CA2908395A1 - Method and device to embed watermark in uncompressed video data - Google Patents
Method and device to embed watermark in uncompressed video dataInfo
- Publication number
- CA2908395A1 CA2908395A1 CA2908395A CA2908395A CA2908395A1 CA 2908395 A1 CA2908395 A1 CA 2908395A1 CA 2908395 A CA2908395 A CA 2908395A CA 2908395 A CA2908395 A CA 2908395A CA 2908395 A1 CA2908395 A1 CA 2908395A1
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- watermark
- content
- secure
- cas
- activation module
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
- H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
- H04N21/8358—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving watermark
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
- G06T1/00—General purpose image data processing
- G06T1/0021—Image watermarking
- G06T1/0092—Payload characteristic determination in a watermarking scheme, e.g. number of bits to be embedded
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/44—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs
- H04N21/4405—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs involving video stream decryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/60—Network structure or processes for video distribution between server and client or between remote clients; Control signalling between clients, server and network components; Transmission of management data between server and client, e.g. sending from server to client commands for recording incoming content stream; Communication details between server and client
- H04N21/63—Control signaling related to video distribution between client, server and network components; Network processes for video distribution between server and clients or between remote clients, e.g. transmitting basic layer and enhancement layers over different transmission paths, setting up a peer-to-peer communication via Internet between remote STB's; Communication protocols; Addressing
- H04N21/633—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client
- H04N21/6332—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client
- H04N21/6334—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key
- H04N21/63345—Control signals issued by server directed to the network components or client directed to client for authorisation, e.g. by transmitting a key by transmitting keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/80—Generation or processing of content or additional data by content creator independently of the distribution process; Content per se
- H04N21/83—Generation or processing of protective or descriptive data associated with content; Content structuring
- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
- H04N21/8355—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates involving usage data, e.g. number of copies or viewings allowed
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
- G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
- G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
- G06T2201/0064—Image watermarking for copy protection or copy management, e.g. CGMS, copy only once, one-time copy
Abstract
The aim of the present invention is to enforce the watermarking on a content received by a client device, in particular to uncompressed video content. The present invention concerns a method to watermark an uncompressed content received at a client device in a compressed form and encrypted by at least one content key (CW), said content key (CW) as well as watermark instruction forming CAS data, said CAS Data being encrypted by a transmission key and comprising at least one signature to authenticate the CAS Data, said client device comprising A Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of the CAS Data, a Descrambler (DSC) having an input to receive the encrypted compressed content and an output to produce an compressed content, a decoder to convert the compressed content into uncompressed content, a Watermark inserter (201) connected to the output of the Decoder, a Secure Activation module (202) connected with the Watermark inserter (201), a Secure Element (SE 200) connected with the Watermark inserter (201) and the Secure Activation module (202), said method comprising the following steps : - receiving the CAS Data, - decrypting by the Conditional Access Module (CAS) the CAS Data with the transmission key, - verifying the signature of the CAS Data, and if the signature is valid, - transferring the content key (CW) to the descrambler (103) and the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202), - transferring the watermark instruction and the unique identifier to the Watermark inserter (201), - enabling or disabling watermarking by the Watermark inserter (201), the uncompressed content received from the Decoder by watermarking data initialized by the unique identifier.
Description
METHOD AND DEVICE TO EMBED WATERMARK IN UNCOMPRESSED VIDEO DATA
Background Art Using watermarking solution on the un-compressed domain is elegant as the watermarking is done standalone in the client device, and as done in the un-compressed domain, it generally offers the best watermark insertion's capability and better invisibility.
But working after the decoder (for un-compressed watermarking) offers no interaction with the security elements which are linked to the descrambling of the data, thus occurring before the decoder.
The document US2010/128871 describes a solution in which a secondary stream is generated comprising the data allowing to reconstruct the main stream and at the same time to marl the reconstructed stream. As a consequence, the same stream contains the scrambling data and the watermarking data. At the reception, this stream is processed as one set of data to be replaced in the modified stream.
The document EP 2 391 125 describes a solution to allow an individual marking (at the reception device) based on a stream common to all devices. The control object contains the original value, an alternate value and a location. The security unit determines a mathematical operation to be applied on the alternate value to retrieve the original value. The mathematical operation is changed according to an internal parameter of the reception device so that the mathematical operation will be unique per device, allowing to track this device if the stream of descrambling data is analyzed.
Brief description of the invention In the proposed solutions, the same content object comprises the key to descramble the main content and the marking data. This is only suitable when the same element is in charge of both operations and needs a particular descrambler module able to execute both operations.
The aim of the present invention is to enforce the watermarking on a content received by a client device, in particular when the element in charge of the descrambling is independent of the element in charge of the watermarking.
The present invention concerns a method to watermark an uncompressed content received at a client device in a compressed form and encrypted by at least one content key (CW), said content key (CW) as well as watermark instruction forming CAS data, said CAS Data being encrypted by a transmission key and comprising at least one signature to authenticate the CAS
Data, said client device comprising:
- A Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of the CAS Data,
Background Art Using watermarking solution on the un-compressed domain is elegant as the watermarking is done standalone in the client device, and as done in the un-compressed domain, it generally offers the best watermark insertion's capability and better invisibility.
But working after the decoder (for un-compressed watermarking) offers no interaction with the security elements which are linked to the descrambling of the data, thus occurring before the decoder.
The document US2010/128871 describes a solution in which a secondary stream is generated comprising the data allowing to reconstruct the main stream and at the same time to marl the reconstructed stream. As a consequence, the same stream contains the scrambling data and the watermarking data. At the reception, this stream is processed as one set of data to be replaced in the modified stream.
The document EP 2 391 125 describes a solution to allow an individual marking (at the reception device) based on a stream common to all devices. The control object contains the original value, an alternate value and a location. The security unit determines a mathematical operation to be applied on the alternate value to retrieve the original value. The mathematical operation is changed according to an internal parameter of the reception device so that the mathematical operation will be unique per device, allowing to track this device if the stream of descrambling data is analyzed.
Brief description of the invention In the proposed solutions, the same content object comprises the key to descramble the main content and the marking data. This is only suitable when the same element is in charge of both operations and needs a particular descrambler module able to execute both operations.
The aim of the present invention is to enforce the watermarking on a content received by a client device, in particular when the element in charge of the descrambling is independent of the element in charge of the watermarking.
The present invention concerns a method to watermark an uncompressed content received at a client device in a compressed form and encrypted by at least one content key (CW), said content key (CW) as well as watermark instruction forming CAS data, said CAS Data being encrypted by a transmission key and comprising at least one signature to authenticate the CAS
Data, said client device comprising:
- A Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of the CAS Data,
2 - a Descrambler (DSC) having an input to receive the encrypted compressed content and an output to produce an compressed content, - a decoder to convert the compressed content into uncompressed content, - a Watermark inserter (201) connected to the output of the Decoder, - a Secure Activation module (202) connected with the Watermark inserter (201), - a Secure Element (SE 200) connected with the Watermark inserter (201) and the Secure Activation module (202), said method comprising the following steps :
- receiving the CAS Data, - decrypting by the Conditional Access Module (CAS) the CAS Data with the transmission key, - verifying the signature of the CAS Data, and if the signature is valid, - transferring the content key (CW) to the descrambler (103) and the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202), - transferring the watermark instruction and the unique identifier to the Watermark inserter (201), - enabling or disabling watermarking by the Watermark inserter (201), the uncompressed content received from the Decoder by watermarking data initialized by the unique identifier.
Brief description of the figures The present invention will be better understood thanks to the attached figures in which:
- Figure 1 illustrates a Watermarking on Un-Compressed Content just after the Video Decoder, - Figure 2 illustrates a Watermarking on Un-compressed Content into the HDMI, - Figure3 illustrates an exchange of messages between the SE and the SA, - Figure 4 illustrates an alternate embodiment of the exchange of messages between the SE and the SA.
Detailed description Conditional access data comprises a content (video or audio data or combination thereof) encrypted by one or a plurality of content keys, and comprises CAS data, i.e. data allowing to decrypt the encrypted content. The CAS data also comprises conditional access conditions associated with the content describing the condition to be met by the decoder to decrypt the content. The conditional
- receiving the CAS Data, - decrypting by the Conditional Access Module (CAS) the CAS Data with the transmission key, - verifying the signature of the CAS Data, and if the signature is valid, - transferring the content key (CW) to the descrambler (103) and the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202), - transferring the watermark instruction and the unique identifier to the Watermark inserter (201), - enabling or disabling watermarking by the Watermark inserter (201), the uncompressed content received from the Decoder by watermarking data initialized by the unique identifier.
Brief description of the figures The present invention will be better understood thanks to the attached figures in which:
- Figure 1 illustrates a Watermarking on Un-Compressed Content just after the Video Decoder, - Figure 2 illustrates a Watermarking on Un-compressed Content into the HDMI, - Figure3 illustrates an exchange of messages between the SE and the SA, - Figure 4 illustrates an alternate embodiment of the exchange of messages between the SE and the SA.
Detailed description Conditional access data comprises a content (video or audio data or combination thereof) encrypted by one or a plurality of content keys, and comprises CAS data, i.e. data allowing to decrypt the encrypted content. The CAS data also comprises conditional access conditions associated with the content describing the condition to be met by the decoder to decrypt the content. The conditional
3 access data are broadcasted, unicasted or sent on request of the recipient.
The CAS Data can also comprise a watermark instruction to be passed to the Watermarking Inserter.
Once received in the decoder, the CAS data are extracted from the conditional access data and forwarded to a Conditional Access module (CAS in figure 1 and 2), in charge of the enforcement of the security measures defined in the conditional access conditions. This module can have several forms, i.e. a physical module or a software module. A well known solution is in the form of a smart card with interface 7816, but the present invention applies to other form factor or interface such as USB, LVDH, PCMCIA. The module CAS can be also integrated into the secure element SE.
This module comprises the key necessary to decrypt the CAS data and to extract from the CAS data the key (CW) to decrypt the content. In addition to the key, this module extracts the conditions (usage rules) and transfers the key and the conditions to a secure element SE.
It is to be noted that the communication between the CAS and the SE is encrypted and protected by a key initialized on both elements.
The messages exchanged between the CAS and the SE could be signed, i.e. a digest of the payload (e.g. watermarking instruction, the random number and the identifier) is calculated by the CAS
(using for example hash function) and encrypted by a signature key to produce the signature. This signature is added into the message and the message is preferably encrypted by a transmission key.
On the reception side, the message is first decrypted and the digest is calculated on the payload.
With the key corresponding with the signature key, the received signature is decrypted and the result is compared with the calculated digest. If both values are the same, the message is authentic. The signature key can be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key (public/private keys).
In a conventional environment, the key obtained by the CAS is transferred to the descrambler DSC in charge of decrypting the content. Once the content is decrypted, the content is processed by a decoder to produce an uncompressed content. A watermarking module WMK receives the uncompressed content and applies the watermark, this watermark being parameterized by a unique identifier of the decoder.
The proposed solution is to have a secure link between the secure element (SE) 200 (refer to Figure 1) provided by the CAS environment and the un-compressed domain watermarking element 201.
According to Figure 1, the SE 200 relays the CAS data, which introduces the explicit dependence between the successful descrambling operation and the activity of the block located after the decoder, namely the Watermarking Inserter.
The SE 200 also supplies other sensitive information (like a unique ID of a device, the CAS module ID, an ID contained in the CAS data or keys). This information, if transmitted in clear to the
The CAS Data can also comprise a watermark instruction to be passed to the Watermarking Inserter.
Once received in the decoder, the CAS data are extracted from the conditional access data and forwarded to a Conditional Access module (CAS in figure 1 and 2), in charge of the enforcement of the security measures defined in the conditional access conditions. This module can have several forms, i.e. a physical module or a software module. A well known solution is in the form of a smart card with interface 7816, but the present invention applies to other form factor or interface such as USB, LVDH, PCMCIA. The module CAS can be also integrated into the secure element SE.
This module comprises the key necessary to decrypt the CAS data and to extract from the CAS data the key (CW) to decrypt the content. In addition to the key, this module extracts the conditions (usage rules) and transfers the key and the conditions to a secure element SE.
It is to be noted that the communication between the CAS and the SE is encrypted and protected by a key initialized on both elements.
The messages exchanged between the CAS and the SE could be signed, i.e. a digest of the payload (e.g. watermarking instruction, the random number and the identifier) is calculated by the CAS
(using for example hash function) and encrypted by a signature key to produce the signature. This signature is added into the message and the message is preferably encrypted by a transmission key.
On the reception side, the message is first decrypted and the digest is calculated on the payload.
With the key corresponding with the signature key, the received signature is decrypted and the result is compared with the calculated digest. If both values are the same, the message is authentic. The signature key can be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key (public/private keys).
In a conventional environment, the key obtained by the CAS is transferred to the descrambler DSC in charge of decrypting the content. Once the content is decrypted, the content is processed by a decoder to produce an uncompressed content. A watermarking module WMK receives the uncompressed content and applies the watermark, this watermark being parameterized by a unique identifier of the decoder.
The proposed solution is to have a secure link between the secure element (SE) 200 (refer to Figure 1) provided by the CAS environment and the un-compressed domain watermarking element 201.
According to Figure 1, the SE 200 relays the CAS data, which introduces the explicit dependence between the successful descrambling operation and the activity of the block located after the decoder, namely the Watermarking Inserter.
The SE 200 also supplies other sensitive information (like a unique ID of a device, the CAS module ID, an ID contained in the CAS data or keys). This information, if transmitted in clear to the
4 Watermarking Inserter could be intercepted and modified. This is why the connection between these two blocks should be secured.
The Watermarking Inserter 201 is here to insert an information (the watermark payload) into the audio and/or video content. This payload is dependant of the unique identifier received from the CAS. It can then be bypassed by a hacker (the audio and/or video content is not sent to the watermarking bloc), or the payload (the watermark data) can be modified. This watermarking inserter can be positioned just after the decoder, or along the line of transmission between the decoder and the final display, like the HDMI transmitter, or the TV screen.
The proposed solution ensures:
- A way to ensure the Watermarking Inserter 201 is not bypassed and therefore activated if decided by the CAS. If the Watermarking Inserter 201 doesn't seem to be activated, then the SE 200 stops descrambling the content.
- A way to ensure communication between SE 200 and Watermarking Inserter 201, so that the Watermarking Inserter 201 accesses with certitude to the information it requires at a moment T such as the necessary payload to insert into the content. The SE 200 manages all or part of the computations on the information to be inserted. Generally speaking this information is: the Unique Identifier (UID) representing the decoder or the CAS module, a time stamp (T), and any other information of interest like a specific information (SID) on the content itself. From this data a payload is computed before the insertion into the content. This operation aims at protecting the payload against attacks or transmissions errors (computations through an ECC or an anti-collusion code like Tardos code).
Then all or part of this payload has to be used by the watermarking system to be inserted into the content.
The proposed solution is to add a Secure Activation block 202 which activates/deactivates the Watermarking Inserter 201. For security reason, it is recommended to implement the Secure Activation block 202 and the Watermarking Inserter 201 just after the Video decoder and in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The access between the Secure Activation block 202 (SA 202) and the Watermarking Inserter 201 is not accessible from the host CPU of the client device.
The Secure Activation block 202 is controlled by some registers accessible, for example, either via a private bus as illustrated in Figure 1 or via a generic bus (AMBA APB) as illustrated in Figure 2. The Secure Activation block 202 is able to at least enable/disable two features:
watermarking on video content, watermarking on audio content, or combination thereof. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the Secure Activation block 202 and the Watermarking Inserter 201 are connected on the video content.
The Watermarking Inserter 201 is here to insert an information (the watermark payload) into the audio and/or video content. This payload is dependant of the unique identifier received from the CAS. It can then be bypassed by a hacker (the audio and/or video content is not sent to the watermarking bloc), or the payload (the watermark data) can be modified. This watermarking inserter can be positioned just after the decoder, or along the line of transmission between the decoder and the final display, like the HDMI transmitter, or the TV screen.
The proposed solution ensures:
- A way to ensure the Watermarking Inserter 201 is not bypassed and therefore activated if decided by the CAS. If the Watermarking Inserter 201 doesn't seem to be activated, then the SE 200 stops descrambling the content.
- A way to ensure communication between SE 200 and Watermarking Inserter 201, so that the Watermarking Inserter 201 accesses with certitude to the information it requires at a moment T such as the necessary payload to insert into the content. The SE 200 manages all or part of the computations on the information to be inserted. Generally speaking this information is: the Unique Identifier (UID) representing the decoder or the CAS module, a time stamp (T), and any other information of interest like a specific information (SID) on the content itself. From this data a payload is computed before the insertion into the content. This operation aims at protecting the payload against attacks or transmissions errors (computations through an ECC or an anti-collusion code like Tardos code).
Then all or part of this payload has to be used by the watermarking system to be inserted into the content.
The proposed solution is to add a Secure Activation block 202 which activates/deactivates the Watermarking Inserter 201. For security reason, it is recommended to implement the Secure Activation block 202 and the Watermarking Inserter 201 just after the Video decoder and in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The access between the Secure Activation block 202 (SA 202) and the Watermarking Inserter 201 is not accessible from the host CPU of the client device.
The Secure Activation block 202 is controlled by some registers accessible, for example, either via a private bus as illustrated in Figure 1 or via a generic bus (AMBA APB) as illustrated in Figure 2. The Secure Activation block 202 is able to at least enable/disable two features:
watermarking on video content, watermarking on audio content, or combination thereof. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, the Secure Activation block 202 and the Watermarking Inserter 201 are connected on the video content.
5 The main concept relies on the fact that the Secure Activation block 202 has to receive a message called Activation Message (AM) from the SE 200 to activate/deactivate the different features. The AM is also used to transmit the payload necessary to mark the content. Another feature carried out by the Secure Activation block 202 is a secure link with the SE 200 to exchange sensitive information.
For example, the SE 200 could transmit secure settings to the Secure Activation block 202. Then the Secure Activation block 202 will transmit them to the Watermarking bloc 201.
The principal attack is that a person records this message and therefore is able to activate or deactivate these features as he wishes. This attack is called "replay attack".
The second attack is that an attacker tries to modify the content of the message. Therefore when the SE 200 generates an AM, it shall be encrypted and signed for the Secure Activation block 202. In addition, the AM shall embed a random value coming from a True Random Number Generator (TRNG). An example of the AM is illustrated in Figure 3. It shall at least contain a random value, the activation flag, the payload (containing the UID), the payload size and the signature.
Figure 2 describes an example where a device is using the HDMI and the Watermarking bloc 201 on the video must be activated. The Conditional Access System (CAS) will receive CAS data. According to this example, the CAS Data are in the form of Entitlement Control Messages ECM. These ECMS
contain an encrypted CW and its usage rules. The encrypted CW and its usage rules are transmitted to the SE 200. The usage rules indicate to the SE 200 that the current video content must be watermarked.
This SE 202 and the SA 202 share a common key stored in each device at an initialization stage. This key will be used to encrypt the messages exchanged so that the content cannot be accessed by a third party. Since the communication between these two elements can be intercepted by a third party, it is important to implement a mutual authentication protocol. Each party should be sure to talk to the other party and not with a simulator.
The message transmitted to the Secure Activation module (202) contains a watermark instruction. In case of an activation, the identifier to be embedded into the content is included in this message.
Then the following steps could be executed in accordance with the figure 3.
1. The CAS receives an ECM containing an encrypted Control Word (CW) and its usage rules or access conditions.
2. The SE 200 decrypts the CW and its usage rule. The usage rule says for instance that the content shall be decrypted using the DVB-CSA descrambler and the watermarking shall be activated on the video. At the same time, the SE 200 generates the Activation Message (AM) and add a
For example, the SE 200 could transmit secure settings to the Secure Activation block 202. Then the Secure Activation block 202 will transmit them to the Watermarking bloc 201.
The principal attack is that a person records this message and therefore is able to activate or deactivate these features as he wishes. This attack is called "replay attack".
The second attack is that an attacker tries to modify the content of the message. Therefore when the SE 200 generates an AM, it shall be encrypted and signed for the Secure Activation block 202. In addition, the AM shall embed a random value coming from a True Random Number Generator (TRNG). An example of the AM is illustrated in Figure 3. It shall at least contain a random value, the activation flag, the payload (containing the UID), the payload size and the signature.
Figure 2 describes an example where a device is using the HDMI and the Watermarking bloc 201 on the video must be activated. The Conditional Access System (CAS) will receive CAS data. According to this example, the CAS Data are in the form of Entitlement Control Messages ECM. These ECMS
contain an encrypted CW and its usage rules. The encrypted CW and its usage rules are transmitted to the SE 200. The usage rules indicate to the SE 200 that the current video content must be watermarked.
This SE 202 and the SA 202 share a common key stored in each device at an initialization stage. This key will be used to encrypt the messages exchanged so that the content cannot be accessed by a third party. Since the communication between these two elements can be intercepted by a third party, it is important to implement a mutual authentication protocol. Each party should be sure to talk to the other party and not with a simulator.
The message transmitted to the Secure Activation module (202) contains a watermark instruction. In case of an activation, the identifier to be embedded into the content is included in this message.
Then the following steps could be executed in accordance with the figure 3.
1. The CAS receives an ECM containing an encrypted Control Word (CW) and its usage rules or access conditions.
2. The SE 200 decrypts the CW and its usage rule. The usage rule says for instance that the content shall be decrypted using the DVB-CSA descrambler and the watermarking shall be activated on the video. At the same time, the SE 200 generates the Activation Message (AM) and add a
6 variable value. This variable value should change for each message generated by the Secure Activation block 202. It could be a random value, a counter incremented at each message or a time stamp. This value is stored into the SE 200. The AM is encrypted and signed.
Then the AM is sent to the Secure Activation block 202.
3. The Secure Activation block 202 decrypts and authenticates the AM. If the authentication succeeds, the Secure Activation block 202 checks if the variable value to determine if the received value has changed compared to a previous value. In case of a counter, the received variable value should be higher than the last received variable value. The same applies for a time stamp, the new received time stamp should be in advance versus the time stamp received in a previous message. For a random value, the Secure Activation block 202 should store all previously received random values (or at least a predefined number e.g. the last 20) in order to compare the one received with the one contained in the message.
In case that the variable value does not comply with one of the above mentioned rules, the message is rejected. Otherwise, the Secure Activation block 202 activates the features depending on the content of the AM. After the authentication, the Secure Activation block generates an Acknowledge Message (ACKM) which is encrypted and signed. This ACKM is sent back to the SE
200. It shall at least contain the same random value as the AM, and could also contain the activation flag, the payload (UID), the payload size, the ACK flag and the signature. The random number is then stored by the Secure Activation block 202 in order to avoid that the same message is presented later.
4. The SE 200 decrypts and authenticates the ACKM. The ACKM shall contain the same random value than the one in the AM. If the ACKM is not correctly authenticated, not received on time (using a watchdog), or the random value is not the same than into the previous AM, the transfer of the watermark instruction is considered as failed and the SE 202 stops providing the CW to the descrambler.
It is common that the Secure Activation block 202 does not comprise permanent memory. It is therefore not possible to store the last variable value for an accurate anti-replay verification. This is why the figure 4 illustrates another method. It is to be noted that this method can be applied even if the SE 202 contains permanent memory.
1. The SE 200 sends a first message (AM) to the Secure Activation block 202 informing that an instruction message will be transmitted. At that stage, the first message can be encrypted or in clear.
The message can contain a signature allowing the SA 202 to authenticate the first message. In the example of the figure 4, the message is an activation message AM.
Then the AM is sent to the Secure Activation block 202.
3. The Secure Activation block 202 decrypts and authenticates the AM. If the authentication succeeds, the Secure Activation block 202 checks if the variable value to determine if the received value has changed compared to a previous value. In case of a counter, the received variable value should be higher than the last received variable value. The same applies for a time stamp, the new received time stamp should be in advance versus the time stamp received in a previous message. For a random value, the Secure Activation block 202 should store all previously received random values (or at least a predefined number e.g. the last 20) in order to compare the one received with the one contained in the message.
In case that the variable value does not comply with one of the above mentioned rules, the message is rejected. Otherwise, the Secure Activation block 202 activates the features depending on the content of the AM. After the authentication, the Secure Activation block generates an Acknowledge Message (ACKM) which is encrypted and signed. This ACKM is sent back to the SE
200. It shall at least contain the same random value as the AM, and could also contain the activation flag, the payload (UID), the payload size, the ACK flag and the signature. The random number is then stored by the Secure Activation block 202 in order to avoid that the same message is presented later.
4. The SE 200 decrypts and authenticates the ACKM. The ACKM shall contain the same random value than the one in the AM. If the ACKM is not correctly authenticated, not received on time (using a watchdog), or the random value is not the same than into the previous AM, the transfer of the watermark instruction is considered as failed and the SE 202 stops providing the CW to the descrambler.
It is common that the Secure Activation block 202 does not comprise permanent memory. It is therefore not possible to store the last variable value for an accurate anti-replay verification. This is why the figure 4 illustrates another method. It is to be noted that this method can be applied even if the SE 202 contains permanent memory.
1. The SE 200 sends a first message (AM) to the Secure Activation block 202 informing that an instruction message will be transmitted. At that stage, the first message can be encrypted or in clear.
The message can contain a signature allowing the SA 202 to authenticate the first message. In the example of the figure 4, the message is an activation message AM.
7 2. In case that the message is encrypted and signed, the SA 202 decrypt and verifies the signature. If the signature is correct, the SA 202 then generates a random number X and sends a second message ACKM containing the random number X to the SE 200. The random number X is stored by the SA 202. At that stage, the second message can be encrypted or in clear. This second message is preferably encrypted and contains a signature to ensure that only a genuine SA 202 can generate it.
3. While the SE 202 receives and decrypts (if encrypted) the message ACKM, the SE 202 extracts the random number. With this random number and the watermark instruction, the SE 202 prepares a message, encrypts and signs it. In case that the instruction concerns the disabling of the watermark on the content, this message does not need to contain an identifier. This message is sent to the SA
202.
4. The SA 202 then decrypts and verifies the signature. If the signature is correct, it verifies also that the random number X is the same as the one stored previously. If it differs, the message is rejected. After having passed these controls, the watermark instruction contained in the message can be executed.
5. The SA 202 then prepares a final acknowledgment message FACKM to confirm the execution of the watermark instruction. This message will contain the random number X
and is encrypted as well.
6. The SE 200 receives the FACKM and once decrypted, extracts the status of the SA 202. If the SA 202 confirms the successful completion of the watermark instruction, the SE
2002 can then transfer the content key to the Descrambler.
3. While the SE 202 receives and decrypts (if encrypted) the message ACKM, the SE 202 extracts the random number. With this random number and the watermark instruction, the SE 202 prepares a message, encrypts and signs it. In case that the instruction concerns the disabling of the watermark on the content, this message does not need to contain an identifier. This message is sent to the SA
202.
4. The SA 202 then decrypts and verifies the signature. If the signature is correct, it verifies also that the random number X is the same as the one stored previously. If it differs, the message is rejected. After having passed these controls, the watermark instruction contained in the message can be executed.
5. The SA 202 then prepares a final acknowledgment message FACKM to confirm the execution of the watermark instruction. This message will contain the random number X
and is encrypted as well.
6. The SE 200 receives the FACKM and once decrypted, extracts the status of the SA 202. If the SA 202 confirms the successful completion of the watermark instruction, the SE
2002 can then transfer the content key to the Descrambler.
Claims (6)
1. Method to watermark an uncompressed content received at a client device in a compressed form and encrypted by at least one content key (CW), said content key (CW) as well as watermark instruction forming CAS data, said CAS Data being encrypted by a transmission key and comprising at least one signature to authenticate the CAS Data, said client device comprising :
- A Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of the CAS Data, - a Descrambler (DSC) having an input to receive the encrypted compressed content and an output to produce a decrypted compressed content, - a decoder to convert the decrypted compressed content into uncompressed content, - a Watermark inserter (201) connected to the output of the Decoder, - a Secure Activation module (202) connected with the Watermark inserter (201), - a Secure Element (SE 200) connected with the Watermark inserter (201) and the Secure Activation module (202), said method comprising the following steps :
- receiving the CAS Data, - decrypting by the Conditional Access Module (CAS) the CAS Data with the transmission key, - verifying the signature of the CAS Data, and if the signature is valid, - transferring the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202), - transferring the content key (CW) to the descrambler (103) only if the transfer of the watermark instruction was successful, - transferring the watermark instruction to the Watermark inserter (201), - enabling or disabling watermarking by the Watermark inserter (201) of the uncompressed content received from the Decoder.
- A Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of the CAS Data, - a Descrambler (DSC) having an input to receive the encrypted compressed content and an output to produce a decrypted compressed content, - a decoder to convert the decrypted compressed content into uncompressed content, - a Watermark inserter (201) connected to the output of the Decoder, - a Secure Activation module (202) connected with the Watermark inserter (201), - a Secure Element (SE 200) connected with the Watermark inserter (201) and the Secure Activation module (202), said method comprising the following steps :
- receiving the CAS Data, - decrypting by the Conditional Access Module (CAS) the CAS Data with the transmission key, - verifying the signature of the CAS Data, and if the signature is valid, - transferring the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202), - transferring the content key (CW) to the descrambler (103) only if the transfer of the watermark instruction was successful, - transferring the watermark instruction to the Watermark inserter (201), - enabling or disabling watermarking by the Watermark inserter (201) of the uncompressed content received from the Decoder.
2. Method of claim 1, wherein the transfer of the watermark instruction from the Secure Element (SE 200) to the Secure Activation module (202) comprising the steps of :
- requesting by the Secure Element (SE 200) a random number (X) from the Secure Activation module (202), - generating this random number (X) by the Secure Activation module (202), storing it and sending it to the Secure Element (SE 200), - preparing by the Secure Element (SE 200) a message containing at least the watermark instruction, the random number, and a signature on both the watermark instruction and the random number, - sending this message to the Secure Activation module (202), - verifying by the Secure Activation module (202) if the signature is authentic and if the random number is the same as the one sent previously, in the positive event, accepting the watermark instruction, and - sending a final acknowledgment message to the Secure Element (SE 200) in order to inform the Secure Element (SE 200) of the successful completion of the transfer .
- requesting by the Secure Element (SE 200) a random number (X) from the Secure Activation module (202), - generating this random number (X) by the Secure Activation module (202), storing it and sending it to the Secure Element (SE 200), - preparing by the Secure Element (SE 200) a message containing at least the watermark instruction, the random number, and a signature on both the watermark instruction and the random number, - sending this message to the Secure Activation module (202), - verifying by the Secure Activation module (202) if the signature is authentic and if the random number is the same as the one sent previously, in the positive event, accepting the watermark instruction, and - sending a final acknowledgment message to the Secure Element (SE 200) in order to inform the Secure Element (SE 200) of the successful completion of the transfer .
3. Method of claim 1 or 2, wherein the Secure Activation module (202) and the Watermark inserter (201) are located in a Trusted environment, the connection between these two elements is not accessible outside of the Trusted environment.
4. Method of one of the claims 1 to 3, wherein the CAS Data comprises a unique identifier, said identifier being transferred to the Secure Activation module (202) and to the Watermark inserter (201) together with the watermark instruction while enabling the watermarking, said identifier defining a payload to watermark the content.
5. Client device comprising a Conditional Access Module (CAS) in charge of receiving and decrypting CAS Data to obtain a watermark instruction and a content key (CW), a Descrambler (DSC) having an input to receive an encrypted compressed content and an output to produce a decrypted compressed content based on the content key, a decoder to convert the decrypted compressed content into uncompressed content, a Watermark inserter (201) connected to the output of the Decoder to insert a watermark based on the watermark instruction, a Secure Activation module (202) connected with the Watermark inserter (201), a Secure Element (SE 200) connected with the Conditional Access Module (CAS), the Descrambler (DSC) and the Secure Activation module (202), characterized in that, the Conditional Access Module (CAS) has means to verify a signature of the CAS
data and in case that the signature is valid, has means to transfer the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202) via the Secure Element (SE200), said Secure Element (SE200) has means to verify that the watermark instructions was successfully transferred to the watermark inserter, and in case of successful transfer, has means to transfer the content key to the descrambler (103).
data and in case that the signature is valid, has means to transfer the watermark instruction to the Secure Activation module (202) via the Secure Element (SE200), said Secure Element (SE200) has means to verify that the watermark instructions was successfully transferred to the watermark inserter, and in case of successful transfer, has means to transfer the content key to the descrambler (103).
6. Client device of the claim 5, wherein the Secure Activation module (202) comprises a random number generator able to produce a random number (X), said Secure Activation module (202) generating, storing and sending said random number to the Secure Element (SE
200) which prepares a message containing at least the watermark instruction, the random number, and a signature on both the watermark instruction and the random number, said Secure Activation module (202) having means to verify if the signature is authentic and if the random number is the same as the one stored, in the positive event, accepting the watermark instruction and sending a final acknowledgment message to the Secure Element (SE 200) in order to inform the Secure Element (SE
200) of the successful completion of the transfer.
200) which prepares a message containing at least the watermark instruction, the random number, and a signature on both the watermark instruction and the random number, said Secure Activation module (202) having means to verify if the signature is authentic and if the random number is the same as the one stored, in the positive event, accepting the watermark instruction and sending a final acknowledgment message to the Secure Element (SE 200) in order to inform the Secure Element (SE
200) of the successful completion of the transfer.
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| EP13165591.2A EP2797334A1 (en) | 2013-04-26 | 2013-04-26 | Method and device to embed watermark in uncompressed video data |
| EP13165591.2 | 2013-04-26 | ||
| PCT/EP2014/057342 WO2014173700A1 (en) | 2013-04-26 | 2014-04-11 | Method and device to embed watermark in uncompressed video data |
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| CA2908395A1 true CA2908395A1 (en) | 2014-10-30 |
| CA2908395C CA2908395C (en) | 2021-10-12 |
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| CN105721951B (en) * | 2016-01-28 | 2018-12-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of method and device of video watermark processing |
| US10757474B2 (en) * | 2018-04-27 | 2020-08-25 | Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment Llc | Method and apparatus for protecting data via application of corrupting function and complimentary restitution at video processing endpoints |
| CN109447886B (en) * | 2018-10-08 | 2023-04-11 | 陕西师范大学 | Binding to EMD-2 1 Embedded multi-carrier secret map separate storage method with recovery |
| CN112383798B (en) * | 2020-11-05 | 2022-05-20 | 国微集团(深圳)有限公司 | Method, system and device for realizing watermark function on CAM |
| US11842422B2 (en) * | 2021-04-30 | 2023-12-12 | The Nielsen Company (Us), Llc | Methods and apparatus to extend a timestamp range supported by a watermark without breaking backwards compatibility |
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| US9794646B2 (en) | 2017-10-17 |
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| BR112015027099A2 (en) | 2017-07-25 |
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| WO2014173700A1 (en) | 2014-10-30 |
| US9602890B2 (en) | 2017-03-21 |
| KR102140356B1 (en) | 2020-08-03 |
| CN105191332B (en) | 2018-06-01 |
| BR112015027099B1 (en) | 2023-02-07 |
| SG11201508179YA (en) | 2015-11-27 |
| MX2015014885A (en) | 2016-03-07 |
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