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Publication numberCN101632086 A
Publication typeApplication
Application numberCN 200880005439
PCT numberPCT/GB2008/050100
Publication date20 Jan 2010
Filing date15 Feb 2008
Priority date20 Feb 2007
Also published asCA2678101A1, CA2678101C, CN101632086B, EP2122527A2, EP2122527B1, US7882553, US20080201577, WO2008102169A2, WO2008102169A3
Publication number200880005439.6, CN 101632086 A, CN 101632086A, CN 200880005439, CN-A-101632086, CN101632086 A, CN101632086A, CN200880005439, CN200880005439.6, PCT/2008/50100, PCT/GB/2008/050100, PCT/GB/2008/50100, PCT/GB/8/050100, PCT/GB/8/50100, PCT/GB2008/050100, PCT/GB2008/50100, PCT/GB2008050100, PCT/GB200850100, PCT/GB8/050100, PCT/GB8/50100, PCT/GB8050100, PCT/GB850100
Inventors乔纳森罗山图利安尼
Applicant科里普托马迪克公司
Export CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan
External Links: SIPO, Espacenet
Authentication device and method
CN 101632086 A
Abstract
This invention relates to an authentication device and method, in particular to devices and methods for generating dynamic passwords, and to cards carrying the device and to software implementing the method. An apparatus for generating intermediate cryptogram data corresponding to a dynamic password for a first cryptographic scheme, the intermediate cryptogram data being suitable for display using a device designed for a second, different cryptographic scheme, the apparatus comprising: a communications interface for communicating with a said device; and a processor coupled to a memory, the memory storing processor controlcode to controlthe processor, when running, to: generate a dynamic password according to the first cryptographic scheme; and generate intermediate cryptogram data corresponding to said dynamic password, the intermediate cryptogram data being suitable for outputting to the said deviceso that, when the said device processes said intermediate cryptogramdata according to the second cryptographic scheme, the said device generates data suitable for displaying said dynamic password.
Claims(23)  translated from Chinese
1、一种用于产生与针对第一密码方案的动态口令相对应的中间密文数据的装置,所述中间密文数据适合使用针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备来显示,所述装置包括: 通信接口,用于与所述设备进行通信;以及处理器,与存储器耦合,所述存储器存储处理器控制代码,处理器控制代码用于控制处理器在运行时进行以下操作: 根据所述第一密码方案产生动态口令;以及产生与所述动态口令相对应的中间密文数据,所述中间密文数据适合向所述设备输出,使得当所述设备根据所述第二密码方案处理所述中间密文数据时,所述设备产生适合显示所述动态口令的数据。 1. An apparatus for generating a dynamic password first cryptographic schemes corresponding intermediate ciphertext data, the intermediate ciphertext data suitable for a second password for different programs and devices designed to show that the apparatus comprising: a communication interface for communicating with the device; and a processor coupled to the memory, the memory storing processor control code, processor control code for controlling the processor to operate at run time: according to the said first dynamic password generated password programs; and generating a dynamic password corresponding intermediate ciphertext data, the intermediate ciphertext data for output to the device, so that when the device is processed according to the second password scheme When the intermediate ciphertext data, the device generates a dynamic password for displaying the data.
2、 根据权利要求l所述的装置,其中,所述动态口令包括一次性口令。 2. The apparatus according to claim l, wherein said dynamic password comprises a one-time password.
3、 根据权利要求1或2所述的装置,其中,第一密码方案包括开放认证方案。 3. The apparatus according to claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the first program comprises an open password authentication scheme.
4、 根据权利要求1或2所述的装置,其中,第一密码方案包括RSA SecureID。 4. The apparatus of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the first cryptographic schemes including RSA SecureID.
5、 根据权利要求1或2所述的装置,其中,第一密码方案包括Vasco Digipass。 5. The apparatus of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the first cryptographic scheme comprises Vasco Digipass.
6、 根据权利要求1至5中任一项所述的装置,其中,第二密码方案包括芯片认证程序(CAP)方案。 6. An apparatus according to any one of claims 1-5, wherein the second cryptographic schemes including chip authentication program (CAP) program.
7、 根据权利要求1至6中任一项所述的装置,其中,用于控制处理器产生中间密文数据的代码包括用于以下操作的代码:产生与所述动态口令相对应的十进制动态口令数据; 产生与所述十进制动态口令数据相对应的反十进制动态口令数据;以及对所述反十进制口令数据进行填充以产生所述中间密文数据。 7. The device according to any one of claims 6, wherein the means for controlling the processor to generate a code intermediate ciphertext data includes codes for the following operations: generating a dynamic password corresponding to the decimal dynamic password data; generating said dynamic password decimal data corresponding to a decimal counter dynamic password data; and the anti-decimal password data to generate the intermediate filling ciphertext data.
8、 根据权利要求7所述的装置,其中,用于对所述反十进制动态口令数据进行填充的代码包括:用于根据CAP发行者专有位图来插入比特的代码。 8. The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein, wherein, for the dynamic password trans decimal data code comprises filling: CAP issuer according Proprietary Bitmap to insert bits of the code.
9、 根据权利要求7或8所述的装置,其中,用于对所述反十进制动态口令数据进行填充的代码包括:用于并入与一个或多个校验数位相对应的校验数位数据的代码。 9. A device according to claim 7 or 8, wherein said counter for dynamic password decimal data filled codes include: for incorporation with one or more of the check the number of phases corresponding check digit data code.
10、 根据权利要求1至9中任一项所述的装置,其中,使用所述设备不能显示第一密码方案中的可能的动态口令的一部分,其中,用于产生动态口令的代码包括:用于重复产生动态口令直到找到能够使用所述设备来显示的动态口令为止的代码。 10. The apparatus according to any one of claims 9, wherein, using a portion of the device can not display the password scheme may first dynamic password, wherein the code for generating a dynamic password comprises: using Repeat the code to generate dynamic password until you find the device can be used to display dynamic password until.
11、 根据权利要求10所述的装置,其中,所述可能的动态口令的一部分包括:具有前导零的动态口令。 11. The apparatus according to claim according to claim 10, wherein said dynamic password may be a part comprising: a dynamic password leading zeros.
12、 根据权利要求10所述的装置,其中,所述设备在运行时产生用于显示的校验数位,以及,用于产生动态口令的代码还包括:用于对由所述设备产生的校验数位进行确定的代码。 12. The apparatus according to claim according to claim 10, wherein said apparatus generates at run-time check digit for display, and generate code for dynamic password further comprising: means for correction generated by said apparatus determination of the number of check digit code.
13、 根据权利要求1至12中任一项所述的装置,其中,所述设备被配置为:除了所述中间密文数据,还处理同步数据;以及,用于产生中间密文数据的代码还包括用于以下操作的代码:产生用于向所述设备输出的同步数据,使得当所述设备根据所述第二密码方案处理所述同步数据和所述中间密文数据时,所述设备产生适合显示所述动态口令的数据。 13, according to claims 1 to 12, apparatus according to any one of claims, wherein the device is configured to: in addition to the intermediate ciphertext data, further processing synchronous data; and, the intermediate code is used to generate the ciphertext data further comprising code for the following operations: generating the synchronous data for the output device, such that when the synchronizing device and the intermediate ciphertext data according to the data of the second cryptographic processing program when the device generating a dynamic password for displaying the data.
14、 根据权利要求13所述的装置,其中,所述同步数据包括应用交易计数器(ATC)。 14. The apparatus according to claim according to claim 13, wherein said synchronization data includes an application transaction counter (ATC).
15、 根据权利要求1至14中任一项所述的装置,其中,所述设备包括CAP兼容读取器。 15. The apparatus according to claim any one of claim 1 14, wherein the apparatus comprises a CAP-compatible reader.
16、 一种集成电路,包括前述权利要求中任一项的装置。 16. An integrated circuit comprising the apparatus of any one of the preceding claims in.
17、 一种卡,承载权利要求16所述的集成电路。 17, a card bearing integrated circuit of claim 16.
18、 一种产生与根据第一密码方案的密文相对应的中间密文数据的方法,所述数据适合在针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备上显示,所述方法包括:根据第一密码方案产生动态口令;以及产生与所述动态口令相对应的中间密文数据,所述中间密文数据适合向所述设备输出,使得当所述设备根据所述第二密码方案处理所述中间密文数据时,所述设备输出所述动态口令。 18. A method of producing the corresponding intermediate ciphertext ciphertext data based on a method first cryptographic scheme, the data for the second password for different programs designed equipment display, the method comprising: the first a dynamic password generated password programs; and generating a dynamic password that corresponds to the intermediate ciphertext data, the intermediate ciphertext data for output to the device, so that when the device according to the second password scheme to process the intermediate ciphertext data, the device outputs the dynamic password.
19、 根据权利要求18所述的方法,其中,所述设备包括CAP兼容读取器。 19. A method according to claim 18, wherein said apparatus comprises a CAP-compatible reader.
20、 根据权利要求18或19所述的方法,其中,产生动态口令包括产生HMAC-SHA1密文。 20. The method according to claim 18 or 19, wherein the generating includes generating a dynamic password HMAC-SHA1 ciphertext.
21、 一种处理器控制代码,用于控制处理器在运行时执行权利要求18至20中任一项所述的方法。 21. A processor control code for controlling a processor to perform a method as claimed in any one of claims 18 to 20, at run-time requirements.
22、 一种计算机可读介质,承载权利要求21所述的处理器控制代码。 22. A computer-readable medium bearing processor of claim 21 wherein the control codes.
23、 一种参照附图实质上如本发明所述的装置、集成电路、卡或方法。 23. A device substantially as drawings, integrated circuit cards or methods of the present invention is described with reference to.
Description  translated from Chinese

认证设备和方法技术领域本发明涉及一种认证设备和方法,具体涉及用于产生动态口令的设备和方法,以及承载该设备的卡和实现该方法的软件。 Certified devices and methods The present invention relates to an authentication device and method, and particularly to an apparatus and method for generating a dynamic password, as well as a card carrying the device and the method for software. 背景技术远程用户的认证是很多基于网和网络的应用的基本部分。 BACKGROUND remote user authentication is a lot of network-based applications and the network of basic parts. 传统的用户名和口令提供廉价但差的解决方案。 Traditional user name and password to provide cheap but poor solution. 通常通过向用户发放'令牌'(小型且便携式设备)来获得较高的安全性,显然,该'令牌'产生仅对单次使用是有效的随机口令:所谓的一次性口令(OTP)。 Typically by issuing to the user 'token' (small and portable device) to obtain high security, it is clear that the 'token' to generate only a single-use random password is valid: the so-called one-time password (OTP) . 通过向系统呈现OTP,用户证明了对该令牌的所有权,当与传统静态口令相结合时,该令牌提供了有力的、双因素认证。 Through the system presents OTP, the user prove ownership of the token, when combined with the traditional static password, the token to provide a strong, two-factor authentication. 在市场上存在广泛不同的令牌,主要基于专有的、供应商特定的技术。 Widely different token presence in the market, mainly based on proprietary, vendor-specific technologies. 例如,RSA SecureID、 VASCO Digipass、 Secure Computing禾口Active Identity。 For example, RSA SecureID, VASCO Digipass, Secure Computing Hekou Active Identity. 最近正在令牌供应商组织正在进行标准化的努力,称作开放认证的倡议(OATH) [http:Vwww.openauthentication.org〗。 Recently token supplier organization is ongoing standardization effort, called the Open Authentication Initiative (OATH) [http: Vwww.openauthentication.org〗. 该OATH寻求促进OTP产生令牌的标准以及它们的部署和使用所需的基础设施。 Which seeks to promote the standard OATH OTP tokens and produce their infrastructure required to deploy and use. 同时,金融部门的强认证的需要已经导致MasterCard领导了基于标准'芯片和PIN'支付卡(图1)的变型的备选标准。 At the same time, strong authentication needs of the financial sector has led to alternative standards based MasterCard leadership standards 'chip and PIN' payment card (Figure 1) variant. 在该方案中, 所谓的芯片认证程序(CAP) [Chip Authentication Program Function Architecture, MasterCard International, September 2004],手持卡读取器(图2)用于基于该卡内的核心功能来创建OTP。 In this scenario, the so-called chip authentication program (CAP) [Chip Authentication Program Function Architecture, MasterCard International, September 2004], handheld card reader (Figure 2) is used on the core functionality of the card to create OTP. 该卡读取器是匿名的并且可互换的,并且提倡普遍的部署的构思让它们成为家庭或者办公室中平凡的物件,从而无需单个用户自己携带他们的卡读取器。 The card reader is anonymous and interchangeable, and to promote the idea of universal deployed them as a home or office in ordinary objects, eliminating the need for individual users to bring their own card reader. 然而,CAP是封闭的专有系统并且不与其它系统兼容。 However, CAP is closed and proprietary systems are not compatible with other systems. 在未来, CAP兼容卡读取器可以变得广泛可用,但是它们将仅对它们的发行银行批准应用的CAP兼容的芯片和PIN卡有用,这是由于只有发行银行可以访问验证该卡所产生的OTP所需的信息。 In the future, CAP-compliant card reader can become widely available, but they will only release the bank approved their application CAP-compatible chip and PIN card of useful, since only the issuing bank to verify that the card can be accessed arising OTP requested information. 发明内容将描述利用标准CAP卡读取器以及传统的、非支付卡一起来产生OATH兼容的OTP的手段。 SUMMARY CAP will be described using a standard card reader as well as traditional, non-payment cards together to produce a means of OATH-compliant OTP. 该方法的优点是可以使用标准OATH基础设施用于卡的部署以及产生的OTP的验证,同时通过利用部署的卡读取器基础,将令牌的成本减少至芯片卡的成本。 The advantage of this method is that you can use the standard OATH infrastructure for card deployment, and verification of the OTP generation, but by using a card reader infrastructure deployment, will reduce the cost of tokens to the cost of the chip card. 更一般地,将描述卡中的替换算法以及基于读取器的一次性口令设备。 More generally, will be described in the card reader and replace algorithm and one-time password device. 可以提供卡与例如RSASecureID、 VASCO DigiPass 、 Secure Computing或者Activldentity 方案协同工作,或取而代之与OATH协同工作。 We can provide the card with, for example RSASecureID, VASCO DigiPass, Secure Computing or Activldentity work program, or instead work with OATH. 将描述一种产生针对第一密码方案的动态口令的集成电路,所述电路适合与针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备一起使用,所述电路包括:电源输入,用于向集成电路供电;接口,用于向集成电路发送数据和接收来自集成电路的数据;以及与存储器耦合的处理器,所述存储器存储处理器控制代码,所述处理器控制代码用于控制处理器在运行时,进行以下处理:根据第一密码方案产生动态口令,然后产生适合向所述设备输出的中间密文数据,使得由所述设备根据第二密码方案执行的处理导致所述设备根据第一密码方案产生原始动态口令。 An integrated circuit will be described for the dynamic password generated first cryptographic scheme of the circuit suitable for use with a second password for different programs designed device, said circuit comprising: a power supply input for supplying power to the integrated circuit ; interface for transmitting data to and receive data from the integrated circuit IC; and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory storing processor control code, the processor control code at runtime to control processor, the following process: generating a first cryptographic schemes based on dynamic password, and then generate an output to the device for intermediate ciphertext data, so that the processing performed by the device according to the second password generating program causing the apparatus according to the first password scheme original dynamic password. 将描述一种根据第一密码方案输出与动态口令相对应的伪密文数据的方法,所述数据适合向针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备输出,所述方法包括:根据第一密码方案产生动态口令,并然后通过所述设备根据第二密码方案执行处理的反处理来产生中间密文数据,并且输出所述中间密文数据,使得处理数据的所述设备根据第一密码方案产生原始动态口令。 Will describe a pseudo ciphertext data corresponding to the first cryptographic schemes based on output and dynamic password method, the data for the second password for different programs designed output device, the method comprising: the first password program to generate dynamic password, and then to produce intermediate ciphertext data processing by the device according to the anti-executed second cryptographic processing program, and the output of the intermediate ciphertext data, so that the apparatus for processing data according to the first password generating program original dynamic password. 根据本发明的一个方面,提供了一种产生与针对第一密码方案的口令相对应的中间密文数据的装置,所述装置适合与针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备一起使用,所述装置包括:用于与所述设备进行通信的通信接口;以及与存储器耦合的处理器,所述存储器存储处6理器控制代码,所述处理器控制代码用于控制处理器在运行时进行如下操作:根据第一密码方案产生口令;以及产生与所述口令相对应的中间密文数据,所述中间密文数据适合向所述设备输出,使得当所述设备根据第二密码方案处理所述中间密文数据时,所述设备产生'所述口令。 According to one aspect of the invention, there is provided a method of producing the corresponding intermediate ciphertext data for the password of the first cryptographic scheme, the apparatus for use with a second password for different programs designed equipment, the said apparatus comprising: means for communicating with the device interface for communicating; and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory stores at 6 processor control code, the processor control code for controlling the processor at runtime as follows: generating a password based on the first cipher programs; and generating a password corresponding intermediate ciphertext data, the intermediate ciphertext data for output to the device, such that when the device processing program according to a second password When the intermediate ciphertext data, the device generates' the password. 优选地,所述口令包括:动态口令或者通过在密文计算中包括来自二进制计数器或者时钟的比特来产生的口令,并且在使用计数器的情况下,每次增加所述计数器时产生口令。 Preferably, the password include: dynamic passwords or passwords by including bits from the binary counter or clock in the calculations to produce the ciphertext, and in the case of counter each time a password increases the counter. 有时第一密码方案的动态口令与第二密码方案的所述设备不兼容,并且产生动态口令的代码可以包括重复地产生动态口令直到找到与第二密码方案兼容的动态口令为止的代码。 Sometimes dynamic password first cryptographic scheme is incompatible with the apparatus of the second cryptographic schemes, and generate dynamic password generated code can include dynamic passcode repeatedly until you find the program compatible with a second password until the dynamic password. 该不兼容性可能由发生在与所述第二密码方案的所述设备不兼容的第一密码方案中的特定动态口令中的前导零(leading zeros)所引起。 This may be caused by an incompatibility occurs is not compatible with the devices of the second program of the first cipher password scheme specific dynamic password leading zeros (leading zeros). 备选地,该不兼容性可能由与第一密码方案的特定动态口令不兼容的所述设备自动产生的校验数位所引起。 Alternatively, the incompatibility may not be compatible with the specific dynamic password the first cryptographic scheme of the device automatically generated caused the check digit. 根据本发明的另一方面,提供了一种根据第一密码方案产生与密文相对应的中间密文数据的方法,所述数据适合在针对不同的第二密码方案而设计的设备上显示,所述方法包括:根据第一密码方案产生动态口令;以及产生与所述动态口令相对应的中间密文数据,所述中间密文数据适合向所述设备输出,使得当所述设备根据第二密码方案处理所述中间密文数据时,所述设备输出所述动态口令。 According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of generating ciphertext corresponding intermediate ciphertext data, said data for display on a second password for different programs and devices designed according to the first cryptographic schemes, the method comprising: generating a first cryptographic schemes based on dynamic password; and generating the dynamic password corresponding intermediate ciphertext data, the intermediate ciphertext data for output to the device, such that when the device according to the second When the password scheme to process the intermediate ciphertext data, the device outputs the dynamic password. 本发明还提供了处理器控制代码以例如在通用计算机系统或数字信号处理器(DSP)上,或者在专用集成电路上(例如智能卡)实现上述方法。 The present invention also provides the above method processor control code, for example, a general purpose computer system or a digital signal processor (DSP) on, or in application specific integrated circuits (such as smart cards) to achieve. 可以在诸如磁盘、CD或DVD-ROM、可编程存储器(如只读存储器(固件))等载体上、或者在诸如光或电信号载体等数据载体上提供所述代码。 It may be such as a diskette, CD or DVD-ROM, programmable memory (e.g., read only memory (Firmware)) and other carriers, or the code is provided on a carrier such as an optical or electrical signal carrier and other data. 实现本发明实施例的代码(和/或数据)可以包括传统编程语言(解释或编译)中的源、目标或可执行代码,如C或者汇编代码。 Implementation code (and / or data) may include a conventional programming languages embodiment of the present invention (interpreted or compiled) source, object or executable code, such as C or assembly code. 还可以例如在FPGA (现场可编程门阵列)上或者在ASIC (专用集成电路)中实现上述方法。 For example, or it may be the above method ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) in the FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) on. 从而所述代码还可以包括:用于设置或控制ASIC或FPGA的代码、或用于诸如Verilog (商标)、VHDL (超高速集成电路硬件描述语言等硬件描述语言的代码、或RTL代码或SystemC。典型地,使用诸如RTL (寄存器传送语言)等代码(或者使用较高级别的语言(比如C)来描述专用硬件。如本领域技术人员将理解的,可以在彼此通信的多个耦合组件中分布这种代码和/或数据。可以将本发明的上述方面和实施例的特征以任意排列进行结合。 附图说明现在将参照附图来详细地描述本发明的这些和其它方面的实施例,在附图中:图3示出了根据本发明的实施例的方法的流程图。 图4示出了根据本发明的实施例的设备的框图。具体实施方式我们将首先描述MasterCard芯片认证程序。 芯片和PIN卡'芯片和PIN'卡遵循形式上称作EMV的技术标准,类似于Europay、 Mastercard和Visa。在世界上很多国家中广泛釆用这种卡, 这是由于它们提供强大的安全特征以允许卡的发行者可以控制各种形式的欺诈行为。使用每个EMV卡中嵌入的芯片来授权交易。该授权是基于使用属于卡的密钥以及交易的细节所计算出来的密文。在发行过程期间将该密钥嵌入至芯片中,并且由发行银行安全地保存副本。该芯片还保持称作应用交易计数器(ATC)的计数器值,作为对重放性攻击(replay attack)的防御,在密文计算中包括该ATC并且会随着每一次交易而增加。最后,持卡人提供PIN,在允许计算密文之前,该芯片将该PIN与存储的参考值进行验证。当接收到交易时,发行者能够使用该卡的密钥的副本重计算该密文。由于没有其他人具有该密钥,有效的密文必然由该卡发起,并且持卡人所有。CAP概述特殊类型的交易是众所周知的'无卡(card not present)' (CNP) 交易。这些交易包括邮件订购、电话订购以及基于网页的电子商务交易。在这些情况中,发行银行仅基于可视的卡的细节(如卡号和过期时间)来授权支付。由于这些值实质上是静态的并且容易复制,因此CNP交易有吸引力的欺诈目标。MasterCard以及在卡工业中的一些其他组织已经开发出允许芯片和PIN卡的安全性在CNP场景中得到补充支持的标准。该方案被称作芯片认证程序(CAP)。 CAP要求向每一个持卡人发行小型手持卡读取器。通过将他们的卡插入他们的读取器,并且输入他们的PIN,该持卡人可以基于卡上的密钥和ATC来产生OTP。 So that the code can also include: means for setting or controlling an ASIC or FPGA code, or for applications such as Verilog (trademark), VHDL (ultra high speed integrated circuit hardware description language hardware description language code, or RTL code or SystemC. Typically, such as RTL (Register Transfer Language) or the like codes (or use a higher level language (such as C) described dedicated hardware. As those skilled in the art will appreciate, may be distributed in a plurality of coupled components in communication with one another This code and / or data may be above aspects and features of the present invention embodiments to be combined in any order. Brief description will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings of the present invention to these embodiments and other aspects of the In the drawings: Figure 3 shows a flowchart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention, Figure 4 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of the apparatus of the present invention, specific embodiments will be described first MasterCard chip authentication program chips. and PIN cards 'chip and PIN' cards follow formal technical standard known as EMV, similar Europay, Mastercard and Visa. In many countries of the world wide preclude the use of such a card, which is because they provide strong security features to allows the card issuer can control various forms of fraud using every EMV chip embedded in the card to authorize the transaction. This authorization is based on the use of keys belonging to the card and transaction details of the calculated cipher text in issue During the process of embedding the key to the chip, and save a copy of security by the issuing bank. The chip also hold counter value is referred to Application Transaction Counter (ATC) as against replay attacks (replay attack) defense, in ciphertext included in the calculation of the ATC and will increase with every transaction. Finally, the cardholders PIN, before allowing the calculation of the ciphertext, the reference value of the chip with the stored PIN validation. Upon receipt of the transaction a copy of the issuer of the card can be used to calculate the weight of key ciphertext. Since no one else has the key, effective ciphertext inevitably initiated by the card, and cardholders all .CAP overview of a particular type of transaction is the well-known 'non-card (card not present)' (CNP) transactions. These transactions include mail order, telephone order and web-based e-commerce transactions. In these cases, the issuing bank card details only visible based (such as the card number and expiration date) to authorize the payment. Since these values are essentially static and easy to copy, so CNP transaction attractive target .MasterCard fraud and other organizations in the card industry has developed to allow chip and PIN card security sex scene get in CNP standard for added support. The program is called the chip authentication program (CAP). CAP require the issue of small hand-held card reader to each cardholder by their card into their reader and enter their PIN, the cardholder may be based on the key and ATC card to generate OTP. 发行者可以基于相同的输入数据和密钥通过重计算密文来验证该OTP。 The issuer may be based on the same input data and key ciphertext to verify that the OTP by recalculation. 注意,卡读取器对于持卡人来说不是私人的,并且不执行重要的安全操作。 Note that the card reader is not private for cardholders, and does not perform important security operations. EMV CAP OTP计算设计芯片和PIN芯片卡用于在现场销售支付终端(point-of-sale payment terminals)和ATM上使用,不是特别用于一次性口令产生。 EMV CAP OTP computing chip and PIN chip cards designed for the field sales payment terminals (point-of-sale payment terminals) and ATM use, not particularly for the one-time password generation. CAP读取器在用卡进行的交易中模拟EMV支付终端,然后卡读取器负责获得由卡产生的支付密文并且将它转换成一次性口令。 CAP reader EMV payment terminal simulation transaction with the card, then the card reader is responsible for obtaining payment from the card generated ciphertext and convert it to a one-time password. 在[芯片认证程序功能结构体系]中详细指定了由CAP读取器执行的处理,但是总之包括下列阶段:1、 收集密文输入数据2、 提取OTP数据3、 十进制换算下面更详细地解释每个步骤。 Details of the processing performed by the designated reader in CAP [Chip Authentication Program features architecture], but in short, consists of the following stages: 1. Collecting ciphertext input data 2, the data extracted OTP 3 per metric conversion is explained below in more detail steps. 收集密文输入数据对密文计算过程的两个主要输入是卡密钥和ATC。 Collect the ciphertext input data for both primary input ciphertext calculation process is card key and ATC. 然而,根据EMV,存在用作对密文验证的输入的许多其它参数。 However, according to EMV, the ciphertext is used to verify the presence of many other parameters entered. 这些对于卡支付来说是特定的,并且不具有其它类型令牌的等同物。 These are specific for payment cards, it does not have other types of tokens and equivalents thereof. 为了再产生密文,对于这些参数来说验证服务器必须使用相同的值。 In order to produce the ciphertext again, for these parameters for the authentication server must use the same values. 在典型的CAP情况下,大多数的这些参数在发行卡时是固定值, 或者可以由验证服务器来预测。 In a typical CAP, most of these parameters when issuing the card is a fixed value, or may be predicted by the authentication server. 然而,根据卡的使用程度,在卡的生命周期期间少数参数可以改变。 However, according to the degree of use of the card, the card during the life cycle of a small number of parameters can be changed. 例如,这包括限制卡将授权脱机的交易的次数或量的参数。 For example, these include restrictions on the number or amount of the card will authorize transactions offline parameters. 由于验证服务器不能预测这些值,必须将这些参数嵌入在一次性口令本身中以将它们从卡发送至服务器。 Since the authentication server can not predict these values, these parameters must be embedded in the one-time password itself to send them from the card to the server. 提取OTP数据为了尽可能地用户友好,产生的一次性口令应当尽可能短,同时维护合理的安全级别。 OTP data in order to extract as much as possible user-friendly, one-time password generated should be as short as possible, while maintaining a reasonable level of security. 由于与密文本身组合的EMV密文输入数据太大以致于不能完整地包括在一次性口令中,因此需要对它进行压縮。 Because of EMV ciphertext input data combined with the ciphertext itself too large to be included in the one-time password intact, so it needs to be compressed. 由卡上的CAP特定字段来定义该压縮处理,被称作发行者专有位图(IPB),但是处理本身由卡读取器来执行。 CAP is defined by a specific field on the card that the compression process, known as issuer Proprietary Bitmap (IPB), but the process itself is performed by the card reader. IPB定义一次性口令中将使用的来自ATC、密文和其它EMV输入数据中的那些比特,丢弃其它比特。 IPB define which bits from the ATC, the ciphertext, and other EMV input data used in the one-time password, discard the other bits. 典型地,包括少数ATC比特以协助服务器和卡之间的计数器值的同步,以及包括至少16比特的密文,并且最终包括那些不能由服务器预测的附加密文输入。 Typically, including minority ATC bit counter value to assist the server and synchronization between the card and comprising at least 16 bits of the ciphertext, and eventually including those attached to the encrypted input can not be predicted by the server. 在一些情况下,当卡应用仅用于CAP而不用于支付时,可以由服务器预测所有附加输入,因此OTP仅基于ATC和密文。 In some cases, when the card application and not only for the CAP for the payment, you can predict any additional input from the server, so OTP based only on ATC and ciphertext. 十进制换算最终,对来自压缩处理的二进制输出进行十进制换算以在读取器屏幕上向用户显示。 Decimal conversion Ultimately, the binary output from the compression process decimal conversion to display to the user on the screen reader. 许多十进制换算方案是可能的,但是CAP基于将截断处理输出简单地解释为单一整数的二进制表示来定义单一方案, 忽略前导零,从而OTP的最终长度可以改变。 Many decimal conversion solution is possible, but will cut treatment based CAP output simply interpreted as a single integer binary representation define a single program, ignoring leading zeros, so the final length OTP can be changed. 接着,描述开放认证标准(OATH)。 Next, open authentication standards (OATH). 概述针对开放认证(OATH)的倡议是寻求促进基于令牌的认证市场的标准化的工业协调机构。 Overview for Open Authentication (OATH) initiative is seeking to promote market-based authentication token standardization of industrial coordination mechanism. OATH已经出版描述一般认证框架的景象的'参考体系结构,,并且正在促进针对该系统内各个接口和组件的许多标准。 OATH has published a general authentication framework described the scene of the 'reference architecture ,, and is contributing to a number of criteria for the various interfaces within the system and components. 本申请最感兴趣的'HOTP:基于HMAC的一次性口令算法',由正TF将其标准化为RFC4226 [HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm, http:〃www. ietf.org/rfc/rfc4226.txt, December 2005]。 This application is most interested in 'HOTP: HMAC-based one-time password algorithm' by positive TF be standardized as RFC4226 [HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm, http:. 〃www ietf.org/rfc/ rfc4226.txt, December 2005]. HOTP计算和CAP —样,HOTP算法基于底层密码基元(underlying cryptographic primitive),在本情况下,是HMAC-SHA1。 HOTP computing and CAP - like, HOTP algorithm based on the underlying code base element (underlying cryptographic primitive), in this case, is HMAC-SHA1. 在HOTP中定义的该算法的输入是令牌密钥和计数器-非常类似于CAP使用的EMV密文计算的基本输入。 Enter HOTP in the definition of the algorithm is the token key and counter - very similar to the basic input EMV CAP ciphertext using calculations. HOTP计算过程如下:1、 HMAC计算,基于令牌密钥和计数器。 HOTP calculated as follows: 1, HMAC calculation, based on the token key and counters. 然后该计数器自动递增。 Then, the counter is automatically incremented. 2、 结果的'动态截断'给出31比特值。 2, the result of 'dynamic cut-off' gives 31-bit value. 3、 对截断值进行十进制换算,以给出OTP。 3, a cutoff decimal conversion to give OTP. 同时与CAP相比,OTP计算是清楚的,重要的是注意到每一个阶段的细节是完全不同的。 At the same time, compared with the CAP, OTP calculation is clear, it is important to note that the details of each stage is completely different. 下面描述每个步骤并且与它的CAP等同物进行对比。 Each step is described below and equivalents thereof CAP and its comparison. HMAC计算在[HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC2104, http:〃www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt, February 1997]中指定了使用的画AC计算,使用SHAl作为底层散列算法[US Secure Hash Algorithm l(SHAl), RFC3174, http:〃www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3174.txt, September 2001]。 HMAC calculation in [HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC2104, http: 〃www.ietf.org / rfc / rfc2104.txt, February 1997] AC use specified painting calculations using SHAl as the underlying hash algorithm [US Secure Hash Algorithm l (SHAl), RFC3174, http: 〃www.ietf.org / rfc / rfc3174.txt, September 2001]. HMAC-SHA1要求的密钥典型地是20字节长,并且[HOTP]指定使用8字节计数器作为唯一的HMAC输入数据。 HMAC-SHA1 key requirement is typically 20 bytes long, and [HOTP] Specifies an 8-byte counter HMAC as the only input data. 相比于CAP使用的8字节密文,该结果是20字节二进制值。 Compared to the 8-byte ciphertext CAP used, the result is a 20-byte binary value. 在两个情况下,主要目标在于,从产生的OTP中恢复与密钥有关的信息应当是不可行的。 In both cases, the main objective is to recover from OTP generated key-related information should be feasible. 这就是在两个情况中使用某种类型的密码算法的原因。 This is the reason to use some type of cryptographic algorithms in both cases. 动态截断由[HOTP]定义的截断处理将20字节HMAC输出减少到31比特串。 Dynamic cut off by the [HOTP] defined truncation process will be reduced by 20 byte HMAC output to 31-bit string. 首先,考虑HMAC输出的最后字节的最后4个比特作为范围0至15ii中的整数n。 First, consider the last four bits of the last byte HMAC output as a range of 0 to the 15ii integer n. 然后,使用字节n、 n+l.....n+3作为截断输出(忽略前导比特)。 Then, using byte n, n + l ..... n + 3 as the cut-off output (ignoring leading bits). 与CAP使用的压縮方案的不同表示如下:* CAP IPB始终从EMV密文的相同位置中选择比特以在OTP中使用。 Unlike CAP compression scheme used is expressed as follows: * CAP IPB always select bits from the same position EMV ciphertext to use in the OTP. 在OATH中,由HMAC输出的最后4个比特来确定的比特的位置是变化的,因此使用术语'动态的'。 In OATH, the position of the last four bits of bits from the HMAC output is varied to determine, and therefore the term 'dynamic'. * [HOTP]当前版本不提供用于将计数器同步信息嵌入至产生的OTP中的机制,相反,CAPIPB可以指定用于包括在OTP中的任意数量的ATC比特。 * [HOTP] The current version does not provide for the counter synchronization information is embedded to the OTP generated by the mechanism, on the contrary, CAPIPB can specify include any number of bits in the OTP of the ATC. * CAP IPB可以指定用于包括在OTP中的许多其它EMV特定数据元素。 * CAP IPB OTP can be specified to be included in many other EMV specific data elements. 对于HOTP来说没有相关的这种便利。 No such facilities for HOTP is. 十进制换算HOTP十进制换算包括:将来自动态截断处理的31比特输出解释为整数的二进制表示,然后通过该整数10d取模来减少,其中d是产生的OTP中所期望的数字的数目。 Decimal conversion HOTP decimal conversion include: from the dynamic truncation processing, 31-bit output interpreted as a binary integer representation, then the integers modulo to reduce 10d, where d is the number of OTP generated the desired number. 与CAP对比,如果该结果少于d个数字, 则插入前导零以给出完整的OTP长度d。 Compared with the CAP, if the result is less than d digits, insert leading zeros to give a complete OTP length d. 还注意到该十进制换算处理实际上执行了附加的截断,在某种意义上,输出具有比输入少的信息内容。 Also notes the decimal conversion process actually performs additional truncated in the sense that output with less than the input of information content. 在CAP中,十进制换算期间没有丢失任何信息。 In the CAP, the decimal conversion period does not lose any information. 现在将描述使用CAP读取器来产生OATH OTPs。 We will now be described using the CAP reader to produce OATH OTPs. 图3示出了实现上述的方法的示例。 Figure 3 shows an example of realization of the method described above. 描述一种通过生产在标准、未修改CPA读取器内使用的特定OATH芯片卡,使用该读取器产生OATH兼容OTP的手段。 Describes a chip card production through specific OATH within the standard, unmodified CPA reader uses, the use of the reader produce OATH-compliant OTP means. 这允许希望部署OATH的组织部署低成本芯片卡而不是高成本令牌,开发所部署的CAP卡读取器基础结构来使用这些芯片卡以及现有的、现成的OATH验证服务器。 This allows the organization wants to deploy OATH deployment of low-cost chip card instead of the high cost of tokens, CAP card reader deployed infrastructure development to use these chip cards as well as existing, ready-OATH authentication server. 明显地,OATH芯片卡再产生EMV卡接口,或者由CAP读取器所使用的至少部分EMV接口。 Obviously, OATH produce EMV chip card and then the card interface, or at least partially by the EMV CAP reader interfaces used. 否则,读取器将拒绝该卡。 Otherwise, the reader will reject the card. 最关键的卡功能呼叫是用于产生密文本身的GENERATE一AC呼叫。 The key card function call is used to generate a GENERATE AC call ciphertext itself. 注意到,简单地将卡中该功能的实现替换为产生在OATH OTP的计算中使用的HOTP散列值的功能是不够的散列。 Notes that simply implement the feature card replaces the function HOTP generate a hash value used in the calculation of OATH OTP hash is not enough. 这是由于对密文进行压縮和十进制换算以给出OTP的过程是在读取器中执行的,并且在CAP和OATH之间是完全不同的。 This is the process of compression due to the ciphertext and decimal conversion to give the OTP is performed in the reader, and between the CAP and OATH are completely different. 因此OATH芯片卡实现下述操作序列:K基于卡密钥和计数器,产生HOTP散列值(301),并且递增计数器(302)。 So OATH chip cards for the following sequences: K-based card keys and counters produce HOTP hash value (301), and the counter is incremented (302). 2、 十进制换算对散列值(303)进行截断并十进制换算以产生OTP 本身。 2, the decimal conversion of the hash value (303) is truncated and the decimal conversion to produce the OTP itself. 3、 使用由CAP读取器采用的十进制换算处理的反处理,将该OTP 转化回二进制格式(304)。 3, used by the CAP reader treatment using anti-decimal conversion process, the OTP conversion back to binary format (304). 4、 以由CAP读取器采用的压縮处理的反处理的方式填充产生的二进制数据(305)(如卡上IPB值所定义的)。 4, in a compressed manner reversal processing by the CAP processing using the reader filled generating binary data (305) (e.g. IPB defined value on the card). 我们将该结果称作中间密文。 The results we called intermediate ciphertext. 该OATH芯片卡将该中间密文传递给CAP读取器,好像它是正常EMV密文一样。 The OATH chip card is passed to the middle of the ciphertext CAP reader, if it is the same as normal EMV ciphertext. 然后CAP读取器将对该数据进行压縮和十进制换算,有效地将上述步骤4和3反转,如在上述步骤2处由OATH卡所计算的一样,从而在读取器屏幕上显示的最终结果将是OATH OTP。 CAP will then read the data compression and decimal conversion, effectively reversing the above steps 4 and 3, the same as calculated by the OATH card in step 2, resulting in the reader screen The end result will be the OATH OTP. 图4示出了用于与CAP读取器兼容的OATH芯片卡的设备的示例的框图。 Figure 4 shows a block diagram of an example for compatibility with CAP OATH chip card reader devices. 特殊情况出现许多特殊情况,考虑如下。 Special situation many special cases, consider the following. 前导零在十进制换算期间,CAP和HOTP都可能导致以'0'开头的十进制结果。 In the period leading zero decimal conversion, CAP, and HOTP decimal results may lead to '0' at the beginning. CAP指定应当移除这样的前导零(因此产生的OTP在长度上可以改变),而HOTP指定应当在OTP中包括这样的前导零(因此具有固定长度)。 CAP specify such leading zeros should be removed (OTP thus generated may vary in length), but should include a specified HOTP leading zeros in the OTP (and therefore has a fixed length). 注意到,在CAP中,包括前导零的截断在内的十进制换算处理发生在读取器中。 Noting, in CAP, including leading zeros truncated including decimal conversion process occurs in the reader. 因此,不管芯片卡中使用的方法如何,不可能强制CAP 读取器显示包括前导零在内的HOTP OTP。 Therefore, regardless of the method used in the chip card, it is impossible to force CAP reader display, including leading zeros of HOTP OTP. 我们提出该问题的三种可能解决方案:1、第一种可能的解决方案是简单的,但是不那么令人满意:当示的OTP前面插入附加的零。 We raised the issue of three possible solutions: 1, one possible solution is simple, but not so satisfying: the front when shown the OTP insert additional zero. 2、 第二种可能是在验证0TP之前让认证应用或者验证服务器自动插入任何丢失的前导零。 2, the second possibility is validated before 0TP make certification application or authentication server automatically insert any missing leading zeros. 这给出了更好的用户体验,但是丧失了实现OATH的原始目标:使用CAP读取器而不对验证基础设施作任何改变。 This gives a better user experience, but lost the realization OATH original goal: to use CAP reader to verify the infrastructure without any changes. 3、 第三种方法是针对OATH芯片卡识别这种情况,并且当它们发生时,自动丢弃OTP (在上述步骤2),并且基于递增的计数器值产生新的OTP。 3. The third method is for OATH chip card recognizes this situation, and when they occur, automatically discarded OTP (in step 2), and the value of creating new OTP-based counter that is incremented. 由于前导零实际上是随机的,口令的长序列全部以零开头是非常不可能的。 Because leading zeros are actually random password length sequence all leading zeros is highly unlikely. 此外,由于在任何情况下为了避免同步问题,验证服务器接受一定范围内的计数器值,忽略临时口令,这是由于其以零开头不会引起验证失败,并且用户注意不到它。 In addition, since in any case in order to avoid synchronization problems, verify that the server accepts the counter value within a certain range, ignoring the temporary password, which is due to its leading zeros do not cause validation fails, and the user noticing it. 最后,尽管该技术确实将可能的HOTP输出的数目减少大约10。 Finally, although the technology does the number of possible HOTP output is reduced by approximately 10. /。 /. ,但是6个数字的最小长度给出至少一百万种可能的OTP,所以提供的整体安全性依然是完全可接受的。 , But the minimum length of six numbers given at least one million kinds of possible OTP, so the overall security provider is still perfectly acceptable. 计数器同步数字目前HOTP不指定在OTP中包括计数器同步数字的任何手段,而CAP提供使用卡中嵌入的IPB来配置的灵活方案。 Counter synchronous digital HOTP not currently specify any means including synchronous digital counter in OTP, whereas CAP provides a flexible scheme using embedded IPB card to configure. 通过简单地用适当的IPB值来抑制CAP同步数字,可以获得兼容性。 By simply using the appropriate values to suppress the CAP IPB synchronous digital, you can get compatibility. 考虑HOTP的未来版本可以包括在OTP中包括计数器同步信息的手段的可能性。 HOTP consider future versions may include the possibility of including the means for counter synchronization information in the OTP. 所选算法极有可能与CAP所使用的算法不兼容,这是由于在HOTP中不存在与CAPIPB的相似物。 The selected algorithm is likely to be incompatible with the algorithm used by the CAP, which is due to the absence of similar composition and CAPIPB HOTP in. 我们注意到通过继续使用IPB来抑制CAP同步信息并且在中间密文中将HOTP同步数据以及其他OTP从卡传递至读取器,依然可以获得兼容性。 We note that the synchronization information is suppressed by continued use of CAP and in the middle of the ciphertext IPB will HOTP synchronize data and other OTP transfer from the card to the reader, you can still get compatibility. 现在考虑CAP读取器包括强制校验数位或者其它同步数据、但HOTP不包括这些的情况。 Now consider the CAP reader includes a mandatory check digit or other synchronization data, but HOTP not include these situations. 在这种情况下,读取器将接收来自卡的密文,并且另外还将接收从中可以提取出同步数据的ATC值,将上述二者组合起来以给出显示的OTP。 In this case, the reader receives the ciphertext from the card, and will also be extracted from the received sync data ATC value, combine to give the OTP displayed above both. 在这种情况下,依靠附加的卡逻辑依然可以保持兼容性。 In this case, rely on the additional card logic can still maintain compatibility. 卡应当计算HOTPOTP,并且将它分成两部分-读取器将从中间密文中提取出的部分以及读取器将从ATC中提取出的部分。 Cards should be calculated HOTPOTP, and divide it into two parts - the reader from the intermediate ciphertext extracted portion and a reader from ATC extracted part. 然后卡向读取器提供中间密文和备选ATC,知道读取器将把这些组合起来以重构原始OTP。 Then the card to the reader to provide an intermediate ciphertext and alternative ATC, the reader will know these combined to reconstruct the original OTP. 关键的观察结论是,读取器不知道备选ATC数器值是不同。 Key observations concluded that the reader does not know the number of options for ATC values are different. 最后,注意到,在HOTP和CAP实现同步方案的情况下,不同地,可以通过上述技术的组合来进行处理。 Finally, it is noted in the case of CAP HOTP and synchronization program differently, it can be treated by a combination of the above techniques. 校验数位校验数位有时用于检测数据中的错误,特别是,由人类抄写所引入的错误。 Check digit check digit is sometimes used to detect errors in the data, especially from the human transcription errors introduced. 目前,CAP或HOTP都不包括用于创建的OTP的校验数位机制,但是在将来可能会改变。 Currently, CAP or HOTP not include a check digit mechanism for the creation of OTP, but it may change in the future. 如果要求标准CAP读取器支持HOTP校验数位,这可以通过简单地将校验数位嵌入到传递给卡读取器的中间密文中,类似于上述用于传递上述同步数据的技术。 If the required standard CAP readers support HOTP check digit, which can be simply embedded in the check digit is passed to the card reader in the middle of the ciphertext, similar to the above for transferring these technologies to synchronize data. 备选地,假定CAP读取器将在OTP中自动包括校验数位,而HOTP 没有指定该校验数位。 Alternatively, assuming that CAP reader will automatically include the check digit in the OTP, but HOTP not specified check digit. 这将产生更显著的问题,这是由于卡不具有抑制这种校验数位的手段。 This will produce a more significant problem, which is due to inhibition of this card does not have a check digit means. 唯一的解决方案是修改应用或验证基础设施以接受具有附加CAP校验数位的HOTP OTP,或者使定制卡重复产生OTP直到(靠运气)找到具有正确检查数字的OTP为止,并且计算适当的中间密文(由于将由读取器来添加校验数位,因此该中间密文不包括校验数位)。 The only solution is to modify the application or verification infrastructure to accept HOTP OTP CAP have additional check digit, or make customized cards OTP generated repeatedly until (luck) to find the OTP has the correct check digit is reached, and calculate the appropriate intermediate density Wen (due by the reader to add a check digit, so the middle of the ciphertext does not include check digit). 后一种方法将极大地增加卡计算时间,这是由于在找到合适的值之前必须计算大量的OTP。 The latter approach would greatly increase the card computing time, which is due before finding a suitable value must be calculated a lot of OTP. 卡计数器将比平常的更快速递增,并且因此可能需要调整验证服务器处的容限。 Card counter is incremented more quickly than usual, and therefore may need to adjust the margin at the authentication server. 尽管所需的卡计数器中的增加是不可预测的,只要由卡读取器插入的纠错信息的数量不太大,依然可能找到提供可接受的安全性和可靠性的系统参数(OTP长度、验证服务器容限)的恰当平衡。 Although the desired increase in the card counter is unpredictable, as long as the number of the inserted card reader error correction information is not too large, it may still be found to provide an acceptable safety and reliability of the system parameters (OTP length, Authentication Server tolerance) is the right balance. 注意到,该最后技术是用于处理基于HOTP的OTP中的前导零的技术的重复。 Noting that the last technique is used to handle duplicate HOTP of OTP-based leading zeros technologies. 一般地,如果无论出于何种原因HOTP OTP与卡读取器不兼容(在上述示例中,由于前导零或者校验数位),对于卡而言始终有可能简单地递增卡计数器直到找到兼容的OTP为止。 Generally, if for whatever reason HOTP OTP is not compatible with card reader (in the above example, since the leading zeros or check digit), the card is concerned it is always possible to simply increment the counter until you find a compatible card OTP so far. 实际中该技术的可应用性依赖于不兼容OTP的数量和分布以及验证服务器的参数。 Practical applicability of this technique depends on the number and distribution parameters OTP authentication server and incompatible. 己经描述了使用特定卡来实现OATH兼容性的CAP卡读取器的特定情况,以及关于计数器同步和校验数位的备选。 It has been described using specific cards to achieve OATH compatibility CAP Card Reader particular case, and options on the counter synchronization and check digit. 下面将列出一些其它可能的应用。 Below are listed some other possible applications. 15可以提供卡与读取器一起使用,所述读取器基于用户接口分离的密码引擎为基础(不仅仅是CAP),被设计用于任何基于OTP的系统。 15 may be provided for use with the card with the reader, the reader based on a user interface based on the separation of the cryptographic engine (not just CAP), it is designed for use in any of the OTP-based system.

然而,CAP是最有可能在接下来几年中实现大量部署的系统。 However, CAP is most likely to achieve mass deployment of the system in the next few years. 可以提供卡在任意OTP系统中使用,不仅仅是OATH。 We can provide the card used in the system at any OTP, just OATH. 示例包括RSA SecureID、 VASCO DigiPass、 Secure Computing禾口ActivIdentity。 Examples include RSA SecureID, VASCO DigiPass, Secure Computing Hekou ActivIdentity. 可以提供卡用于挑战-应答认证。 We can provide cards for challenge - response authentication. 可以提供卡用于'短签名',在该短签名中令牌基于用户输入的消息数据来产生OTP (同时依然包括计数器值,以及不包括计数器值)。 We can provide cards for 'short signature' signature token in the short message based data input by the user to generate OTP (while still including the counter value, and does not include the counter value). 可能的应用包括由移动电话代替CAP读取器(即具有卡读取器的移动电话,该卡读取器具有足够的CAP兼容性以与卡协同工作)。 Possible applications include mobile phones instead of the CAP by the reader (ie, having a mobile phone card reader, the card reader has sufficient CAP compatibility to work with the card). 其它应用包括将OATH卡插入与用户PC连接的卡读取器中。 Other applications include the OATH card into the user's PC connected card reader. 其它应用包括通过电话口头地对OTP进行通信,而不是通过因特网,或者通过邮件、传真、或者通过内部网络。 Other applications include OTP communicate verbally on the phone, rather than via the Internet or by mail, fax, or via the internal network.

毫无疑问,本领域技术人员将想到许多其它有效备选。 Undoubtedly, those skilled in the art will envision many other effective alternatives. 将理解本发明并不限于所述实施例并且本发明包含对于本领域技术人员显而易见的、并且落在所附权利要求的精神和范围内的修改。 It will be understood that the invention is not limited to the embodiments and the present invention encompasses apparent to the skilled person, and modifications falling within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

Referenced by
Citing PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitle
CN104539430A *30 Dec 201422 Apr 2015飞天诚信科技股份有限公司Card-based dynamic password generating method and device
Classifications
International ClassificationG06F21/34, G06Q20/34, G06Q20/40
Cooperative ClassificationG07C9/00031, G07F7/1008, G06Q20/4014, G06F21/34, G06Q20/341
European ClassificationG06F21/34, G06Q20/4014, G06Q20/341, G07C9/00B6, G07F7/10D
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