitrary value and the current authentication information.
- a method of requesting an authentication to an authenticating apparatus from a subject device to be authenticated includes creating current authentication information that is used for a current authentication process, using an arbitrary value; delivering the current authentication information to the authenticating apparatus; creating first transmission information in which next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process is hidden using the current authentication information; creating second transmission information in which the arbitrary value is hidden using the next authentication information; and transmitting the first transmission information and the second transmission information to the authentication apparatus.
- a computer-readable recording medium stores therein a computer program according to the above aspects.
- An authentication apparatus includes a first acquiring unit configured to acquire, from a subject device to be authenticated, current authentication information that is created using an arbitrary value and that is used for a current authentication process; a receiving unit configured to receive first transmission information in which next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process is hidden using the current authentication information, and second transmission information in which the arbitrary value is hidden using the next authentication information, from the subject device; a first calculating unit configured to calculate the next authentication information based on the first transmission information and the current authentication information; a second calculating unit configured to calculate the arbitrary value based on calculated next authentication information and the second transmission information; and a determining unit configured to determine whether to authenticate the subject device based on calculated arbitrary value and the current authentication information.
- An authentication apparatus includes a first creating unit configured to create current authentication information that is used for a current authentication process, using an arbitrary value; a delivering unit configured to deliver the current authentication information to the authenticating apparatus; a second creating unit configured to create first transmission information in which next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process is hidden using the current authentication information; a third creating unit configured to create second transmission information in which the arbitrary value is hidden using the next authentication information; and a transmitting unit configured to transmit the first transmission information and the second transmission information to the authentication apparatus.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic of an authentication processing system according to embodiments of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a hardware configuration of the authentication processing system
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a functional configuration of the authentication processing system
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of an initial registration of a user, according to a first embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart of an initial registration of a user, according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart of an initial registration of a user, according to a third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a flowchart of a user authentication in the SAS-2 authentication method.
- FIG. 1 A system configuration of an authentication processing system according to the embodiments will be explained with reference to FIG. 1 .
- the system configuration of the authentication processing system, hardware configuration, and functional configuration (corresponding to FIG. 1 to FIG. 3 ) are common.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram for illustrating a system configuration of an authentication processing system 1 according to the present invention.
- the authentication processing system 1 is configured with a user 2 ( 2 a to 2 f ) and a server 3 .
- the user 2 is an apparatus to be authenticated that makes a request for an authentication to an authenticating apparatus
- the server 3 is the authenticating apparatus that authenticates the apparatus to be authenticated.
- the user 2 a to 2 f and the server 3 are connected via a network 4 .
- the user 2 makes a request for an authentication to the server 3 , and receives a predetermined service (such as a data communication connection service, a gate pass permission, and a contents providing) that is provided by the server 3 .
- the server 3 carries out an authentication process for the user 2 , and when the user 2 is authenticated, provides the predetermined service to the user 2 .
- the server 3 authenticated the user 2 (when an authentication is completed)
- the user 2 can also carry out an inter-authentication to authenticate the server 3 to which the user makes a request for an authentication.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram for illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of the user 2 and the server 3 constituting the authentication processing system 1 .
- an apparatus an object that implements each of functions of the user 2 and the server 3 is referred to as “an apparatus”.
- a central processing unit (CPU) 11 controls the entire apparatus, a read only memory (ROM) 12 stores a basic input-output program, and a random access memory (RAM) 13 is used as a working area of the CPU 11 .
- ROM read only memory
- RAM random access memory
- a hard disk drive (HDD) 14 controls a read/write of data with respect to a hard disk (HD) 15 according to a control of the CPU 11 , and the HD 15 stores data written by a control of the HDD 14 .
- a flexible disk drive (FDD) 16 controls a read/write of data with respect to a flexible disk (FD) 17 according to a control of the CPU 11 , and the FD 17 stores data written by a control of the FDD 16 .
- a display 18 displays a variety of data, such as a cursor, a menu, a window, a text, and an image.
- a network interface (IF) 19 carries out a reception and a transmission of data with respect to the network 4 .
- a keyboard 20 includes a plurality of keys for inputting a text, a numerical value, and a variety of instructions, and a mouse 21 carries out selection and execution of a variety of instructions, selection of an object to be processed, and movement of the cursor.
- a scanner 22 optically reads a text or an image
- a printer 23 prints out a text or an image on a paper or the like
- a compact disk-read only memory (CD-ROM) 24 is a removable recording medium
- a CD-ROM drive 25 controls a read/write of data with respect to the CD-ROM 24
- a bus (or a cable) 26 connects the above components.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram for illustrating a functional configuration of the user and the server constituting the authentication processing system.
- the user 2 includes a creating unit 31 , a delivering unit 32 , a calculating unit 33 , and a transmitting unit 34 .
- the creating unit 31 creates current authentication information (A) that is used for a current authentication process, using an arbitrary value (a).
- the creating unit 31 creates the current authentication information by carrying out an using a one-way function with which a calculation of a value before the operation is difficult for the arbitrary value.
- the creating unit 31 creates an authentication key (K) that is unique to the user 2 , together with the current authentication information.
- the one-way function is a function with which, when two values (x and y) are operated using the function, even if a value (z) of a result of the operation and one of the two values (for example, x) are known, it is difficult to calculate the other value (y).
- the delivering unit 32 delivers the current authentication information created by the creating unit 31 to the server 3 .
- the delivering unit 32 delivers the authentication key to the server 3 together with the current authentication information.
- the delivering of the current information and the authentication key means sending information to the server 3 using a method that is not available to a third party other than the server 3 , such as a transmission via a dedicated line for the information, and a mailing of a recording medium in which the information is stored.
- the calculating unit 33 calculates next authentication information (B) that is used for a next authentication process, and calculates first transmission information, in which next authentication information to be used for a next authentication process is hidden using the current authentication information, and second transmission information, in which the arbitrary value is hidden using the next authentication information.
- the calculating unit 33 calculates a value by carrying out an operation using a mask function with which a calculation of a value before the operation is easy for the next authentication information and the current authentication information, as the first transmission information, and a value by carrying out the operation using the mask function for the next authentication information (or sum of the next authentication information and the authentication key) and the arbitrary value, as the second transmission information.
- the mask function is a function with which, when the operation is carried out twice, a result of the operation becomes the original value, such as an exclusive OR (XOR).
- XOR exclusive OR
- the mask function is taken as the exclusive-OR operation.
- the transmitting unit 34 transmits the first transmission information and the second transmission information calculated by the calculating unit 33 to the server 3 .
- the transmitting unit 34 transmits the above transmission information to the server 3 via the network 4 .
- the server 3 includes an acquiring unit 41 , a receiving unit 42 , a calculating unit 43 , and a determining unit 44 .
- the acquiring unit 41 acquires the current authentication information delivered by the delivering unit 32 of the user 2 and the authentication key unique to the user 2 .
- the receiving unit 42 receives the first transmission information and the second transmission information transmitted by the transmitting unit 34 of the user 2 .
- the calculating unit 43 calculates the next authentication information using the first transmission information received by the receiving unit 42 and the current authentication information acquired by the acquiring unit 41 , and calculates the arbitrary value using the next authentication information and the second transmission information.
- the calculating unit 43 calculates the next authentication information (or sum of the next authentication information and the authentication key) by carrying out the exclusive-OR operation with respect to the first transmission information and the current authentication information, and calculates the arbitrary value by carrying out the exclusive-OR operation with respect to the next authentication information (or sum of the next authentication information and the authentication key) and the second transmission information.
- the determining unit 44 determines whether to authenticate the user 2 , based on the arbitrary value calculated by the calculating unit 43 and the current authentication information acquired by the acquiring unit 41 .
- the determining unit 44 determines whether a value obtained by carrying out the operation using the one-way function for the arbitrary value is identical to the current authentication information.
- the server 3 authenticates the user 2 , otherwise denies the authentication of the user 2 .
- Each of the above components is implemented by executing a command process by the CPU 11 according to a command of a program that is loaded to the RAM 13 from a variety of recording media, such as the HD 15 , the FD 17 , and the CD-ROM 24 of each of the apparatuses.
- “ ⁇ ” indicates a substitution of a left-hand side by a right-hand side
- “S” means a password that is privately held by the user (apparatus to be authenticated)
- “ID” is a user identifier
- “XOR” is the exclusive-OR operator
- n is the number of authentication
- “N n ” is a random number (n is a positive integer equal to or greater than “1”, and is used for specifying the random number)
- F is a one-way function that does not use the password S.
- “X” is a one-way function that uses the password S and the random number N n
- X n X(ID, S, N n ).
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a processing procedure for an initial registration of the user, according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- the user 2 possesses the user identifier ID for identifying itself from among a plurality of the users 2 .
- the user 2 holds the password S that is private to itself.
- the user identifier ID and the password S can be registered in the user 2 , or can be requested in each case of process.
- the user 2 creates a private key K and a random number N 1 , and stores created private key K and random number N 1 (step S 101 ). Then, the user 2 calculates A 1 following Equations 9 and 10, using the user identifier ID, the password S, and the random number N 1 .
- the A 1 is referred to as first-time authentication information.
- the user 2 transmits the user identifier ID, the private key K, and the first-time authentication information A 1 via a safe means (step S 103 ).
- the safe means includes a transmission through a dedicated line for the information and a mailing of a recording medium in which the information is stored. Then, the user 2 stores the calculated first-time authentication information A 1 (step S 104 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server 3 stores each of the private key K and the first-time authentication information A 1 transmitted from the user 2 in association with the user identifier ID (step S 105 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the user 2 calculates a defined by Equation 11 from stored N n (step S 151 ). Then, the user 2 creates a new random number N n+1 , stores the created random number (step S 152 ), and calculates B defined by Equation 13 following Equations 11 and 12 (step S 153 ).
- the user 2 calculates ⁇ and ⁇ defined by Equations 14 and 15, respectively, using the calculated a and B, and the stored K and A n (step S 154 ), and transmits ID, ⁇ , and ⁇ to the server 3 (step S 155 ). Then, the user 2 stores B calculated at step S 153 as next authentication information A n+1 (step S 156 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- a is data that becomes a source of the authentication information A n .
- the server 3 calculates B defined by Equation 16 using the authentication information A n that is registered in association with ID of the user 2 (step S 157 ), and calculates a defined by Equation 17 using a sum of B and K, with respect to ⁇ and ⁇ received from the user 2 .
- the server 3 determines whether a result of the unidirectional conversion of the calculated a and the stored ID, F(ID, a) is identical to A n (step S 158 ). When F(ID, a) is identical to A n (“YES” at step S 158 ), the server 3 authenticates the user 2 , and starts a connection with the user 2 (step S 159 ). In addition, the server 3 stores B as the next authentication information (A n+1 ) to be used for the next authentication (step S 160 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server denies the authentication of the user 2 , transmits an error message to the user 2 (step S 161 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the method of calculating ⁇ and ⁇ at step S 154 is not limited to the above Equations 14 and 15.
- a sum of B and K is used for calculating ⁇ .
- this process is to prevent, when ⁇ and ⁇ are acquired by a third party during a transmission of ⁇ and ⁇ to the server 3 , an attack by the third party using the acquired values.
- B the value that is exclusive-OR operated with A n or a
- B cannot be calculated from ⁇ and ⁇ .
- the method of calculating ⁇ and ⁇ can be any one, not being limited to above Equations 14 and 15, as long as it satisfies the above condition.
- K is a value calculated as the private key at step S 101 , however, ⁇ and ⁇ can be calculated as following Equations 18 and 19 by using the user identifier ID. ⁇ B XOR An (18) ⁇ ( B +ID) XOR a (19)
- an operation using K can also be used.
- K an addition of K to B can be used for calculating ⁇ , as shown in following Equations 22 and 23.
- an operation to B in calculating ⁇ should be the one for which an inverse operation is possible, such as B ⁇ K. ⁇ ( B+K ) XOR An (22) ⁇ B XOR a (23)
- a method of calculating a at step S 157 depends on the method of calculating ⁇ and ⁇ . For example, when ⁇ and ⁇ are calculated using the above Equations 18 and 19, a can be calculated using operations shown in following Equations 26 and 27.
- the authentication information for an authentication process can only be created using data (password S and random number N n ) that become sources of the authentication information that is exclusively stored in the apparatus to be authenticated (user 2 ). Therefore, even if information regarding the apparatus to be authenticated (ID, K, A n ), which is stored in the authenticating apparatus (server 3 ) is stolen by a third party, the third party cannot create the authentication information for the authentication process, and cannot obtain an authentication by the authenticating apparatus.
- a countermeasure is taken against a stealing of information on an apparatus to be authenticated (user 2 ) from an authenticating apparatus (server 3 ), by creating authentication information to be used for an authenticating process from data that is stored in the apparatus to be authenticated only.
- a second embodiment of the present invention it is confirmed whether information that becomes a source of current authentication information (A n ) that is used for a current (n th ) authentication is calculated from information that is encrypted using next authentication information (A n+1 :B) that is used for a next ((n+1) th ) authentication. With this mechanism, it is possible to detect a modification of delivering information by a third party.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a processing procedure for an initial registration of a user, according to the second embodiment.
- the user 2 possesses a user identifier ID for identifying itself from a plurality of users 2 .
- the user 2 possesses a private password S that is known to itself only.
- the user 2 creates a private key K, and stores K (step S 201 ). Then, the user 2 creates random numbers N 1 and N 2 , and stores N 2 (step S 202 ). The user 2 calculates A 1 from following Equations 28 and 29, and calculates ⁇ 1 from following Equations 30 to 32, using the user identifier ID, the password S, and the random numbers N 1 and N 2 (step S 203 ).
- the right-hand side of Equation 32 E_ ⁇ B ⁇ (a) is a value obtained by encrypting a by using B as a key.
- the user 2 transmits the user identifier ID, the private key K, and the first-time authentication information A 1 and ⁇ 1 via a safe means (step S 204 ). Then, the user 2 stores the calculated a and b (hereinafter, “authenticator a and b”), A 1 , and B (step S 205 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server 3 stores each of the private key K and the first-time authentication information A 1 and ⁇ 1 transmitted from the user 2 in association with the user identifier ID (step S 206 ), and ends the process of the flowchart. With the above process, the user 2 is initially registered in the server 3 .
- the user 2 calculates b defined by Equation 33 from stored N n+1 (step S 251 ), and determines whether the calculated b is identical to the stored b (step S 252 ). At this time, ID and S that are used for calculating b can be requested to the user 2 for every authentication process, and can be stored in the user 2 .
- the user 2 goes to step S 253 .
- the user 2 ends the process of the flowchart. b ⁇ X (ID, S, N n+1 ) (33)
- the user 2 creates a new random number N n+2 , stores N n+2 (step S 253 ), and calculates an authenticator c and authentication information C from following Equations 34 and 35 (step S 254 ).
- the authenticator c and the authentication information C are the information after the next authentication information for an authentication after the next authentication. c ⁇ X (ID, S, N n+2 ) (34) C ⁇ F (ID, c ) (35)
- the user 2 calculates ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ n+1 defined by following Equations 36 to 38, respectively, using the calculated b and D, and the stored K, A n , and B (step S 255 ). Then, the user 2 transmits ID, ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ n+1 to the server 3 (step S 256 ). In addition, the user 2 stores the calculated c and C as the next authenticator b and the next authentication information B (step S 257 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the method of calculating ⁇ and ⁇ although there are various methods as described in the first embodiment, operations shown in following Equations 36 and 37 are used as an example.
- the server 3 calculates a from following Equations 39 and 40 using the authentication information A n and the private key K that are stored in association with ⁇ , ⁇ , and ID received from the user 2 (step S 258 ).
- the server 3 determines whether a result of the unidirectional conversion of the calculated a and the stored ID, F(ID, a), is identical to A n (step S 259 ).
- F(ID, a) is identical to A n (“YES” at step S 259 )
- the server 3 authenticates the user 2 .
- the server 3 decrypts the encrypted information ⁇ n using the received B (indicated as D_ ⁇ B ⁇ ( ⁇ n)), and determines whether D_ ⁇ B ⁇ ( ⁇ n) is identical to a (step S 260 ).
- the server 3 verifies that the authentication information B is not modified, and starts a connection with the user 2 (step S 261 ). In addition, the server 3 stores B as authentication information (A n+1 ) that is used for the next ((n+1) th ) authentication process (step S 262 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server 3 denies the authentication of the user 2 , transmits an error message to the user 2 (step S 263 ), and ends the process of the flowchart. Furthermore, when D_ ⁇ B ⁇ ( ⁇ n) is not identical to a (“NO” at step S 260 ), the server 3 determines that the authentication information B is modified, transmits an error message to the user 2 (step S 263 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the authentication information for an authentication process can only be created using data (password S and random number N n+1 ) that become sources of the authentication information that is exclusively stored in the apparatus to be authenticated (user 2 ). Therefore, even if information regarding the apparatus to be authenticated (ID, K, A n , ⁇ n), which is stored in the authenticating apparatus (server 3 ) is stolen by a third party, the third party cannot create the authentication information for the authentication process, and cannot obtain an authentication by the authenticating apparatus.
- data used for detecting a modification of delivering information is different from data used for an authentication process. With this mechanism, it is possible to enhance a security of the authentication process.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a processing procedure for an initial registration of a user, according to a third embodiment of the present invention.
- the user 2 possesses a user identifier ID for identifying itself from a plurality of users 2 .
- the user 2 possesses a private password S that is known to itself only.
- the user 2 creates a private key K, and stores K (step S 301 ). Then, the user 2 creates random numbers N 1 and N 2 , and stores N 2 (step S 302 ). The user 2 calculates A′ 1 from following Equations 41 to 43, and calculates ⁇ 1 from following Equations 44 to 47, using the user identifier ID, the password S, and the random number N 1 (step S 303 ).
- the right-hand side of Equation 47 E_ ⁇ B′ ⁇ (a) is a value obtained by encrypting a by using B′ as a key.
- the user 2 transmits the user identifier ID, the private key K, and the first-time authentication information A′ 1 and ⁇ 1 via a safe means (step S 304 ). Then, the user 2 stores the calculated a and b (hereinafter, “authenticator a and b”), A, A′ 1 , B, and B′ (step S 205 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- authentication a and b the calculated a and b
- the server 3 stores each of the private key K and the first-time authentication information A′ 1 and ⁇ 1 transmitted from the user 2 in association with the user identifier ID (step S 306 ), and ends the process of the flowchart. With the above process, the user 2 is initially registered in the server 3 .
- the user 2 calculates b defined by Equation 48 from stored N n+1 (step S 351 ), and determines whether the calculated b is identical to the stored b (step S 352 ). At this time, ID and S that are used for calculating b can be requested to the user 2 for every authentication process, and can be stored in the user 2 .
- the user 2 goes to step S 353 .
- the user 2 ends the process of the flowchart. b ⁇ X (ID, S, N n+1 ) (48)
- the user 2 creates a new random number N n+2 , stores N n+2 (step S 353 ), and calculates C′ from following Equations 49 to 51 (step S 354 ).
- the user 2 calculates ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ n+1 defined by following Equations 52 to 54, respectively, using the calculated b and C′, and the stored K, A n , A′ and B′ (step S 355 ). Then, the user 2 transmits ID, ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ n+1 to the server 3 (step S 356 ). In addition, the user 2 stores the calculated c and C as the next authenticator b and the next authentication information B (step S 357 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the method of calculating ⁇ and ⁇ although there are various methods as described in the first embodiment, operations shown in following Equations 52 and 53 are used as an example.
- the server 3 calculates A from following Equations 55 and 56 using the authentication information A′ n and the private key K that are stored in association with ⁇ , ⁇ , and ID received from the user 2 (step S 358 ).
- B ′ ⁇ XOR A′n (55)
- a ′ ⁇ XOR ( B′+K ) (56)
- the server 3 determines whether a result of the unidirectional conversion of the calculated A and the stored ID, F(ID, A), is identical to A′ n (step S 359 ).
- F(ID, A) is identical to A′n (“YES” at step S 359 )
- the server 3 authenticates the user 2 .
- the server 3 decrypts the encrypted information ⁇ n using the received B′ (indicated as D_ ⁇ B′ ⁇ ( ⁇ n)), and calculates a defined by following Equation 57 (step S 360 ).
- Equation 57 a ⁇ D — ⁇ B′ n ⁇ ( ⁇ n ) (57)
- the server 3 determines whether a result of the unidirectional conversion of the calculated a and ID, F(ID, a), is identical to A (step S 361 ). When F(ID, a) is identical to A (“YES” step S 361 ), the server 3 verifies that the authentication information B′ is not modified, and starts a connection with the user 2 (step S 362 ).
- the server 3 stores B′ as authentication information (A′ n+1 ) that is used for the next ((n+1) th ) authentication process (step S 363 ).
- the server 3 stores ⁇ n +1 that is transmitted from the user 2 at step S 356 as the authentication information for the next ((n+1) th ) authentication process instead of ⁇ n (step S 364 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the server 3 denies the authentication of the user 2 , transmits an error message to the user 2 (step S 365 ), and ends the process of the flowchart. Furthermore, when F(ID, a) is not identical to A (“NO” at step S 361 ), the server 3 determines that the authentication information B is modified, transmits an error message to the user 2 (step S 365 ), and ends the process of the flowchart.
- the authentication information for an authentication process can only be created using data (password S and random number N n+1 ) that become sources of the authentication information that is exclusively stored in the apparatus to be authenticated (user 2 ). Therefore, even if information regarding the apparatus to be authenticated (ID, K, A′, ⁇ n), which is stored in the authenticating apparatus (server 3 ) is stolen by a third party, the third party cannot create the authentication information for the authentication process, and cannot obtain an authentication by the authenticating apparatus.
- the data used for the authentication process is transmitted and received in a mask-processed state. Therefore, it is possible to prevent a leakage of data used for the authentication process to a third party.
- by verifying whether data obtained by applying a unidirectional conversion on data a that becomes a source of the current authentication information is identical to the current authentication information A it is possible to authenticate a qualification of an apparatus to be authenticated.
- the authentication processing program, the recording medium, and the authentication processing apparatus in addition to a verification of relation of information delivered to an authenticating apparatus, a verification whether data obtained by applying a unidirectional conversion on data a that becomes a source of the current authentication information is identical to the current authentication information A is performed.
- a verification whether data obtained by applying a unidirectional conversion on data a that becomes a source of the current authentication information is identical to the current authentication information A is performed.
- the authentication processing method can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance with a computer, such as a personal computer and a workstation.
- the program is stored in a computer-readable recording medium, such as a hard disk (HD), a flexible disk (FD), a compact disk-read only memory (CD-ROM), a magneto-optic (MO) disk, and a digital versatile disk (DVD).
- the computer reads out the program from the recording medium, and executes it.
- the program can be distributed via a network, such as the Internet.
Abstract
Description
A 1 ←X 1(ID, S XOR N 1) (1)
A n ←X n(ID, S XOR N n) (2)
C←X n(ID, S XOR N n+1) (3)
D←F(ID, C) (4)
α←C XOR (D+A n) (5)
β←D XOR A n (6)
D←β XOR A n (7)
C←α XOR (D+A n) (8)
a←X(ID, S, N 1) (9)
A 1 ←F(ID, a) (10)
a←X(ID, S, N n) (11)
b←X(ID, S, N n+1) (12)
B←F(ID, b) (13)
α←B XOR A n (14)
β←(B+K) XOR a (15)
B←α XOR A n (16)
a←β XOR (B+K) (17)
α←B XOR An (18)
β←(B+ID) XOR a (19)
α←B XOR An (20)
β←(B−K) XOR a (21)
α←(B+K) XOR An (22)
β←B XOR a (23)
α←(B−ID) XOR An (24)
β←B XOR a (25)
B←α XOR An (26)
a←α XOR (B+ID) (27)
a←X(ID, S, N 1) (28)
A 1 ←F(ID, a) (29)
b←X(ID, S, N 2) (30)
B←F(ID, b) (31)
γ1 ←E — {B}(a) (32)
b←X(ID, S, N n+1) (33)
c←X(ID, S, N n+2) (34)
C←F(ID, c) (35)
α←B XOR An (36)
β←(B+K) XOR a (37)
γn+1 ←E — {C}(b) (38)
B←α XOR An (39)
a←β XOR (B+K) (40)
a←X(ID, S, N 1) (41)
A←F(ID, a) (42)
A′ 1 ←F(ID, A) (43)
b←X(ID, S, N 2) (44)
B←F(ID, b) (45)
B′←F(ID, B) (46)
γ1 ←E — {B′}(a) (47)
b←X(ID, S, N n+1) (48)
c←X(ID, S, N n+2) (49)
C←F(ID, c) (50)
C′←F(ID, C) ( (51)
α←B′ XOR A′n (52)
β←(B′+K) XOR A (53)
γn+1 ←E — {C′}(b) (54)
B′←α XOR A′n (55)
A′←β XOR (B′+K) (56)
a←D — {B′ n}(γn) (57)
Claims (14)
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JP2005246506A JP4436294B2 (en) | 2005-08-26 | 2005-08-26 | Authentication processing method, authentication processing program, recording medium, and authentication processing apparatus |
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US8025681B2 (en) * | 2006-03-29 | 2011-09-27 | Theken Spine, Llc | Dynamic motion spinal stabilization system |
JP2009171253A (en) * | 2008-01-16 | 2009-07-30 | Trinity Security Systems Inc | Key sharing method, authentication method, authentication program, recording medium, and communication system |
JP2009253650A (en) * | 2008-04-04 | 2009-10-29 | N-Crypt Lab Inc | Transmission and reception system, transmission device, reception device, authentication device, user device, method executed by those, and program |
JP2010056673A (en) * | 2008-08-26 | 2010-03-11 | Tss Lab:Kk | Authentication processing method, authentication processing program, recording medium, and authentication processing system |
US8621212B2 (en) * | 2009-12-22 | 2013-12-31 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for cryptographically enhanced automatic blacklist management and enforcement |
US8630411B2 (en) | 2011-02-17 | 2014-01-14 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Systems and methods for device and data authentication |
JP6340273B2 (en) * | 2014-07-07 | 2018-06-06 | 株式会社総合車両製作所 | Authentication system |
JP5963382B1 (en) * | 2015-10-02 | 2016-08-03 | 株式会社Pips | One-time authentication system |
JP7161416B2 (en) * | 2018-01-26 | 2022-10-26 | 明宏 清水 | Authentication system, authenticated device, authentication device, authentication method, and program |
CN113472847B (en) * | 2021-05-28 | 2023-04-07 | 济南浪潮数据技术有限公司 | Method, system, device and medium for filtering invalid users |
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KR20070024332A (en) | 2007-03-02 |
TW200709639A (en) | 2007-03-01 |
US20070050631A1 (en) | 2007-03-01 |
JP2007060568A (en) | 2007-03-08 |
EP1758044A3 (en) | 2009-10-07 |
JP4436294B2 (en) | 2010-03-24 |
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TWI312632B (en) | 2009-07-21 |
CN1921387A (en) | 2007-02-28 |
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