CA2371137A1 - Secure distribution and protection of encryption key information - Google Patents
Secure distribution and protection of encryption key information Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CA2371137A1 CA2371137A1 CA002371137A CA2371137A CA2371137A1 CA 2371137 A1 CA2371137 A1 CA 2371137A1 CA 002371137 A CA002371137 A CA 002371137A CA 2371137 A CA2371137 A CA 2371137A CA 2371137 A1 CA2371137 A1 CA 2371137A1
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- protecting circuit
- key
- certificate
- cert
- encryption key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims 8
- 230000002085 persistent effect Effects 0.000 claims 2
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims 2
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Abstract
The invention relates to secure distribution of a private key (K) from a distributing unit (1) to a receiving unit (2), and is based on providing each of the distributing unit and the receiving unit which a protecting circuit holding an original private key unique for the protecting circuit. The protecting circuit (20) of the receiving unit (2) is associated with a certificate (CERT 2) holding information on the type of the protecting circuit. The protecting circuit (10) of the distributing unit requests this certificate to verify the authenticity by using a public key, of a certificate authority, stored in the protecting circuit (10). Next, the protecting circuit (10) determines, based on the type information of the certificate, whether the protecting circuit (20) of the receiving unit represents a type of circuit that is acceptable for protecting the private key (K) to be distributed. If the protecting circuit is found to be acceptable, the private key is encrypted and transmitted thereto. The received key is decrypted and stored in the protecting circuit of the receiving unit. In this manner, the private key is protected during transfer and may be distributed to and securely protected in one or more receiving units.
Claims (22)
1. A key distributing system comprising a distributing unit (1) and a receiving unit (2) interconnected by a communication link (3), said distributing unit (1) having encryption key information (K) to be distributed to said receiving unit (2), wherein:
said distributing unit (1) includes a first protecting circuit (10) holding a public key of a trusted certificate authority;
said receiving unit (2) includes a second protecting circuit (20) holding an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) unique for said second protecting circuit, said second protecting circuit being associated with a certificate (CERT 2) that includes information on the type of said second protecting circuit (20);
said first protecting circuit (10) includes:
- means for requesting the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit;
- means (13) for determining, by means of the public key of said certificate authority, whether the requested certificate (CERT 2) is authentic;
- means (13) for determining based on the type information of said certificate (CERT 2) whether said second protecting circuit (20) represents one of a number of predetermined types of circuits that are acceptable for protecting said encryption key information (K), provided said certificate (CERT
said distributing unit (1) includes a first protecting circuit (10) holding a public key of a trusted certificate authority;
said receiving unit (2) includes a second protecting circuit (20) holding an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) unique for said second protecting circuit, said second protecting circuit being associated with a certificate (CERT 2) that includes information on the type of said second protecting circuit (20);
said first protecting circuit (10) includes:
- means for requesting the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit;
- means (13) for determining, by means of the public key of said certificate authority, whether the requested certificate (CERT 2) is authentic;
- means (13) for determining based on the type information of said certificate (CERT 2) whether said second protecting circuit (20) represents one of a number of predetermined types of circuits that are acceptable for protecting said encryption key information (K), provided said certificate (CERT
2) is determined to be authentic;
- means (12) for encrypting said encryption key information (K) provided said second protecting circuit is determined to be acceptable; and - means (15) for transmitting said encrypted encryption key information (K) to said second protecting circuit (20) via said communication link (3); and said second protecting circuit (20) includes:
- means (22) for decrypting said encrypted encryption key information (K); and - means (21) for storing said encryption key information (K).
2. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said encrypting means (12) encrypts said encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and said decrypting means (22) decrypts said encrypted encryption key information (K) by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
- means (12) for encrypting said encryption key information (K) provided said second protecting circuit is determined to be acceptable; and - means (15) for transmitting said encrypted encryption key information (K) to said second protecting circuit (20) via said communication link (3); and said second protecting circuit (20) includes:
- means (22) for decrypting said encrypted encryption key information (K); and - means (21) for storing said encryption key information (K).
2. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said encrypting means (12) encrypts said encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and said decrypting means (22) decrypts said encrypted encryption key information (K) by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
3. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said first protecting circuit (10) holds an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) unique for said first protecting circuit, and is associated with a certificate (CERT
1) that includes a public key of said first protecting circuit (10);
said second protecting circuit (20) comprises means for requesting the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and further holds a public key of a trusted certificate authority for verifying that the requested certificate (CERT 1) is authentic;
said encrypting means (12) two-way encrypts said encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT
2) of said second protecting circuit (20) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of said first protecting circuit (10); and said decrypting means (22) two-way decrypts said encrypted encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and the private key (PRIVATE
KEY
2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
1) that includes a public key of said first protecting circuit (10);
said second protecting circuit (20) comprises means for requesting the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and further holds a public key of a trusted certificate authority for verifying that the requested certificate (CERT 1) is authentic;
said encrypting means (12) two-way encrypts said encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT
2) of said second protecting circuit (20) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of said first protecting circuit (10); and said decrypting means (22) two-way decrypts said encrypted encryption key information (K) by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and the private key (PRIVATE
KEY
2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
4. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said encryption key information (K) comprises a private key or a representation thereof.
5. A key distribution system according to claim 4, wherein a certificate (C) associated with said private key is transferred from said distributing unit (1) to said receiving unit (2).
6. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein each one of said acceptable types of circuits handles said encryption key according to a number of predetermined rules.
7. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein an acceptable type of circuit holds said encryption key information (K) within the protecting circuit.
8. A key distribution system according to claim 7, wherein an acceptable type of circuit further deletes the encryption key information (K) stored therein if it receives a delete request from the unit that distributed the encryption key information.
9. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said encryption key information (K) comprises a symmetric key, and said first protecting circuit (10) includes:
- means (12) for encrypting a private key by said symmetric key; and - means (15) for transmitting said symmetrically encrypted private key to said second protecting circuit (20); and said second protecting circuit (20) includes:
- means (22) for decrypting said symmetrically encrypted private key by said symmetric key; and - means (21) for storing said private key.
- means (12) for encrypting a private key by said symmetric key; and - means (15) for transmitting said symmetrically encrypted private key to said second protecting circuit (20); and said second protecting circuit (20) includes:
- means (22) for decrypting said symmetrically encrypted private key by said symmetric key; and - means (21) for storing said private key.
10. A key distribution system according to claim 3, wherein said second protecting circuit (20) further comprises:
means (21) for storing the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) provided the certificate is verified as authentic; and means for deleting the encryption key information (K) stored therein in response to a delete request signed by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of the first protecting circuit (10), said delete request being authenticated by means of the public key comprised in the stored certificate (CERT 1).
means (21) for storing the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) provided the certificate is verified as authentic; and means for deleting the encryption key information (K) stored therein in response to a delete request signed by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of the first protecting circuit (10), said delete request being authenticated by means of the public key comprised in the stored certificate (CERT 1).
11. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said first protecting circuit (10) has an engine (12) for asymmetric cryptography and a persistent memory (11) for storing the encryption key information (K) to be distributed, the public key of said trusted certificate authority, as well as an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) unique for said first protecting circuit (10).
12. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein said second protecting circuit (20) has an engine (22) for asymmetric cryptography and a persistent memory (21) for storing the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit, the received encryption key information (K), as well as a public key of a trusted certificate authority.
13. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein the requested certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20) is stored in said key distributing unit (1).
14. A key distribution system according to claim 1, wherein the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20) has information on the identify of the second protecting circuit, and said key distributing unit (1) stores the identity of said second protecting circuit (20).
15. A method for protected distribution of encryption key information (K) from a key distributing unit (1) to a key receiving unit (2) via a communication link (3), comprising the steps of:
providing said distributing unit (1) with a first protecting circuit (10) holding a public key of a trusted certificate authority;
providing said receiving unit (2) with a second protecting circuit (20) holding an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) unique for said second protecting circuit;
associating said second protecting circuit (20) of said receiving unit (2) with a certificate (CERT 2) having information on the type of said second protecting circuit (20);
said first protecting circuit (10) requesting the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and determining, by using the public key of said certificate authority, whether the requested certificate (CERT 2) is authentic, and determining, based on the type information of said certificate (CERT 2), whether said second protecting circuit (20) represents a type of circuit that is acceptable for protecting said encryption key information (K);
provided said requested certificate (CERT 2) is determined to be authentic and said second protecting circuit (20) is determined to be acceptable:
encrypting said encryption key information (K) in said first protecting circuit (10);
transmitting said encrypted encryption key information (K) from said first protecting circuit (10) to said second protecting circuit (20) via said communication link (3);
decrypting said encrypted encryption key information (K) in said second protecting circuit (20); and storing said encryption key information (K) in said second protecting circuit (20).
providing said distributing unit (1) with a first protecting circuit (10) holding a public key of a trusted certificate authority;
providing said receiving unit (2) with a second protecting circuit (20) holding an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) unique for said second protecting circuit;
associating said second protecting circuit (20) of said receiving unit (2) with a certificate (CERT 2) having information on the type of said second protecting circuit (20);
said first protecting circuit (10) requesting the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and determining, by using the public key of said certificate authority, whether the requested certificate (CERT 2) is authentic, and determining, based on the type information of said certificate (CERT 2), whether said second protecting circuit (20) represents a type of circuit that is acceptable for protecting said encryption key information (K);
provided said requested certificate (CERT 2) is determined to be authentic and said second protecting circuit (20) is determined to be acceptable:
encrypting said encryption key information (K) in said first protecting circuit (10);
transmitting said encrypted encryption key information (K) from said first protecting circuit (10) to said second protecting circuit (20) via said communication link (3);
decrypting said encrypted encryption key information (K) in said second protecting circuit (20); and storing said encryption key information (K) in said second protecting circuit (20).
16. A method according to claim 15, wherein said encryption key information (K) is encrypted by the public key comprised in the requested certificate (CERT
2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and said encrypted encryption key information (K) is decrypted by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
2) of said second protecting circuit (20), and said encrypted encryption key information (K) is decrypted by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
17. A method according to claim 15, wherein said first protecting circuit ( 10) holds an original private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) unique for said first protecting circuit, and is associated with a certificate (CERT 1) that includes a public key of said first protecting circuit;
said second protecting circuit (20) requests the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10), and further holds a public key of a trusted certificate authority for verifying that the requested certificate (CERT 1) is authentic;
said encryption key information (K) is two-way encrypted by the public key comprised in the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of said first protecting circuit (10); and said encrypted encryption key information (K) is two-way decrypted by the public key comprised in the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
said second protecting circuit (20) requests the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10), and further holds a public key of a trusted certificate authority for verifying that the requested certificate (CERT 1) is authentic;
said encryption key information (K) is two-way encrypted by the public key comprised in the certificate (CERT 2) of said second protecting circuit (20) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of said first protecting circuit (10); and said encrypted encryption key information (K) is two-way decrypted by the public key comprised in the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) and the private key (PRIVATE KEY 2) of said second protecting circuit (20).
18. A method according to claim 15, wherein said encryption key information (K) comprises a private key or a representation thereof.
19. A method according to claim 15, wherein an acceptable type of circuit handles said encryption key according to a number of predetermined rules.
20. A method according to claim 15, wherein an acceptable type of circuit holds said encryption key information (K) within the protecting circuit.
21. A method according to claim 17, wherein said second protecting circuit stores the certificate (CERT 1) of said first protecting circuit (10) provided the certificate is verified as authentic, and deletes the encryption key information (K) stored therein in response to a delete request signed by the private key (PRIVATE KEY 1) of said first protecting circuit (10), said delete request being authenticated by means of the public key comprised in the stored certificate (CERT 1).
22. A method according to claim 15, wherein said encryption key information (K) comprises a symmetric encryption key, which is subsequently used for securely distributing a private asymmetric encryption key from said first protecting circuit (10) to said second protecting circuit (20).
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| SE9901671A SE514105C2 (en) | 1999-05-07 | 1999-05-07 | Secure distribution and protection of encryption key information |
| SE9901671-9 | 1999-05-07 | ||
| PCT/SE2000/000537 WO2000069113A1 (en) | 1999-05-07 | 2000-03-20 | Secure distribution and protection of encryption key information |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2371137A1 true CA2371137A1 (en) | 2000-11-16 |
| CA2371137C CA2371137C (en) | 2010-05-18 |
Family
ID=20415516
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA2371137A Expired - Lifetime CA2371137C (en) | 1999-05-07 | 2000-03-20 | Secure distribution and protection of encryption key information |
Country Status (9)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US6711263B1 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP1198922B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JP4638990B2 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU4156000A (en) |
| BR (1) | BR0010364A (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2371137C (en) |
| DE (1) | DE60023705T2 (en) |
| SE (1) | SE514105C2 (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2000069113A1 (en) |
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- 2000-03-20 DE DE60023705T patent/DE60023705T2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
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- 2000-03-20 AU AU41560/00A patent/AU4156000A/en not_active Abandoned
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- 2000-03-20 JP JP2000617596A patent/JP4638990B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2000-03-20 CA CA2371137A patent/CA2371137C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-04-07 US US09/544,892 patent/US6711263B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
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| CA2371137C (en) | 2010-05-18 |
| DE60023705D1 (en) | 2005-12-08 |
| EP1198922B1 (en) | 2005-11-02 |
| SE514105C2 (en) | 2001-01-08 |
| SE9901671L (en) | 2000-11-08 |
| BR0010364A (en) | 2002-02-13 |
| EP1198922A1 (en) | 2002-04-24 |
| SE9901671D0 (en) | 1999-05-07 |
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